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Regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) are the entities responsible under 
international law for creating the conservation and management measures that apply to high 
seas fisheries. States must implement the conservation and management measures of RFMOs 
to which they are a party in their domestic legislation. One of the key challenges facing RFMOs 
globally is a lack of compliance by both contracting and non-contracting Parties.  
 
The current status of wild-capture global fisheries appears grim; with more than 80 per cent of 
global fisheries either fully exploited, or overexploited. The ability of RFMOs to enforce 
compliance with the conservation measures they administer is a critical factor in addressing the 
decline of high seas fish stocks. To date, the performance of RFMOs in this regard has been 
poor; with discontinuity between the compliance approaches of individual RFMOs cited as one of 
the key contributing factors to the challenges facing regional fisheries management. 
 
This thesis aims to make recommendations for reform to assist a specific group of RFMOs: 
RFMOs to which Australia is party (AusRFMOs). It investigates how AusRFMOs can become 
more adaptive and resilient to the challenges posed by non-compliance. It achieves this by 
testing the hypothesis that there are inconsistencies amongst AusRFMOs in their adoption of 
compliance measures.  
 
This thesis argues that private-sector engagement, where the entities being regulated by 
AusRFMOs become a part of the solution, represents a viable and practical solution to the 
problem of non-compliance. It is suggested that rather than continuing to focus on how legislative 
reform can strengthen regional fisheries management, private-sector engagement in the work of 

















Table 1. Private-sector engagement in RFMOs 
 
Table 2. AusRFMOs currently in existence 
 




Figure 1. A figure demonstrating the categories of compliance-related conservation measures 
which may be adopted by RFMOs to take action against non-compliance. 
 
Figure 2. A flow chart of private-sector compliance mechanisms which may be adopted by the 
















































































































































The ability of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) to enforce compliance 
with the conservation measures they administer is a critical factor in addressing the decline of 
high seas fish stocks.1  However the performance of RFMOs in this regard has been poor;2 with 
discontinuity between the compliance approaches of individual RFMOs cited as one of the key 
contributing factors to the challenges facing regional fisheries management.3   
 
The question of how to improve compliance in RFMOs has been widely addressed in literature to 
date,4 but almost exclusively from the perspective of how flag State compliance can be 
strengthened to improve the compliance of the RFMO overall.5 While it is indeed the flag State 
who is responsible for upholding compliance with the conservation measures of RFMOs,6 this 
thesis suggests that limiting discussion of regional fisheries compliance to consideration of flag 
State compliance alone is insufficient. 
 
The author’s thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Laws 
(Thesis)7 found that in 2011, a perceived lack of legitimacy associated with the compliance 
enforcement capacity of AusRFMOs had likely limited the ability of those organisation to enforce 
their mandate.8 This assessment was made following the collation of data regarding what 
compliance enforcement measures had been implemented by which AusRFMOs. The data 
demonstrated that there was little consistency when it came to the type of compliance measures 
each of the AusRFMOs had adopted.  
 
 
1 Denzil G. M. Miller & Elise Clark, ‘Promoting respons ble harvesting by mitigating IUU fishing: a three-block and OODA 
construct?’ (2016) Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/18366503.2016.1169625 
2 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1072, ‘Performance Reviews by Regional Fishery Bodies: Introduction, 
Summarise, Synthesis and Best Practices’, (2012) available online at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2637e/i2637e00.pdf> at 
56. 
3 Miller and Clark, above, n 1. 
4 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement' (2004) LI Netherlands International Law Review 
41. 
5 The principle of flag State jurisdiction is embodied in article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). 
6 Articles 63 and 64 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea require States to cooperate via regional and 
subregional organisations for the purposes of conserving and managing the marine living resources of the high seas. 
7 Elise Clark, ‘Compliance enforcement in regional fisheries management organisations to which Australia is a party’, 2011, 
thesis available online at: https://eprints.utas.edu.au  





This thesis, submitted in in fulfilment of the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy (Law), 
investigates whether, almost a decade later, this same group of organisations has been able to 
achieve a greater sense of unity across their collective compliance enforcement approaches. 
However the aim of this thesis is quite different. Where the findings demonstrate that there 
remain areas for improvement, it is suggested that an alternative vision of compliance 
enforcement; where the resource-user shares responsibility with the regulator to achieve 
compliance with conservation measures, holds significant promise in a modern regional fisheries 
climate.  
 
Recommendations are made for reforms which would assist AusRFMOs in improving industry 
perceptions of regulatory legitimacy and to assist AusRFMOs in how they may adapt their regime 
to encourage greater engagement by the resource-user in their compliance enforcement 
mandate.  This approach allows for the problem of RFMO compliance to be viewed as a 
challenge to both the flag State, and the resource user, under the principle of ‘shared 
responsibility’.9 It is suggested that the strongest regional regimes are those which extend 
beyond conventional notions of flag State compliance, to leverage compliance mechanisms 
which engage the resource-user and harness the opportunities they represent.   
 
It is well recognised that regulatory authorities should constantly be concerned with maintaining 
the involvement of participants in the regime they administer.10 As cooperative action between 
non-State actors and RFMOs increases, so does the strength of the argument that responsibility 
for regional fisheries failures is shared by both the State (often via the RFMO convention) and 
the resource-user.   
 
The term ‘shared responsibility’ has, to date, been rarely used in legal literature11 and the 
concept is one relatively new to the academic discourse.12 It is a term that refers to the 
underexplored problem of allocation of responsibilities amongst multiple states and other actors, 
and has particular relevance in international environmental law.13  The example of high seas fish 
stocks management is often cited as demonstrative of the principle of shared responsibility in 
that it poses challenging questions relating to who is responsible for the over-exploitation of high 
seas fish stocks.14 
 
 
9 Andre Nol kaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework’ (2013) 34 
Michigan Journal of International Law at 365. 
10 Ibid, 27. 
11 Ibid, 362. 
12 Andrew Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos, ‘Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the 
State of the Art’ (Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2014) 27. 
13  Ibid. 





The principle of shared responsibility provides the conceptual framework for the research 
methodology adopted in this thesis.  The premise of the thesis is that fishing industry 
associations, and other relevant organisations and individuals can and have assumed 
responsibility for regional fisheries failures. In doing so, they have also assumed a significant 
compliance responsibility.   
 
This thesis applies the principle of shared responsibility to suggest that AusRFMOs will benefit 
from increased engagement by the resource user in the regulatory compliance sphere.  As the 
frequency and variety of cooperative action between States and non-State actors increases, 
there is a need for new perspectives that help to address how RFMOs might develop approaches 
that better serve the interests of injured parties under regional fisheries regimes.15 
 
While it is indeed the flag State who is responsible for upholding compliance with the 
conservation measures of RFMOs,16 this thesis suggests that for the most part, attempts to 
enforce flag State responsibility have had less than the desired practical impact.  At law, flag 
States signatory to the LOSC may exercise their discretion to determine how, when and if they 
will regulate the activities of their vessels in the interests of environmental sustainability.  
 
This thesis is written in the context of an emerging trend of the resource-user adopting the role of 
the resource-regulator in the compliance sphere and in doing so, provides insight into industry 
interplay with the mechanisms of RFMOs. It is suggested that where compliance tactics work in 
harmony, the RFMO will be best placed to target non-compliance. With many species of wild-
capture fisheries not fished within biologically sustainable levels,17 this thesis is a timely 
examination of how the cross-roads between international relations and international law may 
strengthen regional fisheries management. 
 
This opening chapter will introduce the key issues relevant to the research undertaken in this 
thesis. This begins by undertaking a brief explanation of the legal context in which RFMOs 
operate. While by no means a comprehensive analysis of the legal intricacies at play, it does 
make mention and explore the key agreements which include the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea18 (the LOSC), the ‘Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
 
15 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, above n 9, 362. 
16 LOSC Arts 63 and 64. 
17 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Opportunities and Challenges, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations, Rome, 2014 at 37. 
18 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 





Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas’ (FAO 
Compliance Agreement)19 and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement20 (UNFSA). 
 
The chapter then goes on to discuss in more detail the challenges posed by flag state jurisdiction 
including, and of specific relevance to this thesis, the difficulties that arise from efforts to enforce 
the regimes of RFMOs.  Associated calls for reform to the legal regime are then discussed and it 
is suggested that instead of more reforms to our legal regime via official instruments, a greater 
focus on the responsibilities of the resource-user would have greater practical effect.  
 
Finally, a chapter outline is provided emphasising the three key sections into which the chapters 
are divided: Context (in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4), Data, Analysis and Recommendations (in 




The role of RFMOs has evolved over time to the point that they are now the key forums through 
which States fulfil their legal duty to cooperate to conserve the living resources of the high 
seas.21  This duty is embodied in articles 63, 64 and 118 of the LOSC which requires States to 
establish and cooperate via regional organisations to conserve and manage the living resources 
of the high seas. While this duty is viewed by some as a condition for States to engage in fishing 
on the high seas, the fact is that membership of, and compliance with, the conservation 
measures of RFMOs does not reflect this perspective.22  
 
To provide insight into why it is vital that bottom-up compliance mechanisms within RFMOs have 
attained such an important status in regional fisheries management, this chapter commences by 
undertaking an examination of the current status of fisheries governance on the high seas.  It first 
outlines the key concepts of high seas governance outlined under the LOSC and the challenges 
they pose for securing compliance with the conservation measures of RFMOs. It then briefly 
considers examples of international treaty law which have been established following the 
creation of the LOSC in an effort to encourage compliance with the regime. However it is shown 
that these agreements have, to date, largely failed due to a failure of States to both join and 
implement them appropriately. 
 
19 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the 
High Seas, opened for signature 24 November 1993, 2221 UNTS 39486 (entered into force 24 April 2003). 
20 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for 
signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into force 11 December 2001). 
21 Michael W Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: Report of an 
Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, (2007), ix. 
Available online at: http://www.oecd.org/sd-roundtable/papersandpublications/39374762.pdf  






This section emphasises that the principles underlying international fisheries law place the flag 
State at the centre of resource management and as a result, international agreements are 
created for the purposes of securing flag State compliance with responsible resource 
management.  It is demonstrated that the resource-user has no technical responsibility under 
international fisheries law to achieve compliance with the objectives of RFMOs which does not 
reflect the practical reality of regional fisheries governance today.   As such, we must establish a 
way in which compliance can be spoken of in terms of both the compliance capabilities of both 




The contemporary international fisheries regime was created by the LOSC which was formulated 
(inter alia) to address growing concerns over the finite nature of marine living resources.23  
Where previously the high seas had appeared boundless in scope, 24 globalisation of fishing 
fleets and over-fishing of certain species in the 1970s created new concerns for the health of 
fisheries worldwide.  On 10 December 1982, prompted by concerns including ‘the desire to 
settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the 
sea…for the maintenance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world’,25 States 
parties to the LOSC agreed to measures for the negotiation of matters including, inter alia, 
jurisdictional limitations, merchant shipping, conservation of marine living resources and the high 
seas.26 
 
Importantly, the LOSC establishes a system for maritime zoning. This includes defining: 
 a 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea for coastal States in which they exercise 
sovereignty,  
 a 200 nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for coastal States whereby they have 
sovereign rights with respect to natural resources, certain economic activities and 
whereby they exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental 
protection; and 
 a system for determining the outer boundaries of the continental shelf of coastal States 
whereby the coastal State has sovereign rights with respect to exploration and 
exploitation.27 
 
23 Denzil Miller and Erik Molenaar, 'The SEAFC Convention: A Comparative Analysis in a Developing Coastal State 
Perspective' (2006) 20 Ocean Yearbook 305, 361. 
24 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas (Latin and English version, Magoffin trans.) [1608] 
25 Preamble, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 16 November 1994). 
26 Ibid.  






In addition the LOSC provides that where there are disputes between States relating to matters 
covered by the LOSC, they may be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 
The Tribunal also has exclusive jurisdiction over deep seabed mining disputes.  
 
The LOSC also addresses sub-regional, regional and global fisheries issues and establishes a 
legal regime which establishes the sovereignty of flag States on the high seas.   The founding 
principle of the freedom to fish is embodied in article 87 of the LOSC and is granted on the 
condition that States adhere to other provisions within the LOSC.   This freedom must be 
exercised ‘with due regard for the interests of other States’ and is subject to customary 
international law.  
 
The LOSC urges States to protect and preserve the marine environment via cooperation, 
however it does not provide a management regime to implement such preservation efforts.   
Hard and soft law instruments alike have been developed to implement the framework provisions 
of the LOSC but unfortunately, ratification levels of these subsidiary agreement have never 
reached the same levels as that of the LOSC. At the time of writing, the LOSC had been ratified 
by 168 parties.28 Consequently the LOSC is often referred to as a ‘framework’ convention, 
establishing the rules of play but leaving regulatory issues unanswered and difficult to enforce.  
 
Gaining cooperation from States to conserve and manage high seas fish stocks, and their 
associated environments and ecosystems, has proven problematic.  The LOSC establishes a 
legal regime requiring States to ‘cooperate’ while at the same time, this regime is founded on one 
key international law principle: the freedom of the high seas. Under this principle, the high seas 
are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked, and no high seas areas are the subject of 
national jurisdiction.   As such, it falls to States to regulate the fishing activities of the vessels 
they flag and the political will to regulate the activities of such vessels is low.   
 
In fact many critics have argued that the effect of the freedom to fish the high seas has resulted 
in global marine fish stocks falling victim to the ‘tragedy of the commons’29.   In 1960, Garrett 
Hardin first articulated the negative outcomes of providing unlimited access to a limited resource 
that nobody owns or nobody can control.30 The theory states that in resource-rich areas that are 
open to all, resource-users will tend to maximise their own personal gains. Unfortunately, the 
 
28 United Nations: Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 - 
Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements’. List available 
online at: <https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm>. 
29 Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 13 Dec 1968, Vol. 162, Issue 3859, pp. 1243-1248.  





decision to exploit a fisheries resource to its full extent usually prevails in such circumstances, or 
at least until all agree that the resource needs conservation.   
 
In open-access fisheries, this phenomenon has seen States and resource-users taking as much 
as possible, while still possible.  Today, it is difficult to deny that the impact of the tragedy of the 
commons has been realised with respect to global fish stocks.  On the high seas, the harvesting 
capacity of the global fishing fleet well exceeds the capacity of global fisheries. 
 
The LOSC and RFMOs 
 
The LOSC urges all States to take action at sub-regional, regional and global levels to protect 
and preserve the marine environment. 31  Under articles 63 and 64, the LOSC requires States to 
cooperate via appropriate subregional or regional organisations32 and appropriate international 
organisations.33  In articulating the duty to cooperate, Article 118 also provides that States are to 
cooperate to, ‘establish subregional and regional fisheries organisations’ to conserve and 
manage the living marine resources of the high seas. 
 
These fisheries arrangements take the form of RFMOs; a group of organisations which has 
received substantial scrutiny and critique throughout their varying lifetimes.34  These 
organisations are defined as, ‘intergovernmental fisheries organisations or arrangements…that 
have the competence to establish fisheries conservation and management measures’.35   They 
are established via convention or agreement between States with a common interest in fishing a 
specific area on the high seas or fishing for a specific species therein.    
 
Despite outlining the main function of RFMOs, the LOSC does not explain how RFMOs are to go 
about allocating the relative fishing rights of States.  This lacuna has been the cause of 
substantial disagreement within RFMOs and has even prevented the acceptance of scientifically 
sound catch quotas occurring within certain RFMOs.36 No provision is made for the internal 
enforcement of RFMO conservation measures and as participation in RFMOs remains voluntary, 




31 LOSC arts 63 and 64.  
32 LOSC art 63.   
33 LOSC art 64.  
34 In recent years many regional fishery bodies have taken steps to undergo ‘performance reviews’. ‘Performance Reviews by 
Regional Fishery Bodies’, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1072, FIPI/C1072 (En). 
35 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by consensus at the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI, Rome, Italy, adopted on 23 
June 2001 at the 102th Session of the FAO Council. 





In a modern fisheries context, reliance on RFMOs to recover species from the brink of extinction 
and to better regulate those fish stocks for which they are responsible, continues to grow. 
However RFMO effectiveness has been limited by the individual interests of the signatory States 
Parties over the years. As a result, RFMOs have struggled to meet expectations of their 
regulatory capacity and both ‘sustainability and responsibility to protect the marine environment 




In the decade following the creation of the LOSC, a vast gap in the regulatory regime emerged.  
As a result, in 1993, the ‘Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas’ (FAO Compliance Agreement) 
was created.  A binding agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement was established to 
strengthen the requirement that States only register vessels over which they are able to exercise 
effective control.38  It was hoped that the FAO Compliance Agreement would solve the problem 
of ‘reflagging’ of vessels which is a key mechanism through which illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing operations are carried out.  
 
The FAO Compliance Agreement specifies measures that flag States must implement to ensure 
that their vessels do not undermine the conservation and management measures of RFMOs.39  It 
provides that flag States must take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that fishing 
vessels entitled to fly their flag comply with the regulatory authority of RFMOs.40  The FAO 
Compliance Agreement also requires Parties to cooperate in the implementation of the 
Agreement, particularly with regards to information sharing. While the FAO Compliance 
Agreement constitutes a significant step towards clarifying the provisions of the LOSC, this 
Agreement has suffered a similar fate to that of many other hard and soft international treaties 
introduced post-LOSC: insufficient ratification by flag States.41  As a result, the impact of its 





37 Editorial, ‘Introduction: Advancing governance of areas beyond national jurisdiction’ (2014) 49 Marine Policy at 81. . 
38 High Seas Task Force (2006). ‘Closing the net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas’.  Governments of Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, WWF, IUCN and the Earth Institute at Columbia University at 
54. 
39 Peter Flewwelling, Recent Trends in Monitoring Control and Surveillance Systems for Capture Fisheries (2003) 17. 
40 FAO Compliance Agreement, article III(a). 
41 Despite being adopted by the FAO Conference in 1993, the FAO Compliance Agreement did not officially enter into force 
until 24 April 2003 when it obtained 25 instruments of acceptance. At the time of writing, the UNFSA had 59 signatories and 90 
states parties.Current treaty information available online at: 





Following the creation of the FAO Compliance Agreement, it became clear that the management 
of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks had still not been adequately addressed in the legal 
framework and that these stocks had been subjected to heavy overexploitation.42  In 1995, the 
‘Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ (UNFSA) was formulated to promote the long-term conservation 
and sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory stocks.43 The fundamental purpose of the 
UNFSA is to implement the provisions of the LOSC relating to these specific stocks and to 
ensure that no area of the high seas remains unregulated.44  
 
UNFSA extends the ambit of RFMOs to regulate fisheries within areas of national jurisdiction as 
well as on the high seas.45 It lists the matters upon which States are to agree to achieve the long 
term sustainability of fisheries and in doing so, defines the desirable characteristics of RFMOs.46  
To this end, Part III of UNFSA contains detailed provisions about the duty to cooperate and 
elaborates the manner in which this duty is to be given effect.  UNFSA provides that States are 
required to give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of relevant RFMOs.47  It 
goes on to provide that where no ‘subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement’ exists to conserve a straddling or highly migratory fish stock, States shall 
cooperate to establish such an organisation.48  
 
However, UNFSA provides that this duty cannot be discharged by flag States merely through the 
creation of an RFMO. It requires that States not only become members of RFMOs, but also that 
they participate in and respect the conservation measures imposed by the RFMO concerned.49   
This requirement applies to members of RFMOs and non-members alike and establishes that 
where a State persistently fails to comply with the UNFSA, it will be in breach of the duty to 




43 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Eighth Round of Informal Consultations of State Parties to the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement (2009) <http://www.iisd.ca/vol07/enb0764e.html> at 24 August 2009. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Michael Lodge, 'Managing International Fisheries: Improving Fisheries Governance by Strengthening Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations' (Briefing Paper 07/01, Energy, Environment and Development Programme, Chatham House, 
2007) 3. 
46 Ibid.  Lodge articulates a list of items upon which States should agree including: ‘agreement on conservation and 
management measures to ensure long-term sustainability; agreement on participatory rights such as allocations of allowable 
catch or levels of fishing effort; agreement on decision-making procedures which facilitate the adoption of conservation and 
management measures in a timely and effective manner; and agreement on mechanisms for obtaining scientific advice and 
ensuring compliance with and enforcement of conservation and management measures.’ 
47 UNFSA, art 8(3).  
48 UNFSA, art 8(5). 
49 UNFSA, art 8(6). 





UNFSA is regarded as a progressive agreement in that it places RFMOs at the heart of 
international fisheries management.51  Unfortunately, many States who are parties to the LOSC 
have yet to sign on as parties to the UNFSA.  This has been attributed to the inclusion of 
effective enforcement mechanisms coupled with a lack of contemporary political will to seriously 
address the problem of IUU fishing.52  As a result, high seas fisheries have continued to decline 




The most recent international agreement of significance to this thesis is the “Agreement on Port 
State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
FAO Port State Measures Agreement” (PSM Agreement)54 which was formulated in August 2009 
under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.55  The PSM Agreement entered into force in June 
2016.56 
 
Prior to the introduction of the PSM Agreement, different States elected to adopt different 
standards and conditions of entry with regard to their ports.57  The overall objective of the PSM 
Agreement is to establish common procedures for inspection and agreed measures against IUU 
fishing vessels.58  
 
The PSM Agreement is the first binding international agreement to specifically target the problem 
of IUU fishing. It does this by preventing vessels engaging in IUU fishing from using ports and 
offloading their catch.59 This means that IUU catch is blocked from entering the market which 






51 ‘Global Progress Toward Implementing the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement’, PEW Report May 23 2016, available 
online at: http://pewtrusts.org/en/  
52 Denzil Miller, Eugene Sabourenkov and David Ramm, 'Managing Antarctic Marine Living Resources: The CCAMLR 
Approach' (2004) 19(3) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 317. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Adopted in 
November 2009 by the FAO Conference at its Thirty-sixth Session through Resolution No 12/2009, under Article XIV, 
paragraph 1 of the FAO Constitution. 
55 Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries (2010) 64. 
56 PSM Agreement, above n 54. 
57 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson, above n 55 at 63. 
58 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson, above n 55 at 64. 
59 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, ‘Agreement on Port State Measures: Background’, 2019, available 







The PSM Agreement implements a consistent approach to:62 
 
Cooperation and exchange of information among national authorities and States, 
requirements for prior entry into port, use of ports, port inspection procedures, training  of 
inspectors, the role of flag States, requirements of developing States, dispute settlement, 
dealing with non-parties, and monitoring and review of the implementation of the 
agreement. 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations is undertaking ongoing work to 
build capacity of developing countries to implement the provisions of the PSM Agreement.63 This 
work is being undertaken via the establishment of Technical Cooperation Programmes, Global 
Capacity Development Programmes and a Port State Measures Assistance Fund as provided for 




The concept of flag State jurisdiction, whereby the activities of fishing vessels are regulated by 
the State in which they are registered,65 has survived over centuries. It remains an overriding 
principle of the international law of the sea regime.  The contemporary fisheries regime, 
embodied in the LOSC, adopts the principle of flag State jurisdiction in article 91.66  While this 
principle is subject to various conditions, including those laid down by the LOSC,67 such 
conditions have often proven difficult to enforce.68  Today, as was the case prior to the adoption 
of the LOSC, the regulation of high seas fishing vessels resides first and foremost with the flag 
State.  
 
However not all flag States regulate their vessels to the same standards.  In making this 
observation it is worth first describing the nature of the vessels and companies which operate on 
the high seas today.  As demonstrated by an extensive report into how high seas fishing is 
constantly evolving, the oceans are currently being exploited on a large-scale by fishing vessels 
with extensive capacity.69 Such is the value of certain species, including for example tuna and 
 
62 Ibid. 
63 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, ‘Agreement on Port State Measures: Capacity Building’, available 
online at: <http://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/capacity-development/ongoing-capacity-building-efforts/en/>. 
64 Ibid. 
65 If a vessel is fishing on the high seas, ‘the flag State has the exclusive respons bility for controlling the activities of the vessel.’  
See Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries (2010) at 110. 
66 LOSC, art 91. 
67 LOSC, art 91 and 94. 
68 Stuart Kaye, ‘Threats from the Global Commons: Problems of Jurisdiction and Enforcement’ (2007) 8(1) Melbourne Journal 
of International Law. 
69 Gianni, M. and Simpson, W. (2005). The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: how flags of convenience provide cover for 





certain deep-sea species,70 which occur in high seas areas. These operations are run by multi-
national companies71 and many high seas vessels are now equipped to never have to return to 
port in order to maximise at-sea time as well as profits.  
 
Under the standing afforded via flag State jurisdiction, companies seeking to avoid the rigours of 
international obligations and stringent regulatory processes can register their vessel/s in certain 
States which are unwilling or unable to exercise that jurisdiction and operate on the high seas 
under that flag. As the flag State in question often does not have the capacity or the will to 
exercise any controls over the vessel, the activities of the vessel go unchecked, allowing illegal, 
unreported and unregulated72 (IUU) fishing to occur on the high seas.  This practice, known as 
operating under a ‘flag of convenience’73 (FOC) or ‘flag of non-compliance’74 (FONC), has been 
widely condemned by international fora seeking to regulate international fisheries.75 However it 
still prevails, demonstrating a key failing of flag State jurisdiction.76   
 
It is worth noting that the corporate aspect of FONC fishing operations is that the vessels 
concerned have often been found to operate as ‘a truly globalised fishing fleet’77, where such 
vessels work in a cooperative and integrated way  to disguise/mask their IUU activity.78 
 
70 The prime example in the Southern Ocean being patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) which has been subjected 
to extensive IUU fishing in waters surrounding the Antarctic. Australian Antarctic Division, A History of the Patagonian Toothfish 
Fishery (2001) <http://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-us/publications/australian-antarctic-magazine/2001-2005/issue-2-spring-
2001/international/a-history-of-the-patagonian-toothfish-fishery>. 
71 Gianni and Simpson, above n 69 at 52. 
72 This thesis adopts the definition of IUU fishing contained in the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by consensus 
at the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI, Rome, Italy, adopted on 23 June 2001 at the 102th Session of the FAO Council (‘the 
IPOA-IUU’).  It definition reads as follows: 
Illegal fishing refers to activities - 
a) conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that 
State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations; 
b) conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries management 
organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by that 
organization and by which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or 
c) in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a 
relevant regional fisheries management organization. 
Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities - 
a) which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in contravention of 
national laws and regulations; or 
b) undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization which have not been 
reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the reporting procedures of that organization. 
Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities- 
a) in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are conducted by vessels 
without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a 
manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organization; 
or 
b) in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or management measures and 
where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of 
living marine resources under international law. 
73 Gianni and Simpson, above n 69. 
74 This term is preferred by regional organisations in their terminology as demonstrated by CCAMLR Resolution 19/XXI ‘Flags 
of Non-Compliance’ available online at: <http://archive.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/cm/11-12/r19-XXI.pdf>. 
75 Rachel Baird, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An Analysis of the Legal, Economic and Historical Factors 
Relevant to its Development and Persistence’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 14. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Gianni and SImpson, above n 69. 
78 Davor Vidas, 'IUU Fishing or IUU Operations? Some Observations on Diagnosis and Current Treatment' in D D Caron and H 





Therefore, FONCs operators often disguise their fishing operations to ensure that the company 
reaping the true economic benefits form the IUU fishing being undertaken, operate behind a 
‘corporate veil’79.  
 
Consequently, IUU fishing by FONCs continues to highlight the challenges that this activity poses 
for high seas areas as well as to ensuring the ongoing sustainability of many fish stocks. As a 
global phenomenon, IUU fishing can compromise the ‘ecological health’ of the oceans in which it 
takes place.80  
 
This chapter will now turn to consider an advisory opinion, delivered by the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on 2 April 2015, which tackled the question of what the 
obligations of flag States are with respect to the activities of their flagged vessels engaging in 
IUU fishing. The opinion focussed on the obligations of flag States when their vessels are fishing 
within EEZ waters rather than on the high seas.  However it provides an important addition to the 
body of soft and hard law surrounding the regulation of IUU fishing and sheds further light on 
how regulation of global fisheries have now become one of the greatest governance challenges 





As discussed above in respect of FONCs and IUU fishing, global fish stocks today continue to 
feel the effects of non-compliance by flag States failing to appropriately regulate their vessels on 
the high seas.  However flag State jurisdiction and the associated problems arising from lax flag 
State regulations and enforcement also creates difficulties within the EEZs of coastal States.  In 
such areas, IUU fishing and FONCs pose challenges for the effective implementation of not only 
international agreements, but also compliance with the legislation of the coastal State. Where 
developing States are concerned, the effective monitoring and enforcement compliance of 
domestic legislation poses significant challenges for the coastal State even prior to considering 
the impacts of IUU fishing in coastal waters by vessels flagged to FONCs. 
 
In the case of one West African fisheries organisation, the Sub-regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC), the impacts of FONC vessels fishing within the EEZs of its coastal States led to 
members bringing a request before the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS: the ‘Request 
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for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC)’.82  The 
request, submitted on 28 March 2013, was made as a result of a resolution of the Conference of 
Ministers of the SRFC.83 
 
The context for the request was that the SRFC had become concerned by their inability to 
prevent IUU fishing within their coastal waters. They were seeking clarification of what the 
obligations of the flag State were in cases where IUU fishing activities were being undertaken by 
their vessels in EEZs of coastal states, including the extent to which the flag State was liable for 
the activities of these vessels.84  In addition, they sought the opinion of the ITLOS on whether 
vessels which are licenced to fish by an international agency and which commit IUU fishing 
offences in the EEZ of a coastal State, incur the liability of the international agency.85 Finally they 
sought clarification of the rights and obligations of the coastal State in ensuring the sustainable 
management of shared fish stocks within the EEZs of coastal States.  
 
On 2 April 2015, the ITLOS delivered its opinion on the questions posed by the SRFC. Under 
article 138 of its Rules, the Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an 
international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention makes a specific request to 
that effect.86  While such an opinion constitutes the advice of the ITLOS rather than a binding 
decision, it will be persuasive in shaping the actions of States and may form the basis of future 
cases.  In addition, the ITLOS also clarified that its advice was limited to the specific case of the 
SRFC as it was in that context that the advice was sought. 
 
The ITLOS, in passing down its opinion, advised that if flag States do not undertake necessary 
‘due diligence’ to ensure that vessels they flag are complying with the protection and 
preservation measures of coastal States and are properly marked and properly authorised to fish 
by the coastal State then they may be liable.87  In addition, the flag State must have in place 
enforcement mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance, such as sanctions sufficient to 
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Such advice has significant ramifications for FONCs, which will very rarely have exercised the 
above due diligence in flagging vessels.  As a result, where a FONC cannot demonstrate that 
they have appropriately ensured that flagged vessels will be subject to regulation including 
monitoring and enforcement, sanctions and investigations, then they may be brought before the 
ITLOS for breach of the LOSC.  Where the vessel itself is non-compliant, the flag State may also 
be liable for the offences of the vessel if they cannot demonstrate that they took measures to 
enforce the obligations of the vessel. 
 
There is, however, some ambiguity in the opinion of the ITLOS with respect to the effort flag 
States must go to in order to discharge their commitments in this regard.  The opinion provides 
that flag States must deploy adequate means, and exercise best possible efforts to do the utmost 
to obtain favourable results.  In addition, it is unclear from the decision whether IUU fishing itself 
must have occurred for liability to arise.  Flag States have a duty to cooperate and ensure 
conservation of straddling stocks which occur across EEZs, however, the enforceability of this 
duty remains an unanswered question at law.89    
 
Regional and international agreements which have arisen out of the LOSC seek to interpret, 
implement or regulate the open-ended and often unclear provisions of the LOSC. This section 
demonstrates that today, a complex global framework of treaties and non-binding international 
agreements comprise the international regime for fisheries management90 and yet many issues 




It would appear that today, the current high seas fisheries framework has resulted in a global 
marine crisis of environmental, ecological and social proportions.   While the LOSC sets out 
‘conditions’ which limit application of the freedom of the high seas, it is widely considered that 
this instrument sets out a framework for oceans governance only.    
 
The LOSC and associated agreements provide for the creation of new organisations, and have 
sought to strengthen the role of those organisations in regulating fisheries which fall under the 
regime of the law of the sea. However the current status of international fisheries governance is 
far from static. This section demonstrates that while calls for reform to the legal frameworks for 
governing high seas fisheries are necessary and significant, current proposals fail to 
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appropriately contemplate the role that the sector itself has to play in improving governance 
mechanisms.  
 
Proposals to amend the existing legal regime for international fisheries governance range from 
revolutionary ideas to amend founding principles of the law of the sea,91 to proposals which work 
with those arrangements already in place but encourage more adaptive approaches.  In an 
example of a more revolutionary proposal, Stan Crothers and Lindie Nelson of the New Zealand 
Ministry of Fisheries suggest that the ‘high seas freedom to fish be transformed to a right to 
share in the net wealth generated from sustainable harvest of high seas fisheries…’92 They 
suggest that rather than relying on cooperation of States via regional fisheries organisations, 
instead a management organisation in which States are beneficial owners should be 
established.93  
 
While primarily a discussion paper, this proposal represents a forward-thinking approach to 
considering how alternative governance frameworks to that which currently exists might promote 
accountability of States for the activities of their vessels on the high seas. However today, not 
just critics but States, both individually and through their activities in international and regional 
institutions, are gradually mobilising to consider alternative approaches to the current LOSC 
regime. At the forefront of such alternatives is the notion of biodiversity beyond national 
jurisdiction (BBNJ).94 
 
In an approach requiring the negotiation of an entirely new agreement which would sit under the 
LOSC, certain critics argue that an implementing agreement to the LOSC on BBNJ is the best 
option to address the regulatory gaps that exist under the current regime.  They contend that at 
present, the LOSC’s creation of one regime for high seas areas and another regime for activities 
occurring on the seabed and subsoil thereof has resulted in sectoral management which creates 
difficulties with regard to the effective regulation of activities including deep-sea mining and 
geoengineering.95 Proponents argue that where impacts of ocean activities span the two 
regimes, biodiversity considerations are not appropriately taken into account.96  
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As a result, discussions towards the instigation of negotiations for such an agreement have 
commenced via an ‘Ad-hoc open-ended informal working group to study issues relating to the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction’ 
(the Working Group).97  The Working Group was formed in 2004 under the auspices of the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), however it was not until recently that States 
discussed their positions with respect to the merit of proceeding towards the negotiation of such 
an agreement.98 
 
To many critics, the prospect of re-negotiating principles under the LOSC or indeed creating new 
regimes under the LOSC seem intractable as a way to improve the impacts of fishing in high 
seas areas.99  Instead, they promote the need to improve the implementation of existing 
instruments to achieve effective conservation and sustainable management.100  Certain 
proposals under this approach promote multi-sector mechanisms spanning institutions,101 
encouraging regional organisations to extend their mandate via the adoption of Marine Protected 
Areas (MPAs) in high seas areas, as well as more political solutions such as adopting a UN 
Statement of Principles on marine governance.102 
 
Formal treaty negotiations towards the creation of an agreement on BBNJ were held in March 
2019 via an Intergovernmental Committee at UN Headquarters in New York.103 These 
discussions were centred around the ‘President’s Aid to Negotiations’: an options-based draft 
treaty text. With work by interested States parties now progressing towards the mid-point of 
negotiations, it is looking likely that an implementing agreement to the LOSC on BBNJ will 
proceed.  
 
The UNGA has also encouraged action in this field via the adoption of resolutions for action on 
sustainable high seas fisheries.  In 2006, Resolution 61/105 of the UNGA called for specific 
actions to be taken by States and regional fisheries management organisations with regards to 
bottom fishing in high seas areas.104 It required States authorising their vessels to engage in 
bottom fishing to conduct assessments of the impacts of those activities on vulnerable marine 
ecosystems and to implement appropriate measures in response.105   
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In 2009, the UNGA found that resolution 61/105 had not been implemented effectively and 
adopted resolution 64/72.  This resolution reaffirmed 61/105 and called on States and regional 
fisheries management organisations to prevent vessels from engaging in bottom fishing in such 
areas until assessments had been carried out. Resolution 64/72 calls for long term sustainability 
measures for fish stocks and non-target species.106 A 2013 report into the implementation of 
resolution 61/105 and 64/71 found that these recommendations had been implemented to a 
degree but not sufficiently and made recommendations for improving their implementation.107 
 
This thesis argues that for the most part, neither political reforms nor treaty-based reforms have 
fully taken into account the need to empower the resource-user to contribute to, and adopt their 
own solutions to, the problems of fisheries governance.  Commentary on reform to fisheries 
governance all too often considers ‘scientific, legal and institutional efforts to advance 
governance’,108 without recognising the importance of engaging the sector itself.  It would appear 
that traditional governance is attempting to fight fire with fire; developing layers of unilateral 
agreements aimed at addressing problems arising from associated agreements. This thesis 
suggests that the solution lies not in developing new agreements, but in changing our 
understanding of ‘governance’ and our expectations of what the State is capable of delivering 




According to Andrew T Guzman, compliance is one of the most central questions in international 
law.109  This is exceptionally true of international fisheries law. Compliance, under international 
fisheries law, is achieved via the resource user being controlled by the state which is in turn 
governed by the decisions of the RFMO. However because RFMO membership is voluntary, 
there exists significant opportunity for non-compliance to occur unchecked.  Even where RFMO 
membership exists, rates of non-compliance within the regime are high. 
 
With the entry into force of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995, the role of RFMOs was 
clarified as being a conjugate for cooperation amongst flag States, including in respect of 
fisheries compliance.110  This role prompted the development of compliance-related conservation 
measures within RFMOs, such as port state measures, illegal vessel lists and catch 
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documentation schemes.111  These conservation measures must be legally implemented by the 
flag State domestically and compliance with those measures monitored and reported by the flag 
State. However their impact is felt by the vessels that the flag State regulates.  
 
In areas whereby the resource is the property of the ‘commons’,112 such as international 
fisheries, it has been demonstrated that compliance is easier to achieve when resource users 
support effective monitoring and rule enforcement.113  In fact in a fisheries context, numerous 
studies have reinforced the success of co-management regimes, or regimes which engage the 
resource user throughout different stages of governance.114  While co-management may not be 
possible under an international regime which is founded on the principle of flag State compliance, 
industry initiatives have nevertheless been occurring and have been successful in respect of 
achieving compliance with the objectives of RFMOs.115 Documentation of such efforts, however, 
is minimal.116 
 
To date there has been little academic commentary on attempts by the resource-user to improve 
compliance at fisheries law and their contribution to sustainable fisheries in a legal context.117 
This thesis undertakes a holistic approach towards documenting this trend in a compliance 
capability.  It captures the various forms and approaches that such initiatives take and 
emphasises the role that such efforts play in breaking-down sectoral regulation.  
 
This thesis recommends that effective regional fisheries governance will benefit from a synergy 
between public and private regulation. By examining both top-down compliance tactics in an 
RFMO, and their interaction with bottom-up compliance tactics, this thesis provides a holistic 
view of compliance enforcement tactics in operation.  This allows for the problem of RFMO 
compliance to be viewed as a challenge to both the flag State, and the resource user, under the 
principle of shared responsibility.118  
 
The thesis posits that the strongest regional regimes are those which extend beyond 
conventional notions of flag State compliance, to leverage industry compliance mechanisms and 
engage with the opportunities they provide.  With wild-capture fisheries facing overexploitation, 
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this thesis asserts that RFMO best-practice in a compliance sphere can and should encompass 




Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The purpose of Chapter 1 is to highlight the challenges posed by a regime founded in the 
concept of flag State jurisdiction and the need for increased recognition of the roles and 
responsibilities of the resource-user in an effective fisheries management regime. The chapter 
explains that the thesis will present an up-to-date assessment of the compliance enforcement 
regimes of those RFMOs to which Australia is a party. As part of the solution, it is suggested that 
there is a need to recognise the capability and capacity of the resource-user to better engage in 
the regulatory regime to improve high seas fisheries governance.  
 
In addition, Chapter 1 provides a contextual overview of the problem of unsustainable fishing in 
high seas areas.  It is suggested that a collaborative approach to governance of high seas 
fisheries is now required; whereby the resource-user is increasingly engaged in decision-making 
processes at a regional and international level. It contends that if sustainable fisheries are the 
objective, increased active interaction between the government and the governed must occur. To 
support this assertion, a brief case study of a recent advisory opinion issued by the ITLOS is 
undertaken to highlight the complexities of reliance on flag State responsibility alone in a 
compliance context.  
 
Lastly Chapter 1 outlines the structure of the thesis, and how the chapters are organised into 
three key segments to assess whether the hypothesis can be supported.  Chapters 1-4 are 
devoted to analysing the context of the argument, establishing the founding principles upon 
which the key thesis argument is made and undertaking a review of literature relevant to the field 
of study.  Chapters 5 and 6 comprise the empirical element of the thesis; presenting and 
analysing data collected regarding the AusRFMOs under examination as well as making 
recommendations for reform. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis; undertaking an assessment of how the evidence presented in 
previous chapters supports, or negates, the hypothesis.  This chapter also provides insight into 
how these findings sit within the context of existing literature in the field of study.The conclusions 
demonstrate the positive and practical outcomes of this research and suggest what these 






Chapter 2 – Governance Theory and Research Methodology  
 
This chapter justifies the approach adopted in this study by explaining the theoretical framework 
within which the study is being undertaken.  It begins by examining the objectives of fisheries 
governance at a regional level to provide insight into the current approach adopted by 
AusRFMOs.  The concepts of sustainable management and ecosystem-based management are 
outlined to demonstrate that the resource-user plays a vital role in achieving the objectives of 
regional fisheries governance. In addition, the notion of ‘sustainability’ is explored to highlight 
how the theory of corporate social responsibility applies to this thesis examination.  
 
This chapter explains that both rationalist and normative models of compliance have been taken 
into consideration in this thesis. For example, rationalist models might focus on deterrence and 
enforcement as a means to prevent and publish non-compliance by changing the resource-user’s 
calculation of benefits and costs.119 An example of this approach is found in illegal vessel lists 
which seek to ‘name and shame’ both flag States and the vessels involved.  Normative 
approaches focus on cooperation and compliance assistance as a means to prevent non-
compliance.120 An example of this approach embodied in a conservation measure is via port 
State measures which call on States to cooperate.  
 
Finally this chapter explains the methodology adopted in this thesis. It will test the hypothesis that 
there are significant inconsistencies between and amongst AusRFMOs in their adoption of 
conservation measures to support their compliance and enforcement regime. This will be 
achieved by collecting data on the current conservation measures of six AusRFMOs and 
undertaking a comparison of how complete and comprehensive their suite of compliance 
enforcement mechanisms are. An assessment of where the main gaps are between and among 
AusRFMOs can then be undertaken, assisted by insight from the performance reviews published 
by each AusRFMO.    
 
As a group of organisations whose collective decisions impact on the strength of the wider 
compliance enforcement capacity of a region, it is critical that AusRFMOs work together if they 
are to achieve any real impact on the health of global fish stocks. Where the findings from this 
thesis demonstrate that there remain areas for improvement, it is suggested that an alternative 
vision of compliance enforcement, where the resource-user shares responsibility with the 
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regulator to achieve compliance with conservation measures, holds significant promise to 
strengthen connections and compliance enforcement across AusRFMOs.  
 
Chapter 3 – The Mandate and Performance of AusRFMOs 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore each of the six AusRFMOs under examination in this 
thesis in detail to clarify their mandate, geographic application, and in particular, their 
performance to date. The chapter examines how calls by the United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement Review Conference in 2006 to qualitatively assess the performance of RFMOs led to 
the development of common criteria for the delivery of ongoing review and assessment. Since 
this time, the practice of undertaking performance reviews and monitoring the implemention of 
associated finding has become common across all RFMOs.  
 
However this chapter is of course primarily concerned with the specific AusRFMOs under 
examination in this thesis. All AusRFMOs have published at least one performance review which 
will be analysed to gain a current perspective on the key compliance issues impacting the 
AusRFMOs in question. In addition, the basics of RFMO management are explained including 
the operation of conservation measures in RFMOs, their legal force other key basics behind how 
RFMOs regulate.  
 
The chapter concludes that while the process of undertaking performance reviews is far from 
perfect, if these reports are independent and objective in their approach they represent a 
valuable tool in understanding both specific and common areas for improvement in the RFMO 
regime.  
 
Chapter 4 – Compliance Evaluation in the CCAMLR  
 
This chapter largely comprises an article co-authoried with the late Prof. Denzil Miller and 
entitled, ‘Trust But Verify: Fisheries Compliance Evaluation and Sustainable Antarctic Marine 
Living Resource Management’.121 The author recognises the significant contribution made by 
Prof. Miller to this thesis with regards to his conceptual insights as well as his material 
contribution with regards to Chapter 4. This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Miller. 
 
This chapter documents the rise of the ‘compliance evaluation procedure’ (CEP) in AusRFMOs 
and how this process is one of the many compliance-related conservation measures being 
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assessed throughout the thesis. The popularity of processes to evaluate compliance in 
AusRFMOs is demonstrative of the focus AusRFMOs and RFMOs in general currently have on 
compliance. The CCAMLR CEP was one of the first of its kind and constitutes a strong example 
of how the process can function to effectively address instances of non-compliance in a regional 
context.   
 
The Chapter focuses on efforts by the CCAMLR to improve Antarctic marine governance and 
conservation through the recently-developed CCAMLR compliance evaluation procedure 
(CCEP).  The CCEP’s achievements and shortcomings are contrasted with trends in fisheries 
compliance globally within the context of future uncertainty and risk. It is viewed as a model for 
other polar and high seas areas, and is suggested that adoption of a CEP by AusRFMOs can 
fundamentally alter the performance of the RFMO.  
Chapter 5 – Compliance-Related Conservation Measures in AusRFMOs   
 
This chapter begins by identifying and categorising the compliance enforcement mechanisms 
specifically under examination in this thesis. These include: cooperative policies, policies relating 
to non-contracting parties, policies relating to cooperating parties, vessel lists, requests and 
negotiations, diplomatic demarches, trade-related measures, graded sanctions and boarding and 
inspection and arrest. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of how these methods can be 
categorised for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
Having discussed the different measures, this thesis proceeds to investigate which AusRFMOs 
have adopted which of these measures. A desktop study is undertaken to compile a 
comprehensive list of the specific compliance-related conservation measures currently in force in 
each of the AusRFMOs being assessed.  
 
This data collected is used in Chapter 6 to allocate each AusRFMO a compliance ranking of 
basic, developing or established. These findings highlight the limitations of AusRFMOs when it 
comes to implementing effective compliance regimes and it is emphasised that compliance must 
now be viewed as a challenge to both the flag State, and industry, if progress it to be made. 
 
Chapter 6 – Analysis and Recommendations 
 
This chapter comprises the analytical basis of the thesis and is designed to compare the 
compliance capacity of AusRFMO with their overall performance as determined by their most 
recent performance reviews. The introductory section of this chapter establishes the context in 





and how such approaches interact with the principle of shared responsibility. The legal status of 
the resource-user in RFMOs is also examined to demonstrate the difficulties faced by the private-
sector seeking to engage directly via the forum provided by the RFMO.  
 
Following this introduction, the chapter undertakes an analysis of the data presented in Chapter 
5 and Table 1. Table 3 comprises a summary of the compliance-related conservation measures 
of each AusRFMO contained in Chapter 5. This table provides a quick reference guide and also 
demonstrates the respective strengths and weaknesses of each AusRFMO.  
 
Based on this information, the analysis is undertaken by allocating each AusRFMO a status of 
‘basic’, ‘satisfactory or ‘established’ with regard to its compliance capacity. This finding is then 
considered in light of the performance of the RFMO as determined by their most recent 
performance review outcome and other factors. Areas for improvement are identified and 
discussed to highlight the key compliance concerns of each AusRFMO as determined by this 
thesis.  
 
In light of the above finding, this chapter examines the ways in which the private-sector can 
contribute to the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs. Figure 2 is introduced to highlight how 
avenues for private-sector engagement can be categorised into cooperative measures, 
benchmarking measures, and political measures to assist in understanding their operation and 
desired effect.  
 
Finally this chapter highlights that private-sector engagement represents a viable alternative to 
regulatory reform with regards to the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs. To demonstrate this 
point, specific and practical recommendations for how both AusRFMOs and the private-sector 
can improve their respective engagement with one another to a positive effect are made. The 
chapter concludes there is significant work to be done to rebuild perceptions of the legitimacy of 
compliance conservation measures in AusRFMOs and that private-sector engagement can assist 
in addressing this challenge.  
 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
 
The concluding chapter begins by reviewing the content and findings of previous chapters. It is 
shown that when read as a whole, this thesis contains evidence to suggest that AusRFMOs can 
and should increase their engagement with the private-sector in the interests of achieving 
improved compliance outcomes for their respective fisheries. Additionally, the private-sector 
should be encouraged to demonstrate sustainable leadership and assume shared responsibility 






The next section of this chapter outlines a series of conclusions that are primarily based on the 
data and analysis contained in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. Chapter 6 has shown that there 
are commonalities in the type of compliance challenges facing AusRFMOs, but that this also 
means that there are commonalities when it comes to identifying how AusRFMOs may improve 
their compliance capacity.  
 
The thesis concludes that efforts to improve the governance regime for high seas fisheries via 
amendment to international agreements or development of new agreements may be limited in 
effect.  It highlights that so long as the impacts of depletion of fish stocks continue to be felt by 
the ‘whole’, rather than the individual, significant governance challenges will remain in achieving 




This thesis asserts that it is time to address the current imbalance between our expectations of 
the resource-user as opposed to the State if we are to achieve actual progress towards 
sustainable global fisheries. We live in a dramatically altered climate from that in which the LOSC 
was negotiated and today, international fishing companies are seeking to strengthen their ‘social 
licence’ to operate.122  To do this, they are distinguishing themselves from competitors by 
evoking their corporate social responsibility.123 If we continue to look to the RFMOs and legal 
solutions to address the global fisheries crisis, we fail to recognise integrative solutions whereby 
governance institutions, industry, civil society and researchers124 are all seen as equally vital 
components in the effort to improve governance of internationalised fisheries.  
 
If, as many commentators continue to assert, a holistic and multi-sectoral and collaborative 
solution represents the best option for achieving effective reform to fisheries governance, we 
must adapt our understanding of what governance looks like.  The notion of ‘reforming’ 
international treaty law, per se, becomes redundant if, as this thesis argues, the governance 
regime recognises both flag State responsibility and the responsibility of the resource-user as 
equal. It is argued that this approach can be largely achieved by altering our attitude towards the 
resource-user and what the governance regime for regional fisheries comprises.  
 
 
122 Osterblom H and Bodin O, ‘Global Cooperation Among Diverse Organisations to Reduce Illegal Fishing in the Southern 
Ocean’, Conservation Biology, 2012. 
123 Ibid.  





The need to enforce both engagement in and compliance with the conservation measures of 
RFMOs remains a critical factor to be resolved if we are to stem the decline of high seas fish 
stocks.125  To date, the performance of RFMOs in this regard has been poor;126 with discontinuity 
between the compliance approaches of individual RFMOs cited as one of the key contributing 
factors to the challenges facing regional fisheries management.127  The question of how to 
improve compliance in RFMOs has been widely addressed in academic literature, but almost 
exclusively from the perspective of how flag State compliance can be strengthened to improve 
the compliance of the RFMO overall.128 
 
This thesis analyses the legal regime surrounding this issue to recommend a quasi-legal solution 
at the cross-roads between international law and international relations: RFMOs compliance will 
function best when there is a synergy between the regulator and the regulated. This fresh 





125 Lodge et al, above n 21. 
126 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1072, ‘Performance Reviews by Regional Fishery Bodies: Introduction, 
Summarise, Synthesis and Best Practices’, (2012) available online at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2637e/i2637e00.pdf> at 
56. 
127 Ibid.  
128 The principle of flag State jurisdiction is embodied in article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 










The question of why flag States, organisations and individuals choose to comply with 
international law is at the heart of understanding how to best direct compliance effort to secure 
sustainable global fisheries.
1 It is essential that regulators promote an ‘enabling environment’2 for the sector while effectively 
managing the risks that this approach may bring. This chapter examines the theories which may 
underpin efforts by the private-sector to comply with the conservation measures of AusRFMOs.  
 
To date, few studies examining the need to reform the regional fisheries regime have 
contemplated the role that certain influential corporations play in determining the effectiveness of 
the regional fisheries regime.3  Fisheries regulators and States parties to RFMOs alike are today 
recognising the growing role that the private-sector can and should play in the effective 
regulation of the fishery.4  From a legal perspective, fisheries reform efforts have largely 
focussed on the mandates and conservation measures of RFMOs and how to improve decision-
making within the political minefield of State-based interactions.  However, some academics 
have started to approach the problem from a social science perspective, examining the interplay 
between ecosystems and influential corporations.5   
 
This thesis argues that it is beneficial to consider the findings of these social science studies6 
alongside or in tandem with legal efforts to improve the ability of RFMOs to achieve compliance 
with their conservation measures.  This proposal is supported by recent insights into the actual 
extent of the role and influence of a limited number of large companies on the high seas.7  With 
certain companies having an influence that is arguably larger than most nations in terms of 
 
1 Lori Ridgeway, ‘Chair’s Summary Report’, Workshop on the Challenges and Opportunities of Fisheries Globalisation, April 
2007. Report available online at: <http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/fisheries/39997562.pdf>.   
2 Ibid. 
3 Orjan Bodin and Henrik Osterblom, ‘International fisheries regime effectiveness—Activities and resources of key actors in the 
Southern Ocean’, Global Environmental Change, 23 (2013) 948–956 at 948. 
4 For example, in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources (CCAMLR), the Association for 
Respons ble Krill harvesting companies functions to support the compliance activities of the organisation.  
5 Bodin and Osterblom, above n 3.  
6 Bodin and Osterblom, above n 3. 







achieving sustainable fisheries,8 it is argued that the assumption that flag States alone control 
international fisheries can no longer be said to be correct.  
 
Despite this influence, many of these large and powerful fishing corporations have yet to assume 
responsibility for the fisheries they influence.9 However, others are engaging in a positive way 
with regulatory organisations such as RFMOs to achieve compliance outcomes for the fishery 
concerned. There is growing evidence that engagement in policy-making and research efforts by 
influential corporations is increasing in RFMOs and that this trend can be beneficial to the work of 
the RFMO.10 While the motivations of the corporation must always be questioned, it is also true 
that the motivations of States in decision-making in RFMOs should be equally challenged.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to justify the approach adopted in this thesis by explaining the 
practical and theoretical framework within which the study is being undertaken.  To do this, 
certain terminology adopted for the purposes of the thesis is first explained in a ‘vocabulary and 
definitions’ section. The notion of sustainability is defined as it applies to this thesis and terms 
including ‘keystone actors’, ‘sustainable leadership’, and ‘private-sector compliance measures’ 
are introduced. This section also clarifies that the thesis is adopting a broad definition of 
compliance as any effort by a party to pursue the objectives of an RFMO by utilising either 
rationalist or normative means. 
 
Next the chapter considers the theoretical framework, or ‘governance theories’, which form the 
basis of the thesis hypothesis and approach adopted to this research. Here the theory which 
underpins why States, organisations and individuals choose to comply with international fisheries 
law is examined. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the theories which underpin this 
approach are also shown to be an important contributing factor to the compliance discussion. So 
too is the international legal principle of shared responsibility, which suggests that both the 
private-sector and the relevant governmental body share responsibility for the maintenance of 
the resource.   
 
Finally this chapter explains the methodology adopted in this thesis. It will test the hypothesis that 
there are significant inconsistencies between and amongst AusRFMOs in their adoption of 
conservation measures to support their compliance and enforcement regimes. This will be 
achieved by collecting data on the current conservation measures of six AusRFMOs and 
 
8 Österblom H, Jouffray J-B, Folke C, Crona B, Troell M, Merrie A, et al. (2015) Transnational Corporations as ‘Keystone 
Actors’ in Marine Ecosystems. PLoS ONE 10(5): e0127533.Available online at 
<http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0127533> 
9 Ibid. 
10 H Osterblom and O Bodin, ‘Global Cooperation among Diverse Organizations to Reduce Illegal Fishing in the Southern 





undertaking a comparison of how complete and comprehensive their suite of compliance 
enforcement mechanisms are. This will form an assessment as to where the main gaps are 
between and amongst AusRFMOs, assisted by insight from performance reviews of the 




As a group of organisations whose collective decisions impact on the strength of the wider 
compliance enforcement capacity of a region, it is critical that AusRFMOs work together if they 
are to achieve any real impact on the health of global fish stocks. Despite this there remains 
significant inconsistencies often even in the terminology used to discuss a particular approach or 
particular conservation measure. This section aims to clarify the meaning and intent behind the 
recommendations made in this thesis and ensure that any level of uncertainty around the 




In 1987, just five years after the adoption of the LOSC, a report of the United Nations World 
Commission on Environment and Development entitled ‘Our Common Future’ (otherwise known 
as the ‘Brundtland Report’)11 defined ecologically sustainable development (ESD) as 
development that ‘seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising 
the ability to meet those of the future.’12  In this way, sustainable development may be seen to be 
an organisational principle for human life on a finite planet, whereby living conditions and 
resource-use meet human needs without undermining natural systems.  Many critics now 
recognise sustainable development as essential for the longevity of the human race.  The 
Brundtland Report found that a ‘transition to sustainable development’13 must occur in 
governance approaches, if we are to retain a healthy planet and population into the future.    
 
To understand the conservation objectives of AusRFMOs, it is important to examine the concept 
of sustainability and its evolution alongside the associated concept of ecosystem-based 
management (EBM). Such concepts are fundamental to the direction that marine governance 
efforts have taken in recent decades. The limitations of traditional governance methods, ie. 
single-sector management and population-driven approaches, have been demonstrated as 
lacking with respect to their ability to comprehend the impacts of the activity on its associated 
 
11 Brundtland G, ‘Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future’, 1987, United 
Nations General Assembly document A/42/427. Available online at: <http://www.sciepub.com/reference/92946> 
12 Ibid.  





ecosystem and environment.  Indeed the calls for reform to fisheries governance examined 
below have been motivated by the requirement that governance contemplate ecosystems, 
environments and the need for sustainability.  
 
The interconnectedness of species which occur in the same ecosystem is no longer escaping the 
minds of governing bodies in the fisheries sphere.  While certain governance bodies do remain 
limited by the scope of their mandate, others are adapting to incorporate measures which seek to 
conserve species affected by the actions of those fishing for the target catch. Indeed, some 
governance regimes have gone further and have shaped their regime around a sustainability-
based approach with not only species but environmental damage considered in conservation 
measures.  
 
However, the question of what sustainability actually ‘is’ remains.  This thesis adopts the 
following definition of sustainability as a mechanism which: 
 
• extends the socially useful life of organisations, 
• enhances the planet’s ability to maintain and renew the viability of the biosphere 
and protect all living species, 
• enhances society’s ability to maintain itself and to solve its major problems, and  
• maintains a decent level of welfare for present and future generations of 
humanity.14 
 
In this way, it can be demonstrated that organisations engaging in sustainable leadership for 
example will engage in activities that contributes to one or a number of the above objectives15 
This concept is explored further below in this chapter’s examination of corporate social 
responsibility.  
 
However, the notion that natural resources should be managed with consideration of the impacts 
of such exploitation on ecosystems is not new.  ‘Ecosystems-based management’ (EBM) was 
originally contemplated in the mid-1980s and recognises that environmental impacts are almost 
always felt on an ecosystem-level rather than on a single species.16  Proponents of EBM argue 
that the environment ought to be managed in whole ecological units based on integrative 
biological, physical or socioeconomic assessments.    
 
 
14 Dexter Dunphy, ‘Corporate Sustainability: Challenge to Managerial Orthodoxies’, Journal of Management and Organisation, 
Volume 9, Issue 1 January 2003 , p. 2-11 
15 Ibid.  






EBM represents a unique approach to fisheries governance in that it is concerned with sustaining 
ecosystems to meet ecological and human needs into the future.    This approach continues to 
gain favour and in fisheries management, EBM emerged as an alternative approach to single-
species management in the early 2000s.17 Since then, it has been implemented into fisheries 
governance frameworks on a national and international level, recognising the need to support the 
ecosystems in which single species depend to survive.  
 
EBM aims to balance the need to protect ecosystem health with the need to provide resources to 
the people.  In this way, EMB has a strong temporal element and cannot exist without recognition 
of an associated concept: that of sustainability.18 EBM is connected to sustainability in that it is 
required if we are to achieve intergenerational-equity, where the resource is to be managed not 
only for the short-term, but with recognition of the rights of future generations.19 Sustainability is 
inherently linked to basic questions of equity in that it requires fairness, social justice and quality 




As already discussed, to tackle the question of how governance of high seas fisheries may be 
reformed, we must understand who ‘owns’ the resource, in a technical legal sense as well as in a 
practical sense. It is the starting point of this thesis that while the legal framework governing high 
seas fisheries places the State at the centre of resource ownership, with thirteen global 
corporations controlling up to 16% of total wild capture fisheries worldwide,20 stocks which are 
also, coincidentally, the largest and most valuable fisheries, we must question traditional notions 
of flag State responsibility on the high seas.  
 
A recent study into these thirteen global influential corporations identifies them as ‘keystone 
actors’ in that they, ‘dominate all segments of seafood production, operate through an extensive 
global network of subsidiaries and are profoundly involved in fisheries and aquaculture decision-
making.’21  The study in question found that keystone actors comprise a central feature in this 
‘new global dynamic’,22 but that they have yet to assume the responsibility that comes with this 
role on a global scale.  
 
 
17 Ibid.  
18 Dunphy, above n 14. 
19 G.D. Meyers and S.C. Muller, "The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications, and Practical Limitations of Adopting 
Sustainable Development as National and International Policy," 4 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 1-44 (1996). 
20 Osterblom et al, above n 8. 
21 Osterblom et al, above n 8.  





However, we are increasingly seeing examples of the private-sector engaging in the compliance 
regime of AusRFMOs.23  To describe this trend, this thesis adopts terminology applied in a 
recent study by the Stockholm Resilience Centre24: the term ‘sustainable leadership’. While not 
explicitly defined by the Centre, sustainable leadership might be evident where influential 
keystone actors become leaders in their field by promoting sustainable fisheries measures. This 
concept is similar to the notion of ‘responsible leadership’ which is linked to corporate social 
responsibility and sustainability.25  
 
Where we can start to see examples of ‘sustainable leadership’ by keystone actors in 
AusRFMOs, this could in turn enable a critical transition towards improved management of 
marine living resources and ecosystems.26 This thesis investigates how sustainable leadership 
by corporations in respect of achieving compliance with RFMO conservation measures may 
impact upon the compliance capability of the RFMO overall. Sustainable leadership has the 
power to strengthen RFMOs and enable a critical transition towards improved management of 
global fish stocks.27 
 
Having introduced the idea of ‘sustainable leadership’, this thesis suggests that corporations may 
attain ‘leadership status’ by engaging in ‘private-sector compliance measures’.  These measures 




For the purposes of this thesis, ‘private-sector compliance measures’ may be defined as 
initiatives adopted by the private-sector in the interests of achieving sustainable high-seas 
fisheries. This may occur by any private-sector entity releasing sustainability reports, or by 
changing the fishing gear they use to achieve a sustainable seafood certification. While not 
necessarily directly linked to the compliance measures of AusRFMOs, private-sector compliance 
measures can assist in promoting or achieving the objectives of the relevant RFMO.  
 
Private-sector compliance measures may take many forms and may be undertaken by 
corporations individually or as a group. Where a number of actors with similar incentives and 
values band together to develop mechanisms in the interests of sustainability, this may also be 
considered a private-sector compliance measure.28  Private-sector compliance measures are 
 
23 Osterblom et al, above n 8.  
24 Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden. 
25 Meyers and Muller, above n 19. 
26 Osterblom, above n 8. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Österblom, H., and C. Fo ke. 2013. Emergence of global adaptive governance for stewardship of regional marine resources. 





voluntary and self-imposed,29 and may leverage a certification scheme to achieve their goal.30 
The adoption of private-sector compliance measures by a company will often depend upon their 
willingness to invest in sustainability outcomes, their ability to fund these outcomes and to trust in 
their counterparts within the relevant fishery.31   
 
Figure 1 of this thesis identifies three key categories of private-sector compliance measures and 
specific examples which fall under these key categories.32 These three categories are broadly 
described below: 
 
 Cooperative – where the compliance measure is driven by the individual corporation or 
the association and utilises cooperation between fishing corporations to achieve 
sustainable leadership.  
 Benchmarking – where the compliance measure, driven by either the individual 
corporation or the association, leverages corporate benchmarking to achieve 
sustainability leadership.   
 Political – where an individual company, or association of companies, seeks to engage in 
the governance process of an RFMO by leveraging political engagement.  
 
These categories are not, however, entirely distinct from one another and often one measure 
may deliver upon multiple objectives and outcomes.  
 
This thesis argues that underneath each of these categories of private-sector compliance 
measures are different types of actions that may be undertaken by a company or a group of 
fishing companies. An explanation of each is outlined in the below table using examples of how 
they may operate in practice. 
 
Table 1: Private-sector engagement in RFMOs 
Cooperative Measures 
 
Sustainability associations: a group of fishing corporations 
may join together to form an association in the interests of 
achieving sustainable outcomes for the fishery.  
Information sharing: fishing corporations operating in the 
same sector may share information regarding their catch to 
 
29 Self-imposed initiatives may be adopted by individual fishers for the purpose of demonstrating that they are meeting 
sustainability standards. Examples of this might include sustainability reporting or the adoption of sustainability policies. 
30 Association-based initiatives may include a group of entities which have united with a common mandate for sustainability.  
Improving the sustainability of the sector may be at stake here. 
31 Osterblom, above n 10. 





monitor the overall take for the fishery amongst themselves at 
any given point in the season. 
Monitoring and surveillance: fishing corporations operating in 
the same sector may take it upon themselves to undertake 
monitoring and surveillance activities and provide this 
information to one another, the relevant State or the relevant 
RFMO. 
Benchmarking Measures Certification schemes: a group of fishing companies may fund 
the attainment of a sustainability certification for their fishery. 
Self-imposed sustainability reporting: a fishing company or 
group of companies may take it upon themselves to set their 
own sustainability goals and publicly report on progress against 
those goals on an annual basis (or otherwise). 
Transparency: a fishing company may agree to make their 
documentation publically available in the interests of 
demonstrating their legitimacy to consumers, in comparison to 
other companies.  
Political Measures Lobbying: a fishing company or group of companies may 
undertake political lobbying to achieve a sustainability goal for 
their fishery.  
Funding research projects: a fishing company or association 
may target certain States, including in particular developing 
States, to fund project to build their compliance capacity. 
Engagement in RFMOs: a fishing company or association may 
gain observer status to an RFMO and use this status to achieve 
a compliance outcome. 
 
Specific examples of private-sector compliance measures have been examined in literature for 
their contribution to sustainable leadership;33 however, there is little academic commentary on 
the phenomenon of private-sector compliance measures generally.  
 
The thesis argues that if governance regimes are able to leverage and utilise private-sector 
compliance measures, this will encourage the adoption of the principle of shared responsibility in 
 
33 R. Quentin Grafton et al, ‘Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries’ on NRC Research Press (15 February 2006) 





AusRFMOs. The ‘transition to sustainable development’34 will most likely occur in an 




Understanding how the resource-user can contribute to the compliance capability of RFMOs 
requires an understanding of terminology which has only recently been coined via social science 
studies.35 Most notably, the work of Henrik Österblom36 has influenced the framework for this 
thesis and has provided the basis for the assertion that private-sector compliance can drive 




From a sociological perspective, Tom Tyler37 argues that there are two basic principles that 
explain why States adopt and implement international laws: the ‘instrumental’ approach and the 
‘normative’ approach.38  The instrumental approach reflects the notion of the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ and recognises that States are primarily driven by self-interest.39 It suggests that in a 
fisheries context, compliance is determined by States’ expectations that sanctions will flow from a 
violation of regulations and therefore their behaviour is dictated by external factors.40   
 
Both nationals and States under this view are seen as ‘utility maximising individuals’41 who 
compare the costs of non-compliance (both social and economic) to the potential gain to be 
made from such behaviour.42  Under this approach, coercive measures, such as the use of force 
or removal of fishing privileges, represent the most effective mechanism for ensuring compliance 
with fisheries regulations.43 The ‘normative’ approach emphasises the voluntary aspect of 
compliance and places the ability of authorities to secure compliance, ‘in the hands of those they 
lead’.44  In a global fisheries context, under both approaches, industry leaders often determine 
the effectiveness or otherwise of RFMO compliance measures.  
 
 
34 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, Transmitted to the General 
Assembly as an Annex to UN Doc A/42/427 (20 March 1987) (‘The Brundtland Report’) at para 53. 
35 Osterblom, above n 10. 
36 Henrik Österblom, PhD, Associate Professor, Deputy Science Director, STOCKHOLM RESILIENCE CENTRE, Stockholm 
University, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden 
37 Tom Tyler is Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, New York University, New York. 
38 T. R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006) 165. 
39 Olav Schram Stokke, Governing High Seas Fisheries: the Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (2001) 122. 
40 Jesper Raakjær Nielsen, 'An Analytical Framework for Studying: Compliance and Legitimacy in Fisheries Management' 
(2003) 27(5) Marine Policy 425. 
41 Tyler, above n 38. 
42 Nielsen, above n 40 at 427. 
43 Nielsen, above n 40 at 427. 







The principle of shared responsibility has to date been rarely used in legal literature and the 
concept is one relatively new to the academic discourse.  It is a term that refers to the 
underexplored problem of allocation of responsibilities amongst multiple states and other actors, 
and has particular relevance in international environmental law.45   In fact, the example of high 
seas fish stocks management is often cited as demonstrative of the principle of shared 
responsibility in that it poses challenging questions relating to who is responsible for the over-
exploitation of high seas fish stocks.  
 
Shared responsibility seeks to address the challenge where multiple actors contribute to harmful 
outcomes.46 The determination of responsibility for such outcomes then becomes challenging 
and often, the law does not allow for the shared allocation of responsibility and blame.  For 
example, the LOSC provides that under the principle of flag State responsibility, it is the sole 
responsibility of States to cooperate via RFMOs for the conservation of global fisheries 
resources.  However, in reality, it is often more likely that key-stone actors, rather than the State, 
will have the primary ability to influence global fisheries resources.  
 
The principle of shared responsibility refers to situations where a ‘multiplicity of actors contributes 
to a single harmful outcome, and legal responsibility for this harmful outcome is distributed 
among more than one of the contributing actors’.47  International law recognises States as the 
bearers of responsibility, however, states can only act through individuals or private 
corporations.48 Therefore, international law must address certain questions concerning the 
interaction between these actors. 
 
It is well recognised that regulatory authorities should constantly be concerned with maintaining 
the involvement of participants in the regime they administer.49  However, there is a gap in legal 
discourse considering how RFMOs interact with the private-sector. This is particularly true in a 
compliance sense.  As cooperative action between the private-sector and RFMOs increases, so 
does the strength of the argument that responsibility for regional fisheries failures is shared by 
both the State (often via the RFMO convention) and the private-sector.   
 
This thesis applies the principle of shared responsibility to suggest that RFMOs will benefit from 
increased engagement by the private-sector in the regulatory compliance sphere.  It seeks to 
 
45 A. Nol kaemper & I. Plakokefalos (Eds.), Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of 
the Art (Shared Responsibility in International Law, p. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
46 Ibid, at 1. 
47 Ibid at 7. 
48 Ibid at 61. 





demonstrate that the strongest regional regimes are those which extend beyond conventional 
notions of flag State compliance to leverage industry compliance mechanisms and engage with 
the opportunities they provide.  As the frequency and variety of cooperative action between 
States and non-State actors increases, there is a need for new perspectives that help to address 
how RFMOs might develop approaches that better serve the interests of injured parties under 




Today, the difference between flag State responsibility and corporate social responsibility in 
respect of the protection and preservation of global oceans is becoming blurred.  Today, global 
corporations can take more fish than an entire State, and certainly have the capacity to ‘buy-out’ 
the resources of an entire State’s EEZ.51  Yet complex and innovative solutions to ‘improving’52 
flag State responsibility and ‘strengthening’53 RFMOs continue to reside at the centre of legal 
discourse on the problem of global fisheries management.   
 
As noted above private-sector compliance measures have evolved significantly in recent 
decades in an effort to address the deepening crisis of declining global fisheries.  Industry has 
harnessed measures including sustainability reporting, eco-labelling, and monitoring and 
compliance schemes and to increase their engagement in the international fisheries governance 
space.  Recent evidence suggests that this trend is on the increase.54 
 
An examination of the theoretical underpinnings of CSR can assist in how this theory might 
operate in international fisheries. Andrew Crane55 explains that there exists no universally 
accepted definition of CSR56 as it can mean different things depending upon the philosophical or 
political standpoint from which it is being approached. There are four groups of corporate social 
responsibility theories, of which two will now be contrasted to demonstrate the variation in 
approach. The first, ‘shareholder value theory’ or ‘fiduciary capitalism’ posits that the only social 
responsibility of business is to make profit and increase the value of the company for 
shareholders.57 This theory views human beings as individuals who are free in society to make 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 The Guardian, above n 7.  
52 Best Practices for High Seas Fisheries Management: Lessons Learned Marjorie L. Mooney-Seus and Andrew A. Rosenberg 
EEDP BP 07/03 May 2007. 
53 Ibid.  
54 The Guardian, above n 7. 
55 Andrew Crane is the George R. Gardiner Professor of Business Ethics, and Director of the Centre of Excellence in 
Respons ble Business at the Schulich School of Business at York University in Toronto. <acrane@schulich.yorku.ca> 
56 Andrew Crane Guido Palazzo Laura J. Spence Dirk Matten, Contesting the Value of “Creating Shared Value”, California 
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their own choices and as such, only those who may directly gain from the activities of the 
business should drive the management approach of that business.  
 
The second, ‘stakeholder theory’ posits that groups and individuals who benefit from or who are 
harmed from the actions of a company should drive the management approach of that 
business.58  Under this theory, it is recognised that economic success in the long run cannot be 
achieved unless shareholders’ interests as well as the interests of, ‘employees, customers, 
suppliers, local communities and others with an interest in companies’ activities’59 are taken into 
account.  In this way, stakeholder theory is seen as a managerial theory related to business 
success in contemporary society where stakeholders have multiplied to include non-government 
organisations, activists, media, communities and many others.60  
 
An alternative approach to CSR to those theories described above is that of ‘corporate social 
performance theory’.  This theory asserts that corporate responsibility is a process whereby a 
company responds to social demands with policies, programs and tangible results.61 This theory 
highlights that society gives license to business to operate and as such, business must serve 
society beyond meeting its economic and legal responsibilities.62  Business has power and 
power entails responsibility; as a result, a company may be vulnerable to risk if its approach is 
contrary to the way its customers expect it to behave.  Corporate social performance theory 
emphasises that companies must accept and work with their communities to integrate community 
expectations into their management approach.  
 
While some may search for a legal, economic or ethical obligation to establish the premise that 
companies must act in a responsible manner towards their customers, Crane et al emphasise 
that many companies adopt a sustainable leadership approach not for reasons of economic gain 
but merely because they wish to ‘do the right thing.’  Perhaps companies recognise the position 
of power that they yield over the consumer and the morals of executives are driving the 
behaviour of the whole.  Whatever the case, it is clear that as Davis63 asserts, ‘business needs 
social acceptance’ to be successful and with society continually evolving, business must remain 
connected to society’s expectations.   
 
 
58 Ibid at 19. 
59 Ibid at 17. 
60 Crane, above n 56 at 6. 
61 Ibid at 4 
62 Ibid.  
63 The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, Andrew Crane, Abagail McWilliams, Dirk Matten, Jeremy Moon, 





The ‘Dexter Dunphy Scale,’64 developed in 2003, provides a model for corporate social 
responsibility which recognises that businesses can no longer continue to operate as usual and 
must adapt to ensure business, social and ecological sustainability.65  Dunphy supports the idea 
that responsibility for ensuring the sustainability of our global resources can no longer be said to 
fall solely to government.66   
 
Dunphy, then, develops phases within which a business might sit in terms of coming to 






 strategic pro-activity  
 the sustaining corporation67 
 
Under this model, a company that is a ‘sustaining corporation’ is not just complying with a 
regime, but adopting its own measures to go beyond the requirements of the law. It is here that 
we can see the application of the Dexter Dunphy Scale to the increasing adoption of private-
sector compliance measures. It is clear that today, certain fishing corporations are meeting this 
standard and are exceeding expectations. However others continue to linger in the traditional 
model whereby the State directs the corporation to comply or face RFMO enforcement tactics.   
 
Essential steps to progression by the private-sector through the phases of Dunphy’s model might 
be articulated as follows: 
 
Transparency  Commitment  Ownership  Accountability  
           
           
   Sustainable ship 
 
Where the corporation begins from the point of transparency, rather than corporate knowledge 
retention, they can then commence on the path to making a commitment to meeting and 
understanding their sustainability obligations.  When they come to own those obligations, this is 
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65 Dunphy, above n 14. 
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where the true transition point occurs and they become accountable to themselves, rather than 
the State.  This accountability leads to shared responsibility and sustainable leadership whereby 
the corporation can strengthen existing legal provisions, build fisheries compliance and fill their 
own governance gaps without requiring international fisheries arrangements to be modified or 
new agreements to be developed.  
 
This thesis suggests that when keystone actors attain the status of ‘sustaining corporations’, we 
will see responsibility for global fisheries appropriately allocated and in turn, the effective 
governance of high seas fish stocks. This shift may be incentivised by the private-sector being 
able to frame their operations in a positive ethical light with the consumer, thereby enabling them 
to gain a business edge and often charge more for the product being sourced.68  By claiming the 
impacts of their activities, it is demonstrated, corporations can gain a business advantage as well 
as contribute to the sustainability of their operation. 
 
In an era where traditional governance frameworks on the high seas have failed to achieve 
sustainable global fish stocks, it is argued that the ability and efforts of corporations to fill gaps 
and contribute to improving the status of regulatory regimes is growing increasingly important.  
As with other industries, certification schemes and reporting initiatives instigated by industry in 
response to CSR obligations are growing increasingly popular in an international fisheries 
context.  CSR can be seen as a linchpin for achieving positive behavioural change in the 
corporations responsible for the depletion of the resource with which this thesis is concerned. It is 
the objective of this thesis to examine the potential of CSR to counter the tragic effects of the 




This thesis aims to make recommendations for reform to assist AusRFMOs become more 
adaptive and resilient to the challenges posed by non-compliance. It achieves this by first testing 
the hypothesis that there are inconsistencies among AusRFMOs in their adoption of compliance 
measures. It then suggests that AusRFMOs may increase compliance rates by improving 
industry perceptions of regulatory legitimacy in AusRFMOs. 
 
This thesis starts from the presumption that a combination of sustainable leadership by 
corporations and flag State responsibility exists today to ‘govern’ global fisheries.  This has been 
demonstrated largely via the work of Henrik Österblom and co-authors to such works including, 
 





notably, Rashid Sumaila,69 as already referred to throughout the course of this thesis. The 
presumption also allows for the problem of RFMO compliance to be viewed as a challenge to 
both the flag State, and the resource user, under the principle of shared responsibility.70  
 
This thesis posits that the strongest regional regimes are those which extend beyond 
conventional notions of flag State compliance, to leverage industry compliance mechanisms and 
engage with the opportunities they provide.  With wild-capture fisheries facing overexploitation, 
this thesis asserts that best-practice for AusRFMOs in a compliance sphere can and should 




At the time of writing, there are 18 RFMOs in operation globally as demonstrated in Table 1 
below. While a definition of RFMOs has previously been provided, it is also worth noting that 
RFMOs have ‘competence under international law to adopt legally binding conservation and 
management measures regarding fisheries.’71 Also, the area to which this legal competence 
applies includes a part of the high seas.72  
 
Some have suggested that it is useful to identify three different basic types of RFMOs:   
 General RFMOs,73  
 Tuna RFMOs,74 and   
 Specialised RFMOs.75 
 
The RFMOs under analysis in this thesis include the following general RFMOs: 
 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources (CCAMLR) 
 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) 
 Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SIOFA) 
 
The following RFMOs under analysis in this thesis are Tuna RFMOs: 
 
69 Institute for the Oceans and Fisheries, University of British Columbia. Profile available online at: 
http://www.fisheries.ubc.ca/faculty-staff/rashid-sumaila  
70 Nollkaemper, above n 45. 
71 Stefan Asmundsson, ‘Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs):  Who are they, what is their geographic 
coverage on the high seas and which ones should be considered as General RFMOs, Tuna RFMOs and Specialised RFMOs?’ 
paper submitted to the 2016 meeting of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Available online at: 
<https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/mar/soiom-2016-01/other/soiom-2016-01-fao-19-en.pdf> 
72 Ibid. 
73 Rather than having legal competence regarding specific species or groups of species, ‘general RFMOs’ can adopt measures 
for most fisheries in their respective areas. Stefan Asmundsson, ‘Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs):  
Who are they, what is their geographic coverage on the high seas and which ones should be considered as General RFMOs, 
Tuna RFMOs and Specialised RFMOs?’ paper submitted to the 2016 meeting of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
74 Because of the distinct nature of tuna fisheries, all over the world specific RFMOs have been established explicitly to manage 
fisheries for tuna and tuna-like species.  





 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) 
 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) 
 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
 
Interestingly, two of the most recently formed RFMOs are AusRFMOs: the SIOFA and the 
SPRFMO both of which entered into force in 2012.76 Australia’s key priorities in these regions 
include implementing best-practice approaches from the instigation of these agreements and 
continuing to work with a coalition of parties towards sustainable management of the species 




This thesis seeks to demonstrate that AusRFMOs are currently facing critical challenges 
regarding their compliance capacity and that private-sector compliance measures represent a 
practical opportunity to address these challenges. As such, the research approach adopted in 
this thesis tests the hypothesis that there are significant inconsistencies between and amongst 
AusRFMOs in their adoption of conservation measures to support their compliance regime.  
 
The thesis demonstrates that AusRFMOs have varied and inconsistent approaches to adopting 
compliance measures by collecting data on the current conservation measures of the six 
AusRFMOs currently in existence.  Then, a comparison of how complete and comprehensive 
their respective suite of compliance enforcement mechanisms shows that while some 
AusRFMOs are doing well to implement the full range of compliance measures available to them, 
others are not as advanced.  
 
Once it is established that there are inconsistencies across the AusRFMO collective compliance 
regime, the final chapters of this thesis demonstrate how private-sector compliance measures 
represent an opportunity to promote improved compliance with AusRFMOs. The following stages 
clarify the practical actions undertaken in the course of this research project to demonstrate 




Information was collected on each of the RFMOs under examination including member States, 
historical evolution, and fisheries regulated. An analysis was undertaken of the performance 
 
76 Australian Government Department of Agriculture, ‘International Fisheries’ (Web Page) 
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reviews published by AusRFMOs and a summary was made of the key compliance issues facing 
each organisation. This summary served to highlight the key areas for improvement identified for 
each and provide a status update on how AusRFMOs are addressing the issues reflected in 
these reviews. This data was gained by accessing information including the founding agreements 




The types of measures that might constitute ‘private-sector compliance measures’ were 
considered and a figure was developed to clarify the different categories of these measures as 
they are assessed in the context of this thesis. This figure, Figure 1, outlines ‘cooperative’, 
‘benchmarking’ and ‘political’ as categories for bottom-up compliance measures which may be 




Next a summary of the most recent performance reviews of AusRFMOs was undertaken to 
determine where the RFMO was placed in comparison to the other AusRFMOs under 
examination in the thesis.  A ranking of ‘basic’, ‘satisfactory’ or ‘established’ was allocated to 
each RFMO in terms of their compliance performance by using pre-existing findings of their 




A comprehensive and up-to-date desktop assessment of the compliance measures in existence 
in each AusRFMO was collated and tabulated. This included consideration of any future 
compliance measures which may have been tabled at meetings of the AusRFMOs. Data was 




Finally, the ways in which private-sector compliance measures may fill certain gaps in the 
compliance capacity of AusRFMOs was considered and specific recommendations made for how 
this process might commence. Private-sector compliance measures were shown to have promise 







As a group of organisations whose collective decisions impact on the strength of the wider 
compliance enforcement capacity of a region, it is critical that AusRFMOs work together if they 
are to achieve any real impact on the health of global fish stocks.  Where the findings from this 
thesis demonstrate that there remain areas for improvement, it is suggested that an alternative 
vision of compliance enforcement, where the resource-user shares responsibility with the 
regulator to achieve compliance with conservation measures, holds significant promise to 




This chapter has introduced new terminology for the purposes of undertaking this study which 
include the notion of ‘keystone actors’, or large international organisations that have a significant 
influence in global fisheries management. This concept is critical to understanding how private-
sector compliance measures can and should be taken into account in supporting the work that 
AusRFMOs have to do.  
 
The chapter has also explained how sustainable leadership is given effect via private-sector 
compliance measures and that underlying both of these concepts is the international legal 
principle of shared responsibility.  By suggesting that both the private-sector and the relevant 
governmental body share responsibility for the maintenance of the resource, the principle of 
shared responsibility holds significant promise for the future of a high-seas fisheries regime 
lacking ‘teeth’. 
 
This thesis is concerned with whether there are positive outcomes to be gained where the 
private-sector works alongside the RFMO in an effort to achieve sustainable fisheries. It is 
suggested that continually drafting new layers of treaty-type agreements in an attempt to improve 
fisheries governance is not the most effective use of energy and resources. To re-direct efforts in 
the most effective manner to achieve sustainable fisheries we must turn to promote sustainable 
leadership via CSR, to recognise the influence of ‘keystone actors’ and to understand how 












Table. 2.  Regional Fisheries Management Organisations Currently in Force (AusRFMOs 
highlighted in bold) 
 
Date of Entry 
Into Force 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisation Acronym 
1923 International Pacific Halibut Commission IPHC  
1946 International Whaling Commission IWC  
1950 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission IATTC  
1952 General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean  GFCM  
1969 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ICCAT  
1979 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization NAFO  
1982 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources 
CCAMLR  
1982 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission NEAFC  
1983 North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization NASCO  
1985 Pacific Salmon Commission PSC  
1993 North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission NPAFC  
1994 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna CCSBT 
1996 Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Pollock 
Resources in the Central Bering Sea 
CCBSP  
1996 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission IOTC  
2003 South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization SEAFO  
2004 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission WCPFC  
2012 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation SPRFMO 










Effective fisheries management is the responsibility of fishers, fisheries management authorities, 
fishery scientists and other groups engaging in the regulation and exploitation of the resource.1 
The implications of this reality are that fisheries managers are not always best placed to take 
action to address problems within a particular fishery, or to fully understand the underlying 
causes of the problem in order to effectively address the situation.2  Co-operation and 
communication between fisheries user-groups and regulators to ensure open channels for 
information exchange is therefore fundamental to achieving sustainable global fisheries.3  
 
Damage to ecosystems and global marine environments as a result of unsustainable fishing 
approaches is, in a contemporary fishing climate, one of the major obstacles to effective fisheries 
management.4  Many commercial fishing operators target predatory species such as tuna; in 
some cases leading to an 80% reduction in tuna populations.5  The exploitation and targeting of 
specific species in this way has resulted in the overfishing of prey species as humans adjust their 
appetites to settle for the less desirable but more commercially available prey species.6   
 
Contributing to this exploitation, the thriving aquaculture industry today requires a constant 
supply of prey to be caught and ground into meal to ‘grow’ fish bred within captivity.7  Inevitably, 
it is not fishing practices alone that reduce stocks on the high seas and within EEZs but also the 
impact that the removal of such fish has on other species that has furthered the crisis of 
international fisheries present today.  It is important to recognise at this point that the threat of 
climate change to the world’s fisheries imposes another layer of uncertainty to scientific studies 
into the impact of overfishing on marine ecosystems.8  
 
 
1 Cochrane, K.L. (ed.) ‘A fishery managers guidebook. Management measures and their application’. FAO Fisheries Technical 
Paper. No. 424. Rome, FAO. 2002.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Andrew R Smith, Papers presented at the Expert Consultation on Sustainable Fishing Technologies and Practices St. John's, 
Newfoundland, Canada, 1 - 6 March 1998 pp 145. 
4 E.J Molenaar, 'Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management, Commercial Fisheries, Marine Mammals and the 2001 Reykjavik 
Declaration in the Context of International Fisheries Law' (2002) 17(4) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
561, 563. 
5 Margot L. Stiles et al, Hungry Oceans: What Happens When The Prey Is Gone? (2009) 4. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 G L Lugten, 'CCAMLR and COFI: Challenges from the Twenty-Eighth Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries' (2009)  





So what is the role of fisheries managers in addressing this situation? In his Guidebook for 
Fisheries Managers, Kevern Cochrane explains that, ‘all too often the fisheries manager remains 
either unaware of the state of the resources, or fails to act sufficiently as the fisheries slip further 
and further into decay and crisis, or both. This is rarely, if ever, a deliberate choice…’9   
 
Cochrane suggests that a lack of available information, resources and a failure to understand the 
complexity of regulation are amongst the issues faced by fisheries managers which prevent 
effective governance.  Escalating this problem is the fact that there exists no agreed definition of 
‘fisheries management’ and the concept itself is one which can differ dramatically from regime to 
regime.  
 
The ability of the regulatory organisation to employ incentives to encourage the voluntary 
engagement of the resource-user in compliance efforts has proven itself to be an effective 
alternative where traditional governance approaches have failed.10 There is an increasing body 
of evidence to suggest that leveraging the knowledge, information and skills of the resource-user 
to tackle new threats to the sustainability of a fishery is both logical and effective.11 
 
This thesis argues that where the regulator does not take into account the governance 
contribution of the resource-user and where the resource-user does not demonstrate sustainable 
leadership, this can pose a significant risk to the sustainability of a fisheries regime. One reason 
why engaging the resource-user in implementing regulatory measures has proven so effective 
may be that in doing so, responsibility transfer occurs, empowering those who are well-placed to 
address the problem. 
 
Instead of stock level declines and depleted fisheries being viewed as a problem for which the 
regulator is to blame, responsibility transfer occurs and the onus is shared for the consequences 
of actions.12 Critics have argued that a ‘transition to sustainable development’13 must occur if 
governments are to ensure the sustainable development of life on our planet.  
 
It is argued that commentary on reform to fisheries governance all too often considers legal and 
institutional efforts to advance governance without recognising the importance of engaging the 
sector itself. If, as many commentators continue to assert, a holistic and multi-sectoral and 
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collaborative solution provides the best option to achieving effective reform to fisheries 
governance, then further consideration of the role of the resource-user will be beneficial. 
 
This chapter begins by clarifying some of the technicalities of how AusRFMOs operate. This 
includes exploring the process for adopting compliance-related conservation measures and the 
impact of such measures. It also explains the different types of membership to AusRFMOs 
including: ‘contracting parties’, ‘cooperating non-contracting parties’ and ‘non-cooperating 
parties’. 
 
This chapter then explores the operation of the individual AusRFMOs in question. This includes 
their mandates, geographic remit, States parties and, in particular, how they are currently 
performing with regards to achieving compliance. All bar one of the AusRFMOs under 
examination have published at least one performance review14 which will be analysed and used 
to gain a current perspective on the key compliance issues impacting each.  
 
In an era where traditional governance frameworks on the high seas have largely failed to 
achieve sustainable global fish stocks, this chapter concludes that the ability and efforts of the 
private-sector to fill gaps and contribute to improving the status of regulatory regimes is growing 
increasingly important.  
 
The chapter emphasises that if RFMOs are to protect against fisheries collapse, climate change, 
and the wide range of other factors impacting on their ability to maintaining stable and 
sustainable stock levels, it is in their interest to encourage a cooperative and communicative 




As explained in Chapter 1, RFMOs are, ‘intergovernmental fisheries organisations or 
arrangements…that have the competence to establish fisheries conservation and management 
measures’.15   They are established via convention or agreement between States with a common 
interest in fishing a specific area on the high seas or fishing for a specific species.   RFMOs also 
have a secretariat that operates under the governing body of States to give effect to their 
decisions and functions.16  
 
14 All AusRFMOs except the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement have undertaken a review of their performance to 
date. 
15 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by consensus at the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI, Rome, Italy, adopted on 23 
June 2001 at the 102th Session of the FAO Council. 







RFMOs are a sub-group within the larger group of RFBs.  RFBs also consist of a group of States 
or organisations that aim to work together towards conservation of fish stocks.17 They have 
varying mandates and some may be responsible for the conservation of associated species such 
as sea birds or turtles.18  However most RFBs have an advisory mandate and provide for 
mechanisms or decisions that are non-binding on their members. It is their unique ability to 
develop conservation measures to which States Parties must adhere that sets RFMOs apart 
from other RFBs.19  
 
There are different types of membership that apply to RFMOs and accordingly, different legal 
obligations are attached. First, Contracting Parties (CPs) or Members. CPs have a legal 
obligation under international law to adhere to the conservation measures that they accept upon 
becoming a party to a RFMO. In this way, enforcement action can be bought against a CP in the 
event of non-compliance.   
 
However in the case of non-Contracting Parties (NCPs), RFMOs have no legal standing to 
enforce their conservation measures in the case of non-compliance.20 In an attempt to overcome 
this problem, UNFSA provides that all States, regardless of their membership of the relevant 
RFMO, have an obligation to ensure their vessels comply with the conservation and 
management measures adopted by that RFMO.21   
 
In addition, the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (hereafter referred to as the “FAO 
Compliance Agreement”) provides that States should take measures to ensure that their vessels 
do not engage in activity which undermines the effectiveness of RFMO conservation measures.22   
 
There is some debate as to the extent to which RFMOs have the jurisdiction to create 
compliance mechanisms that apply to NCPs.23  Despite this, certain RFMOs have adopted 
 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Judith Swan, 'Decision-Making in Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements: the Evolving Role of RFBs and International 
Agreement on Decision-Making Processes' (FAO Fisheries Circular  - C995, 2004).  Available on line at 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y5357E/y5357e00.HTM> 
20 This is because States must voluntarily agree to adopt and implement RFMO conservation measures. If a States chooses not 
to then they cannot be penalised, however there are exceptions to the rule.  R. Quentin Grafton et al, Handbook of Marine 
Fisheries Conservation and Management (2010) 160. 
21 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for 
signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into force 11 December 2001), article 18(1). 
22 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the 
High Seas, opened for signature 24 November 1993, 2221 UNTS 39486 (entered into force 24 April 2003), article 3(1). 
23 The debate as to whether RFMOs might impose their conservation measures on non-contracting parties arose between 
States at CCAMLR XXVIII held in Hobart, Tasmania in 2010.  See Paragraphs 12.95 – 12.100 of the 2010 Commission Report 





conservation measures which aim to penalise non-compliant NCPs24 and there are examples of 
NCPs demonstrating an acceptance of their responsibility to RFMOs by ordering their vessels to 
comply with these measures.25   
 
In a report entitled ‘Practice of RFMOs Regarding Non-Members’, Daniel Owen26 states that all 
RFMOs should require CNCPs to confirm their commitment to ‘respect the Commission’s 
conservation and management measures’.27  As a general rule, he argues, all the conservation 
and management measures of the RFMO in question are to be complied with by CNPs.28   
 
Where a measure refers only to members, there may be some difficulty determining how it will 
apply to CNCPs but this, Owen suggests, will come down to a matter of wording.  Arguably, for 
the purposes of compliance enforcement, CNPs hold the same status as CPs unless the wording 
of a conservation measure suggests otherwise.  In summary, and for the purposes of practicality, 
this chapter considers compliance enforcement mechanisms that could theoretically be adopted 
by an RFMO to combat non-compliance by flag States with varying degrees of RFMO 
membership. 
 
Another group of parties to an RFMO, known as ‘cooperating non-contracting parties’ (CNCPs), 
are States parties who have committed to complying with the conservation measures of the 
organisation but who have yet to ratify the relevant Agreement. These CNCPs can also act in a 
manner which is non-compliant with the conservation measures of the organisation.  
 
To encourage compliance, many RFMOs have invited NCPs to accept CNCP status.29  It is up to 
the individual RFMO to determine matters such as how CNCPs will participate in the organisation 
(including their attendance at annual meetings), procedures for attaining CNP status and which 
conservation measures will apply to CNPs.  There is great variation in the approach that different 
RFMOs have to CNCPs, with certain RFMOs only recognising CNCPs for their participation in 
specific conservation measures.30   
 
 
24 Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, 'CCAMLR XXII Meeting Report', 24 October - 7 November 2003, Hobart, Australia, 
6.  Available on line at <http://www.asoc.org/Portals/0/ASOC%20final%20report%20CCAMLR%20XXII,%20Dec%2003.pdf>. 
25 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement' (2004) LI Netherlands International Law 
Review 41, 62. 
26 Owen is a barrister at the bar of England and Wales. He specializes in international, European Community and United 
Kingdom law regulating the use of the marine environment, and has worked frequently on fisheries matters.   
27 Daniel Owen, "Practice of RFMOs Regarding non-Members: A Report to Support the Independent High Level Panel to 
Develop a Model for Improved Governance by RFMOs", Cambridge, United Kingdom, February 2007, 12. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2002) accessed on line at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0098e/a0098e00.htm.  





In recent times, ‘co-management’ in fisheries governance has received increased attention 
whereby stakeholders play a role in decision-making and this has been flagged as an opportunity 
for reform in RFMOs.31 Many RFMOs have a mandate to consider biodiversity and ecologically 





In a modern fisheries context, reliance on RFMOs to recover species from the brink of extinction 
and to better regulate fish stocks for which they are responsible continues to grow.  However 
RFMOs must function under international principles established via the LOSC and the UNFSA. 
RFMO effectiveness is limited by the individual interests of States Parties, and over the years, 
States have demonstrated a lack of political will to conserve the world’s fish stocks.  As a result, 
RFMOs have struggled to meet expectations of their regulatory capacity and their effectiveness 
has been challenged. 
 
The challenges faced by RFMOs have most recently been highlighted by the publication of 
individual RFMO performance reviews; documents commonly compiled by a panel of experts 
and other relevant individuals which reflect upon the performance of the RFMO against specific 
objectives including resource management. These reviews have been prompted by a range of 
factors, including discussions at the Committee on Fisheries (COFI),32 review conferences of the 
UNFSA, as well as a series of meetings of the five RFMOs that manage the world’s tuna 
fisheries.   
 
The 2006 UNFSA Review Conference urged RFMOs to undergo performance reviews on an 
urgent basis and to publish results accordingly.33   In 2007, several members of COFI supported 
the idea of performance reviews as an opportunity to develop ‘common criteria for the evaluation 
of core functions and objection’34  In 2007, at the annual meeting of the UNFSA Review 
Conference key themes, parameters and criteria which should be assessed in performance 
reviews were discussed and agreed.  These criteria were published by the UNFAO and 




32 FAO, Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, 7-11 March 2005,  FAO Fisheries Report 
No. 780 (FIPL/R780), FAO: Rome, 2005.  
33 Recasting Transboundary Fisheries Management Arrangements In Light of Sustainable Development, Legal Aspects of 
Sustainable Development, Russell and Vanderzwaag (eds). 
34 FAO, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, 5-9 March 2007,  FAO Fisheries Report 
No. 830 (FIEL/R830), FAO: Rome, 2007, p 14. 





Today, the practice of undertaking performance reviews has been widely adopted by RFMOs 
and, not unexpectedly, these reviews have been the subject of much debate and scrutiny.  The 
results of assessments have reflected wide discrepancies in levels of performance across 
RFMOs.36  While the performance review of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) for example indicated positive results, the performance 
review of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas exposed the 
RFMO as an ‘international disgrace’37.   
 
The performance reviews of many other RFMOs have highlighted significant issues to be 
addressed and recommended that large-scale changes be adopted in the organisation to provide 
for the future sustainability of the fisheries concerned.38 In 2015, a circular commissioned by the 
UN FAO and authored by Drs Peter Szigeti and Gail Lugten entitled ‘The implementation of 
performance review reports by regional fishery bodies, 2004–2014’39 was released. As an 
information paper, rather than an opinion piece, the circular provides an overview of the evolution 
of performance reviews and goes on to study the reviews of regional fisheries bodies that had 
been undertaken at that date.  
 
Note that this report considered all regional fisheries bodies (not just RFMOs) which this thesis 
has previously explained includes RFMOs as well as organisations that do not have the capacity 
to make legally binding conservation measures. At 2014, 19 regional fisheries bodies had 
undertaken at least one performance review which the United Nations General Assembly had 
clarified should use transparent criteria, and some element of independent evaluation.40 In 
addition, the results should be made publically available.41  
 
In their 2015 circular, Szigeti and Lugten noted that it is, ‘sometimes hard to determine what 
counts as an independent, external performance review. Assessments and strategic plans for 
fisheries management, in the international sphere as well as for waters under coastal State 
jurisdiction, are nothing new.’ As was reported, many of the 19 performance reviews undertaken 
stated that they had been undertaken by an ‘external’ or ‘independent’ review panel however in 
reality, the panels were often a mix of internal and external individuals.  
 
 
36 International Programme on the State of the Ocean, ‘The Global State of the Ocean; Interactions Between Stresses, Impacts 
and Some Potential Solutions’ Synthesis papers from the International Programme on the State of the Ocean 2011 and 2012 
Workshops. Marine Pollution Bulletin, 74, Issue 2, 495. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  
39 FAO. 2015. The implementation of performance review reports by regional fishery bodies, 2004–2014, by Péter D. Szigeti 
and Gail L. Lugten. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1108. Rome, Italy.  
40 Ibid.  





These findings should be taken into account when considering the recommendations of RFMO 
performance reviews, and indeed this chapter remains cognisant of the need to continually query 
the motivations behind certain findings. Despite this, performance reviews remain an 
authoritative source of information (and in fact one of the only sources of information) on how 
RFMOs are progressing in efforts to improve their compliance regimes.  
 
In March 2019, a group of environmental non-governmental organisations published their 
submission42 to the ‘14th round of informal consultations of States Parties to the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement (UNFSA) on Performance reviews of regional fisheries management organizations 
and arrangements’. Their submission undertook a review of the consistency of information 
contained in performance reviews across RFMOs. 
 
The submission communicated their view that key provisions of the UNFSA ‘continue to be 
far from effectively implemented by most if not all RFMOs’.43 They recommended that there 
needs to be a regular review of the content of RFMO performance reviews and how they 
have implemented the findings in the reports. They also recommended that any RFMO 
performance review should include comments from member states, observers and the 
scientific community.44 
 
It would appear then that RFMO performance reviews, while desirable and important for the 
progression of regional management regimes, should be explored for the composition of 
their panel and contributing authors prior to making any firm conclusions on their 
implications. This thesis will continue to draw attention to this matter as it now turns to 
examine the mandate of the six AusRFMOs under examination in this thesis. 
 
This next section discusses the findings of each AusRFMOs’ most recent performance 
review. This section aims to highlight the unique compliance challenges facing each of the 
AusRFMOs under examination which will then be specifically addressed in the final chapter 




The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was 
established on 7 April 1982 in response to, inter alia, fears that the krill fishery would become the 
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next in a line of species to be overfished in the Antarctic.45  As a key ecological species, 
scientists were concerned that if stocks of krill were to become depleted, the entire Antarctic 
marine food chain could be compromised.46   
 
The CCAMLR manages populations of finfish, molluscs, crustacean and sea birds and explicitly 
excludes whales and seals which are subject to other international conventions.47 The CCAMLR 
Convention Area surrounds Antarctica and extends to areas of the Southern Ocean south of the 
Antarctic Convergence.48 The Southern Ocean itself represents approximately 15 percent of the 
world’s oceans.49 
 
At the time of writing the CCAMLR has 26 members, or CPs, and 10 acceding States which 
include States that have signed but not ratified the agreement. The acceding states are legally 
bound by the terms of the Convention and so are considered CPs for the purposes of this thesis. 
The CCAMLR can also develop cooperative working relationships with intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organisations including entering into formal agreement with them.  
 
At its Twenty-sixth meeting in 2007, CCAMLR decided to undertake a performance review during 
2008.50 The review was carried out by a panel of nine people appointed by the Commission. The 
purpose of the review was to evaluate CCAMLR’s performance against specific criteria.51  In 
general, the review noted that in recent years, there had been a good degree of compliance by 
CPs and that levels of compliance actually increased with time.52  While there continued to be 
breaches by CPs, many of these appeared to be of a “technical nature” rather than physical acts 
of illegal fishing for instance.53  
 
The first CCAMLR Performance Review went on to state that despite the combined effect of 
CCAMLR’s provisions relating to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,54 this practice 
 
45 This phenomenon, known as the “line of exploitation” includes the exploitation of seals, whales and fish such as the 
Patagonian toothfish. D.G. M. Miller, 'Managing Fishing in the Sub-Antarctic' (2007) 141(1) Papers and Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of Tasmania 121, 124. 
46 E A Clark, 'The Duty of States to Cooperate in International Marine Capture Fisheries Law' (2009) 13 Antarctic and Southern 
Oceans Law and Policy Occasional Papers 46, 57. 
47 ‘About CCAMLR’, Commission for the Conservation of Marine Living Resources, https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation 
accessed 5 August 2019. 
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50 CCAMLR, Report of the CCAMLR Performance Review Panel (2007) <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/revpanrep.htm> at 21 May 
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continued to be a significant problem, specifically in respect of localised areas in CCAMLR 
waters.55   
 
In reality, the report noted that a major problem was the failure of certain parties to discharge 
conservation and management obligations.56  The first performance review of the CCAMLR 
proposed that the organisation should ensure that it continues to improve the efficiency, reach 
and use of compliance enforcement tools.  
 
The second CCAMLR Performance Review was undertaken in early 2017 when Commission 
Members agreed to an eight-person panel57 to undertake the review comprising: 
 four experts from CCAMLR contracting parties, 
 two external experts,  
 one representative from the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat’s Committee for Environmental 
Protection, and 
 one representative from an environmental non-governmental organisation.58  
 
The panel submitted its report to the CCAMLR at its annual meeting in October 2017 and 
clarified that the review’s purpose was to evaluate the progress of the CCAMLR in implementing 
the findings of the first CCAMLR Performance Review.59 With respect to compliance, the Panel 
found that the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure60 could be strengthened by requiring 
enhanced reporting on the actions taken by states to address infringements.61 Where, for 
example, a Contracting Party failed to report on follow-up investigations, such failures should be 
identified as ‘serious, frequent or persistent non-compliance’.62 
 
With respect to the CCAMLR IUU vessel listing procedures, the Panel recommended that these 
could be strengthened to provide for listing of ‘stateless’ fishing vessels.63 In addition, any vessel 
owned by an individual or company named on the IUU vessel list could also be added to the list 
by association.64   
 
Recommendation 16 of the report suggested that the CCAMLR encourage Members to 
undertake bilateral and sub-regional actions to achieve effective cooperation by non-Members 
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with CCAMLR conservation measures.65 To this end CCAMLR should also encourage Members 
to discourage non-Members from undermining the conservation measures of the CCAMLR.66 A 





The Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC Agreement) 
was adopted by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in November 1993.  
Entering into force in 1996, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) retains a special 
relationship to the FAO in that it is legally an Article XIV body of the FAO. This relationship, 
however, has been reported to have caused significant problems for the IOTC in a budgetary 
context and in terms of participation by relevant flag States.67 
 
The IOTC is responsible for the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas north of the Antarctic 
Convergence to the extent that it is necessary for the purpose of conserving and managing 
migrating tuna stocks.68  In addition to the range of tuna stocks under the purview of the 
Commission,69 the Secretariat also collates data on non-target, associated and dependent 
species which may be affected by tuna fishing in the Indian Ocean.70 
 
The primary objective of the IOTC is to “promote cooperation among its Members with a view to 
ensuring, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilisation of stocks 
covered by this Agreement and encouraging sustainable development of fisheries...”71  However 
the fulfilment of this objective has proven difficult for the IOTC and its CPs.72  The IOTC 
Compliance Committee was established in 2002 and is designed to report to the Commission on 
the status of compliance by CPs with conservation measures.73   
 
Membership to the IOTC is open to Indian Ocean coastal countries and countries whose vessels 
are fishing for tuna in the Indian Ocean.74 At the time of writing there are 31 Contracting Parties 
(Members) to the IOTC including Australia.75 The IOTC also has five cooperating non-contracting 
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parties which are states with a ‘real interest’ in Indian Ocean fisheries.76 These States, such as 
Liberia and Senegal, do not enjoy voting rights and are subject to the same regulations as full 
Members.77 It should also be noted that while Taiwan cooperatively participates with the IOTC, 
they are not a member to the Commission as they are not members of the United Nations.  
 
The IOTC committed to undertaking its first performance review in 2007 through an evaluation of 
any weaknesses and identification of necessary actions to improve efficiency.78  The compliance 
concerns facing the IOTC at that time are highlighted throughout the 2009 ‘Report of the 
Performance Review Panel’.79  The review demonstrated that low levels of compliance with IOTC 
measures were commonplace and limited action had been taken to remedy the situation.80  For 
example, the IOTC IUU Vessel List applied only to NCPs with no sanctions or penalties available 
to address non-compliance.81  
 
This first Performance Review of the IOTC suggested that the ability of their Compliance 
Committee to address and monitor non-compliance was very limited.82  The Report proposed 
that mechanisms to sanction non-compliance should be developed and the IUU vessel lists 
should be amended to allow for the inclusion of vessels flagged to CPs.83  
 
In 2014, the IOTC agreed to undertake its second performance review with members of the 
panel to include: 
 An independent Chairperson, 
 Contracting Parties from both coastal States and distant water fishing nations, 
 A science expert not affiliated with the IOTC Membership, 
 Members from environmental non-governmental organisations,  
 Members from other RFMOs.84 
 
The second Report, published in 2015, noted that the functions of the IOTC Compliance 
Committee were only consolidated into the IOTC Rules of Procedure in 2014. The Report noted 
that ‘it has only been in the recent past that the Commission has taken a more active approach to 
compliance of its members.’85 
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The 2015 recommended that the IOTC Agreement should be amended or replaced to 
incorporate modern fisheries management principles and compliance provisions.86 While 
addressing compliance-related recommendations from the first Review was considered to be an 
ongoing process, the Panel commended the implementation by the IOTC of a transparent 
process for reviewing compliance by CPs. It was noted however that the process did not assess 
compliance by members against individual obligations.87  
 
The Panel recommended that the IOTC should establish a scheme of responses to non-
compliance in relation to Member’s obligations and identify reasons for non-compliance.88 In this 
way, the need for capacity assistance or whether it is wilful or repeated non-compliance, should 
then guide the response taken by the Commission. An online reporting tool was also suggested 
as an option to automate the identification of non-compliance.89  
 
The Panel recommended that the Compliance Committee strengthen its compliance monitoring 
in relation to its timeliness and the accuracy of data submissions.90 In addition, it should take 
action to support the implementation of requirements in accordance with the FAO Agreement on 
Port State Measures. The priority though, for the Commission, in relation to compliance 
measures appears to be the need for review of monitoring, control and surveillance measures to 




The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) arose out of a 
voluntary agreement between Australia, New Zealand and Japan established in the 1980s.  In 
the early 1990s, the three States decided to formalise this agreement and in 1993 they signed a 
Convention creating the CCSBT.92  The CCSBT has its headquarters in Canberra, Australia and 
today, numerous other States which have been active in the fishery for southern bluefin tuna 
have joined the Commission.93  
 
The CCSBT does not have a specific geographic remit and instead seeks to manage a specific 
globally-significant species: southern Bluefin tuna. The most recent States to join the Extended 
Commission as CPs include the European Union, in 2015 and South Africa in 2016. 
 
86 Ibid at 23. 
87 Ibid at 26. 
88 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Report of the Performance Review Working Group, 2016, 
available online at <https://www.iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2016/04/IOTC-2016-PRIOTC02-RE - FINAL 0.pdf> 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid at 36. 
91 Ibid at 35. 
92 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, About the Commission (Web Page) <www.ccsbt.org>. 






In July 2008, the CCSBT underwent its first ‘performance review’ which constituted a self-
assessment of its performance.94  This assessment was accompanied by the report of an 
independent expert issued in September of 2008 which was designed to offer recommendations 
of its own concerning the performance of this organisation.95  The report of the independent 
expert noted the concerns of the organisation that it had not managed to prevent serious 
overfishing of southern bluefin tuna (SBT), or to prevent under-reporting of catches.96   
 
The self-assessment conducted by the CCSBT in 2008 revealed that the RFMO had struggled to 
fulfil its original mandate to conserve and optimally utilize southern bluefin tuna (SBT) stocks.97 
The review found that the RFMO had been faced with significant challenges and had overcome 
these challenges with only limited success. Serious overfishing of SBT and under-reporting of 
SBT catches was found to have undermined the health of the resource and ability of the CCSBT 
to take adequate management measures.98   
 
This reality was demonstrated in the finding that the CCSBT had failed to reach agreement over 
many years on “even the most basic management measures for a single fish stock – a total 
allowable catch...”99  The review states that at its core, the CCSBT is a convention for the 
management of a single fish stock: a scenario that does not reflect a modern scientific 
understanding of ecosystems management or the precautionary approach.100    
 
In 2008, the Commission did not have a suite of measures in place relating to compliance.  It was 
reported that the Commission needed to work towards adopting a broader set of Port State 
measures to prevent the landing and transhipment of IUU SBT catch by both CPs and NCPs.101 
 
The second performance review of the CCSBT assessed the performance of the RFMO from 
2009-2013 and was released in 2014.102 It was undertaken by two independent experts: Dr. 
Serge Garcia103 and Holly Koehler104 who found that the CCSBT had made progress in regards 
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to its compliance monitoring system.105 While the 2008 Review noted an ‘urgent need’ for the 
CCSBT to finalise longer term monitoring, control and surveillance measures, it was found that in 
2014 significant progress had been made in this regard. In particular, the design and function of 
the CCSBT Compliance Committee had been clarified and a Compliance Action Plan had been 
developed.106 
 
The CCSBT Compliance Action Plan107 provided a framework to improve compliance and 
address priority compliance risks within the Commission. The RFMO has adopted three 
compliance policies in accordance with the Plan which include: 
 ‘Minimum Performance Requirements to Meet CCSBT Obligations’, 
 ‘Corrective Actions Policy’, and 
 ‘MCS Information Collection and Sharing’.108 
 
The CCSBT has also implemented a Quality Assurance Review (QAR) program to help 
members identify how well they are performing with respect to their CCSBT obligations and 
provide recommendations on where improvement required.109  Despite the development of these 
new compliance measures, the 2014 Review found that the CCSBT should continue to improve 




The WCPFC seeks to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of migratory 
species that exist in this area of the Pacific including species such as tunas, billfish and marlin.110  
The main object of the Commission is to enhance the provisions of the Agreement amongst CPs 
by developing conservation measures to that effect.111   The RFMO was established after lengthy 
negotiations at the Multilateral High Level Conference which began in 1994 and concluded in 
Honolulu, Hawaii in 2000.112   
 
The Commission has three subsidiary bodies: the Scientific Committee, Technical and 
Compliance Committee and the Northern Committee.113 These bodies, and the full session of the 
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Commission, meet at least once a year. The Commission operates in a unique geo-political 
environment with the special requirements of developing States and need to cooperate with other 
RFMOs whose respective areas of competence overlap with the geographic remit of the 
WCPFC. Australia signed the WCPFC in October of 2000 and ratified the Agreement in 
September of 2003.   
 
At the time of writing, the Commission has 26 Members, including Chinese-Taipei.114 
Participating territories include American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau and Wallis and Fortuna. Cooperating 
non-members include Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Liberia, Thailand and 
Vietnam.115  
 
A 2010 study into the effectiveness of RFMOs rated the WCPFC consistently high across the 
board and at that time, the RFMO received the highest overall score out of all those assessed.116   
However today, the WCPFC faces significant challenges regarding the sustainability of regulated 
fish stocks.117  A 2018 report of the WCPFC Scientific Committee found that it was very likely that 
stocks of Pacific bluefin tuna, Northern Pacific striped marlin and Oceanic Whitetip Shark were 
overfished.118 Whether many of the shark species of interest to the Commission were overfished 
or otherwise was unknown due to a lack of scientific evidence.119  
 
A proposal to conduct a Performance Review of the WCPFC was initiated in 2007 by Australia in 
an effort to bring the WCPFC in to line with recommendations of the UNGA.120  At that time it was 
agreed that the review should be deferred with Japan suggesting a review not be undertaken 
until 2009 in light of timing considerations.121 At the regular session of the WCPFC in 2008, it 
was agreed that the Performance Review would be undertaken in early 2010. When the 2009 
meeting occurred, however, it was noted that the review could not be undertaken within the 2010 
budget of the Commission.122  At the end of the 2009 meeting, the review had been postponed 
for future consideration.123  
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In December 2010, the Commission committed to reviewing its performance. The Executive 
Director was charged with developing appropriate criteria for review and proposing a panel of 
independent experts and members of the Commission, for approval.124 The panel found that 
compliance with conservation measures relating to the reporting of fishery data was problematic; 
specifically with regards to meeting data submission requirements.125  
 
It stated, ‘the Panel has a grave concern about failures by many CCMs to report fishery data as 
required.’126 It advised that where Members were late, or failed to provide operational data before 
the required deadlines, this should be considered a serious problem to be addressed as a matter 
of urgency.127 In 2012 it was also clear that the WCPFC needed to develop and implement a 
catch-documentation scheme as soon as possible to better track the progress of stocks under 
threat (such as bigeye tuna).128  
 
The review also found that in 2012, the WCPFC was lagging behind other RFMOs in developing 
port State measures to combat IUU fishing. They recommended that a new conservation 
measure on port State measures be adopted and implemented at the earliest opportunity. 
Additionally, the Panel recommended that clearer mechanisms be established to ensure that 
Members follow-up on infringements by their vessels and that guidelines be established for a 
range of penalties to be applied in these instances.129  
 
While the WCPFC in general has a good track record with regards to its compliance and 
enforcement measures, the lack of adoption of port State measures, market-related measures 
and a catch-documentation scheme were highlighted as the key issues still to be addressed by 
the RFMO.130 The current status of the organisation’s compliance measures will be clarified in 




International consultations on the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
(SPRFMO) were initiated in February 2006 by Australia, Chile and New Zealand. In May 2007, 
voluntary interim measures were adopted by Australia and other participants to manage the 
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fishery whilst negotiations were being concluded.131 These measures were designed to regulate 
both pelagic and demersal fisheries in the South Pacific Ocean in the interests of sustainably 
managing non-highly migratory fish and vulnerable marine ecosystems.132   
 
On 14 November 2009, the Convention on the Conservation and Management of the High Seas 
Fishery Resources of the South Pacific Ocean was adopted in New Zealand, solidifying the 
commitment of States signatories to managing the fishery.133 To become a fully-fledged RFMO, 
the SPRFMO required ratification, accession, acceptance or approval by eight States.134 This 
occurred in August 2012. 
 
The entry into force of the SPRFMO closed the gap in the international conservation and 
management of fisheries from the most eastern part of the South Indian Ocean through the 
Pacific towards South America.  Negotiations for the SPRFMO aimed to establish an 
organisation in which the precautionary and ecosystem approaches to fisheries management 
would be central to the conservation and management measures adopted by the organisation.135   
 
Commentators have highlighted the high standard set by the SPRFMO in terms of its objective 
and principles.136  The emphasis of the SPRFMO on modern principles of fisheries management, 
international practices and provisions concerning robust decision-making processes all contribute 
to it being considered a model for other RFMOs.137    
 
At the time of writing, the SPRFMO has 15 Members.138 In addition, States whose vessels fish in 
the Convention Area are requested to become party to the Convention or to agree to cooperate 
fully in the implementation of conservation measures as CNCPs.139 The current list of CNCPs 
include the Republic of Columbia, Curacao, Republic of Liberia and Republic of Panama. 
 
Article 30 of the SPRFMO Convention provides for the regular review of the effectiveness of the 
Commission every five years via performance review.  In January 2018, the SPRFMO adopted a 
process to establish a review Panel, criteria for the review, timeline for the process and terms of 
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reference for the review.140 The first performance review of the SPRFMO was released in 
January 2019 by a panel comprising four international independent experts, two of whom were 
nationals of SPRFMO members and two who were external to the SPRFMO.  
 
At the time of the first performance review of the SPRFMO, the organisation was still in the early 
stages of implementation. The Panel reported a range of compliance-related recommendations 
for the SPRFMO however acknowledged that the organisation was still in the early stages of 
implementation. As such, it should focus most of its effort on conservation measures relating to 
management of relevant species.   
 
The Panel recommended, inter alia, that the RFMO should: 
 revise its Port Inspection measure to specify that all potential IUU vessels should be 
inspected, 
 continue to work towards the adoption of its own high seas boarding and inspection 
regime, 
 continue to develop the SPRFMO observer programme, 
 consider requiring all transhipments to be observed, and 
 take a more proactive approach towards identifying vessels of non-Members and CNCPs 
undertaking fishing operations in the Convention Area.141 
 
The Panel noted that the SPRFMO had not yet adopted any market-related measures or a CDS, 
however at this stage, it did not recommend pursuing these objectives until the RFMO had 




The Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement142 (SIOFA) seeks to ensure the long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resources other than tunas in areas that fall outside 
national jurisdiction.143  This includes the management of demersal fish species including 
alfonsino and orange roughy.144   
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The creation of an RFMO for the Southern Indian Ocean had been a primary objective of the 
Southern Indian Ocean Deepsea Fisheries Association (SIODFA) since its formation in 2006.145  
The SIODFA is an organisation formed to represent the interests of deep-sea fishing operators in 
the area and to promote responsible management of relevant fisheries.146 
 
The achievement of management objectives in the SIOFA are provided for by the formulation of 
a “Meeting of Parties” designed to adopt legally binding conservation and management 
measures which CPs will be required to implement and enforce.147 Instead of establishing an 
RFMO, the SIOFA relies on an Annual “Meetings of Parties” to carry out its objectives, including 
through the adoption of legally binding conservation and management measures.148  In this way, 
the SIOFA establishes a regional fisheries ‘arrangement’ or ‘mechanism’, rather than a fully-
fledged RFMO.   
 
In 2005, negotiations for a specific high seas agreement which could extend to cover the west 
coast of Australia began.149  In 2006, a Conference of the Plenipotentiaries for the Adoption of 
the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement was held at the Headquarters of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome, Italy.150  At this meeting, the text 
of the agreement establishing the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) was 
adopted. The FAO was named as the Depository of the Agreement.151  
 
The SIOFA seeks to specifically recognise the needs of developing states bordering the 
region.152 The Mauritian government joined the Cook Islands, the European Union and the 
Seychelles in ratifying the SIOFA in 2010.153 The Agreement provided that it would enter into 
force ninety days from the date of receipt of the fourth instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
approval and the agreement entered into force in June 2012.154   
 
 
145 Baird Maritime, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement comes into effect (2010) 
<http://www.bairdmaritime.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7697:southern-indian-ocean-fisheries-
agreement-comes-into-effect&catid=75:fisheries&Itemid=68>.  
146 FAO Legal Office Treaties, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (Web Page) 
<http://www.fao.org/legal/treaties/035s-e.htm>. 
147 Ibid. 
148 E.J Molenaar, 'New Areas and Gaps: How to Address Them' (Paper presented at the Conference on the Governance of 
High Seas Fisheries and the UN Fish Agreement, St John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, 1 - 5 May 2005).  Available on line at 
<http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fgc-cgp/documents/molenaar_e.htm#RFMOs>. 
149 Ibid.  
150 FAO, above n 146. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission, 'Regional Fisheries Contacts: South Indian Ocean Fishery Agreement' (Web Page) 
<http://www.apfic.org/modules/addresses/visit.php?cid=2&lid=110>. 
153 Fish Information and Services, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement comes into force (Web Page) 
<http://fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special=&monthyear=&day=&id=37823&ndb=1&df=0>. 
154 Article 24, FAO Legal Office Treaties, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (2010) 





At the time of writing, the Agreement has nine contracting parties,155 one participating fishing 
entity (Chinese Taipei) and one CNCP (Comoros).156  The Agreement covers the management of 
resources including fish, molluscs, crustaceans and other sedentary species within the area. The 
Agreement does not cover highly migratory species or sedentary species subject to the fishery 
jurisdiction of coastal states.  
 
At the time of writing, the SIOFA has not published a performance review. However it has 
adopted a range of compliance-related conservation measures in 2018 that will be further 




An increase in the popularity of participative decision-making and compliance effort has resulted 
in important developments for the regional fisheries sector including critical engagement which 
has been argued to have improved the quality of decision-making.  The ability of RFMOs to 
adapt and be sufficiently flexible so as to deal with an increasing appetite for engagement by the 
resource-user in governance must be a critical factor in determining how new and unforeseen 
challenges will be approached. 
 
This chapter has outlined the legal status of states parties to RFMOs, and those who choose not 
to engage in their regulatory regime. While there remains some doubt as to whether RFMOs can 
impose legally binding conservation measures on NCPs, a number of RFMOs have adopted 
measures to this effect. CNCPs were common across RFMOs which perhaps demonstrates the 
challenges States face in committing to the conservation measures of RFMOs.  
 
Next the chapter has provided a brief overview of the inception, geographic mandate and States 
parties of AusRFMOs. It has been shown that while certain AusRFMOs have a specific 
geographic mandate, others are limited to the management of a particular fishery. Both options 
pose their own challenges as demonstrated by their performance reviews.  
 
The recent and past performance reviews of the SPRFMO, CCAMLR, IOTC, WCPFC and 
CCSBT were considered for their findings with relation to compliance. While some reviews 
revealed wide-ranging issues in AusRFMOs with respect to compliance, others reflected that 
positive outcomes had been achieved and implemented successfully. In particular, the CCAMLR 
was applauded for its mature measures which had been implemented to great effect.  
 
155 Australia, the Cook Islands, the European Union, France on behalf of its Indian Ocean Territories, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Thailand.  






This thesis will now take a deeper look at how the CCAMLR has tackled compliance-related 
challenges in the past, specifically with respect to its ability to effectively engage the resource-
user.  The next chapter will investigate how the relationship between the management 
organisation and the private-sector can actually improve the performance of the RFMO long-
term. It explores how engaging the private-sector can encourage fishers to assume a sense of 
















This chapter is largely comprised of an excerpt from a publication co-authored by the author and 
the late Dr Denzil Miller, who was first a friend, and second, a mentor to the author. Significantly, 
Dr Miller held the position of Executive Secretary for the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) from 2002-2010. Throughout this time, Dr Miller 
pioneered many important changes to the Commission and his loss was a tragedy for the 
Antarctic scientific community.  
 
The content of this article was presented in December 2019 at the Polar Law Symposium held in 
Hobart, Tasmania by the author. At the time of writing, the article has been accepted by and will 
be included in vol. 12 of The Yearbook of Polar Law. Due to the relevance of the article to the 
topic of this thesis, and in recognition of the sudden and recent passing of Dr. Miller in November 
2019, minimal alterations to the original article have been made. 
 
This article explores the phenomenon of the compliance evaluation procedure (CEP) but 
specifically with regard to one RFMO-like organisation: the CCAMLR. CEPs represent an avenue 
for RFMOs to undertake internal evaluation of compliance by both Contracting and non-
Contracting parties in line with their conservation measures.  
 
The CEP of an RFMO is often reviewed annually and is designed to highlight instances where 
non-compliance has occurred and to track progress against these instances. CEPs are very 
relevant to this thesis in that they are one of the many compliance-related conservation 
measures being assessed, and they also demonstrate a critical means by which RFMOs can 
improve transparency.  
 
The CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure (CCEP) was one of the first of its kind and 
constitutes a strong example of how the process can function to effectively address instances of 
non-compliance in a regional fisheries context.  This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the 
CCEP over the first five years of its operation. The CCEP’s achievements and shortcomings are 







CCAMLR has seen success as a regional conservation organisation as a result of its long-term 
engagement with non-regulatory entities and with the industry it regulates in particular.  The 
CCEP is viewed as a model for other polar and high seas areas, suggesting that CCAMLR's 
management of a relatively small number of Antarctic marine living resources could enhance 
sustainable, and responsible, fishing practices worldwide.  
 
As a brief introduction to the article, and demonstration of its relevance to this thesis, the 




The CCAMLR has a unique approach to regulation which stems from its inception as a 
‘conservation’ organisation, rather than a management organisation. Since the instigation of the 
CCAMLR, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) has been engaged in 
negotiations to promote the effective incorporation of the precautionary approach and 
ecosystems-based approach within the regulatory regime.  
In accordance with Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention, if an intergovernmental or non-
governmental organisation would contribute to the work of the Commission they may be granted 
observer status. Throughout CCAMLR’s history, ASOC has been successful in applying for 
observer status at meetings of the Commission and its sub-committees.  Gaining observer status 
does not enable participation by the organisation in decision-making but does allow them insight 
into the meeting and the ability to make a statement to the Commission where appropriate on 
matters relevant to their field.  
ASOC has contributed in this capacity to inform the development of effective conservation 
measures and has engaged with the CCAMLR on IUU fishing tactics since the initial identification 
of the issue in the early 1990’s. They have commented on matters including the destructive 
fishing methods employed by IUU vessels and in 2009, presented papers for the consideration of 
the Commission.  Such contributions can inform and assist the CCAMLR in undertaking its 
regulatory functions.   
Undertaking effective monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) in an area of water as remote 
and isolated as the Southern Ocean is a significant challenge facing CCAMLR. To combat this 
issue, the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) comprises a group of legal toothfish 
operators who work with the CCAMLR to improve sustainability of Patagonian Toothfish. Formed 
in 2003, in light of the increase in IUU catch of Toothfish in the CCAMLR Convention Area, 





providing estimates of IUU catches, to monitoring and reporting sightings of IUU vessels, assist 
the capacity of the CCAMLR to achieve its objectives.  
CCAMLR has enshrined the precautionary approach and ecosystems-based approach in its 
Convention to manage the interaction between science and policy development.  This approach 
enables a balance between conservation and sustainable use to be struck to drive the direction 
of the organisation towards an effective regulatory regime.  This approach is well suited to 
allowing scientific input from industry stakeholders. 
In a recent example of this, the Association for Responsible Krill harvesting companies (ARK) 
has gained observer status at CCAMLR meetings.   In 2014, the ARK convened a scientific 
workshop to discuss krill ecology and explore further how close collaboration between CCAMLR 
and the industry may assist in shaping the conservation policy of the regional organisation. This, 
and other efforts of ARK are likely to continue to influence the conservation approach of the 
CCAMLR into the future. 
The complexity of the IUU problem is one which demands effective information exchange and 
cooperation between regulatory and non-regulatory authorities.   Without a complete picture of 
the problem and its attributes, regulating to address the problem is often pointless.  To address 
this issue, individual companies operating under the CCAMLR regime have taken steps to 
increase their level of transparency.   
Aker BioMarine, for example, has made commitments improve transparency of their fisheries 
reporting to contribute to improved information and knowledge exchange in the krill fishery. This 
occurs via implementing practices which ensure 100% traceability of product caught and Marine 
Stewardship Certification (MSC) for the fishery which required the company to demonstrate 
greater transparency of fishing methods and stock trends.   By undertaking public reporting 
processes on sustainability commitments, Aker BioMarine is an example of the industry engaging 
in CCAMLR’s regulatory effort.  
This thesis argues that if we are to prevent future fisheries decline, the most practical and 
effective steps RFMOs can take is to encourage greater cooperation and engagement between 
the regulator and the regulated.  While a range of private-sector entities under CCAMLR’s remit 
have taken steps to improve their accountability, the CCAMLR CEP represents an effort by the 
RFMO in turn to improve accountability, transparency and, ultimately, enforcement of its 
conservation measures.  
The ways in which the CCAMLR CEP achieves these outcomes is explored in detail in the 
following article: ‘Trust but Verify: Fisheries Compliance Evaluation and Sustainable Antarctic 















Article II of the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CAMLR Convention) contextualises a precautionary approach (PA) and ecosystem-based 
(EBM)  method to managing marine living resources in the Convention Area south of the 
Antarctic Polar Front.1,2 Following its inception in 1982, the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) has developed a conservation, fisheries 
management, ecosystem and biodiversity protection framework consistent with the Convention's 
objective.3  
A key principle of the CCAMLR framework is that conservation includes "rational use" (Article 
II.2).4 To ensure consistency with the Commission's PA and EBM mandates, CCAMLR manages 
harvested resources directly, with other relevant management needs being addressed more 
broadly (Article II.3)5. Both conservation and harvesting are subject to the conservation principles 
outlined in Article II.3 of the Convention. Consequently, CCAMLR's management approach 
addresses the Convention's primary management intent whilst considering situational and 
procedural uncertainties likely to challenge agreed, practical, effective, and realisable 
management priorities addressed by CCAMLR CMs.6  
In addressing conservation and management needs, CCAMLR facilitates research7 and compiles 
data8 to assess uncertainty commensurate with available knowledge on Antarctic marine 
ecosystem dynamics, functioning and fisheries.9 Every effort is made to identify knowledge gaps 
 
1 CAMLR Convention Article I.4 defines the Convention Area's the northern boundary as the "Antarctic Convergence" or 
Antarctic Polar Front as currently known. In this paper, the "Convention Area" will be referenced as such, or as the "CCAMLR 
Area'. CCAMLR, 2018. Basic Documents, CCAMLR, Hobart. 147. 
2 Established by the CAMLR Convention Contracting Parties (CPs) under Convention Article VII.1, the Commission's 
membership conditions are elaborated in Article VII.2.  
3 Article II.1, states the Convention's objective as "the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources". In its broadest sense, 
this objective aims to conserve, including rational use of, Antarctic marine living resources south of the Antarctic Polar Front 
(Antarctic Convergence)(c. +45oS) through precautionary and ecosystem-based management.   
4 The term 'rational use' has been widely debated (e.g. CCAMLR-VIII, 1989. Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Commission. 
CCAMLR, Hobart, paras 65 to 75; CCAMLR-IX, 1990. Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Commission, CCAMLR, Hobart, paras 
8.1 to 8.14 and CCAMLR-X, 1991.  
5 Österblom, H. and Olsson, O. (Österblom, H. and Olsson, O. 2017. CCAMLR: An ecosystem approach to the Southern Ocean 
in the Anthropocene. In: Dodds, K., Hemmings, A.D. and Roberts, 2017. Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica. Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar  p. 417) suggest that: "To clarify existing uncertainty and differences in the interpretation of ‘rational use’ appears 
to be an increasingly important issue for CCAMLR."   
6 One of the Commission's primary tasks is to give effect to the objective and principles set out in CAMLR Convention Article II 
(Article IX). This includes (Article IX.1.(e)) identifying conservation needs and analysing the effectiveness of agreed 
Conservation Measures (CMs) to address such needs.  
7 Under Article IX.1.(a), research includes comprehensive studies of Antarctic marine living resources and the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem. CCAMLR Basic Documents, 2018. op. cit. 
8 Consistent with Article IX.1.(b), data to be compiled focuses on the status of, and populations changes in, Antarctic marine 
living resource, as well as on factors affecting harvested species distribution, abundance and productivity, including the 
potential effects of harvesting on dependent or related species populations as per Article II.3.  
9 Constable, A.J., de la Mare, W.K., Agnew, D.J., Everson, I. and D.G.M. Miller 2000. Managing fishing to conserve Antarctic 
marine living resources: Practical implementation of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.  





and deficiencies in terms of potential impacts on management decisions,10 as well as to evaluate 
inherent and residual risk(s) affecting such decisions.11 To address these needs, CCAMLR CM 
formulation, adoption and revision are required to be based on the “the best scientific evidence 
available”.12  
As intimated, catch monitoring and harvested stock sustainability assessment are key CCAMLR 
priorities.13  They stand in the face of growing acceptance that the natural world, including its 
biodiversity and constituent ecosystems, are as crucial to human and ecological well-being as 
economic prosperity.14 However, the natural world remains undervalued by conventional 
economic analyses,15 even though these analyses emphasise the need for informed decision-
making to manage resource utilisation in a sustainable manner. Ideally, natural ecosystems, and 
the services they deliver, should underpin human existence by breaking-down waste products, 
producing essential food, regulating water supplies and responding to climate variability.  
Furthermore, these attributes are valuable in less obvious ways - for example, where contact with 
nature induces pleasure, provides a sense of place and delivers recreational opportunities.16 
Together, such attributes exert a positive, long-term impact on human health, well-being and 
happiness.17  
It follows that the natural world's attendant, and important, socio-ecological values require the 
expenditure of political capital in order to address important issues that affect them.18 Nowhere is 
this better demonstrated than in the Antarctic, where the Antarctic Treaty System's (ATS)19 
political and diplomatic benefits have served as global enablers of the Treaty's ideals for close to 
60 years. These ideals aim to preserve Antarctica as an international zone of peace, 
 
10 Heenan, A., Pomeroy, R. S., Bell, J. D., Munday, P. L., Cheung, W. H., Logan, C. A., Brainard, R. E., Amri, A., Alino, P., 
Armada, N., L David, L., Rivera-Guieb, R., Green, S., Jompa, J., Leonardo, T., Mamauag, S., Parker, B., Shackeroff, J. and 
Yasin, Z. 2015. A climate-informed, ecosystem approach to fisheries management. Marine Policy, 57: 182-192. 
11 Inherent risks exist before controls (i.e. mitigation) are applied, while residual risks remain after controls are applied.  
12 CAMLR Convention Article IX.1.(f). CCAMLR Resolution XXVIII.10 in CCAMLR Schedule of Conservation Measures in Force 
2018/19, 322 pp. Unless otherwise stipulated, all CMs cited is this paper are based on the current (2018/19) version of 
CCAMLR Conservation Measures in Force. 
13 CAMLR Convention Article IX.1.(b). 
14 UK National Ecosystem Assessment: Understanding nature's value to society, Synthesis of the Key Findings, (Web Page) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317236524_UK_National_Ecosystem_Assessment_understanding_nature's_value_t
o_society_Synthesis_of_key_findings> 
15 Piccolo, J.J., ‘Intrinsic values in nature: Objective good or simply half of an unhelpful dichotomy?’, Journal for the 
Conservation of Nature, 37. Available online <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1617138117300742> 
16 Ibid.   
17 Maller, C., Townsend, M., Pryor, A., Brown, P. and St Leger, L. ‘Healthy nature healthy people: ‘contact with nature’ as an 
upstream health promotion intervention for populations’, Health Promotion International, 2006, 21.(1), 45. 
18 Pierce, J., Johnson, B.J. and White, S.S, ‘Social, creative, human, and political capital effects on sustainability initiatives in 
Kansas counties: A research note’, Journal of Community Development, 2014, 44.(2): 188-199. 
19 The ATS is a complex arrangement of international arrangements with the expressed purpose of regulating relations among 
States in the Antarctic. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty is at its heart, as are Recommendations adopted by meetings of the Antarctic 





cooperation, and science,20 with the ATS becoming the home of significant, and precedent-
setting, environmental protection, resource conservation and rational exploitation initiatives.21  
As an important ATS institution, CCAMLR's diligent CM implementation provides a sturdy 
foundation for marine conservation and biodiversity protection in the Convention Area. This has 
meant that CCAMLR has actively pursued effective CM compliance enforcement to avoid 
undermining of its management efforts or violation of the Convention's objective, insofar that 
future sustainable and responsible22 fishing in the CCAMLR Area are a function of the effective 
implementation of, and compliance with, robust CMs.23  
For example, the Antarctic krill (Euphausia superba) fishery’s vast potential and ecological 
importance24 require effective compliance enforcement to meet the Convention’s Article II 
objectives. In particular, attendant ecological and economic risks of a systemic krill fishery 
compliance failure would severely impact the Antarctic marine ecosystem as a whole, given the 
central position of krill in many Antarctic food webs.25  
In context, CCAMLR's experiences from the mid-1990s with the pervasively negative 
consequences of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)26 fishing for Toothfish (Dissostichus 
spp.) are particularly noteworthy. Nonetheless, IUU fishing continues to challenge CCAMLR in 
meeting Article II.3.(a) conservation principles,27 and in ensuring that CCAMLR-sanctioned 
fisheries continue to be sustainable.28 Overall, the need for robust CM compliance is crucial, 
despite CCAMLR having achieved considerable success in combating Toothfish IUU fishing per 
se.29  
However, it was not until 2006 that CCAMLR formally considered developing a compliance 
evaluation process30 (i.e. the CCEP) to improve CM application. The organisation's efforts 
 
20  Dudeney, J.R. and Walton, D.W.H. ‘Leadership in politics and science within the Antarctic Treaty’, Polar Research, 2012, 
31.(1), 11075, 1-9. 
21 Ibid. 
22 "Responsible fishing" is taken to be compatible with 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries provisions. It is 
undertaken with due concern for the conservation of fisheries resources and their management, the development of fisheries 
and other uses of the aquatic environment associated with fishing (e.g. fisheries research).  
23 Miller, D.G.M. and Slicer, N.M. 2014. CCAMLR and Antarctic Conservation: The Leader to Follow, In: Garcia, S.M., Rice, J. 
and Charles, A.T. (eds), Governance for Fisheries and Marine Conservation: Interactions and Co-Evolution, Wiley-Blackwell – 
Oxford, United Kingdom, pp. 253-270. 
24 Hill, S.L. Atkinson, A., Darby, C., Fielding, S., Krafft, B.A., Godø, O.R., Skaret, G., Trathan, P.N. and Watkins, J.L, ‘Is current 
management of the Antarctic krill fishery in the Atlantic sector of the Southern Ocean precautionary?’, Science, 2012, 23.(1): 
31-51.  
25 Equally, the CAMLR Convention was negotiated with the ecological importance of krill in mind. 
26 Rachel Baird credits CCAMLR as the first organisation to formally recognise the problem of non-compliant fishers and to coin 
the phrase "IUU fishing". Baird, R, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing: An analysis of the legal, economic and historical 
factors relevant to this development and persistence’. Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2004. 5: 36 pp.   
27 Ibid.   
28 Miller, D.G.M., Slicer, N.M. & Sabourenkov, E.N, ‘IUU fishing in Antarctic Waters: CCAMLR actions and regulations’, In Law, 
Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalisation (Ed. D. Vidas). 2010. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden and Boston. pp. 175–196.  
29 Ősterblom, H., Bodin, Ö., Sumaila, U.R. and Press, A.J. ‘Reducing illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean: A global effort’, 
Solutions, 2015, 4.(5): 72-79.  






focused on mitigating IUU fishing directly, as well as on CM compliance enforcement, in order to 
address the Convention's objective better through compliance monitoring. 
In this chapter, we focus on how CCAMLR is boosting its marine governance and management 
strategies by improving CM compliance evaluation and monitoring.31 The Commission's 
compliance enforcement efforts are briefly summarised and the organisation's recently-
developed compliance evaluation procedure (CCEP) is evaluated. We posit that the CCEP 
provides a model for other polar and high seas areas and illustrates that CCAMLR's 
management of a relatively small number of Antarctic fisheries may offer a way forward to 
promote sustainable, and responsible, fishing practices globally. We therefore contrast what the 
CCEP has achieved with other initiatives addressing sustainable fishing and ocean governance 




Covering just over 70% of the earth's surface, the oceans are crucial to the important 
geochemical processes regulating world climate and sustaining planetary life.32 They are also 
fundamentally important to the global economy, 33 with about 40% of the world's human 
population living within 100 kms of the coast.34 This figure is expected to rise to more than 60% 
by 202035 and to 75% by 2050, with tens of millions of people depending on fishing as a protein 
source.36,37  
A 2008 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) assessment38 
predicted that global crop production will increase from a 2000 level of 2143 million tonnes to 
3402 million tonnes in 2050.39 This increase slightly exceeds that assumed for future global 
population growth by 2050. While this may suggest no cause for concern, the 2005 Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment40 indicates that the 2015 estimated rate of crop development is not 
 
31 A CCAMLR Contracting Party (CP) is a signatory to the CAMLR Convention in conformity with paragraph 1 of Article XXIX, 
with CCAMLR Members fulfilling the conditions of Article VII.1 outlined in Footnote 2 (Article XIX.3). 
32 Pew Environment Group, 2010. Protecting Life in the Sea. Pew Environment Group, Washington DC. (Web Page)   
<https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/peg/publications/report/protectinglifeintheseapdf.pdf>. 
33 World Bank Group, 2017. ‘The Potential of the Blue Economy’. Washington DC, The World Bank. (Web Page) 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26843/115545.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>. 
34  United Nations, ‘Factsheet: People and Oceans’. In: The Ocean Conference - 5 to 9 June, 2017. New York, United Nations, 
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Ocean-fact-sheet-package.pdf> 
35 UNEP, GEO4 Global Environment Outlook. Environment for Development. 2007, 572 pp. At: 
<https://na.unep.net/atlas/datlas/sites/default/files/GEO-4_Report_Full_en.pdf>. 
36 World Bank Group, above n 33. 
37 In 2010, the United Nations estimated that fish provided more that 2.9 billion people with at least 15% of their average per 
capita animal protein intake. In 2014 an estimated 58.6 million people were directly engaged in producing fish, either by fishing 
or aquaculture.  
38 OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050: The Consequences of Inaction. Paris, OECD. 353 pp. At: https://read.oecd-
il brary.org/environment/oecd-environmental-outlook-to-2050_9789264122246-en#page1.   
39 Ibid. 






sustainable. In the absence of new policies, progress in reducing environmental pressures will 
therefore continue to be profoundly influenced by the sheer scale of human population growth.41  
In contrast, a United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report has indicated that 
fish account for almost 17% of global animal protein intake.42 With global fish production 
currently approaching sustainable limits,43 around 90% of the world's fish stocks are being fully 
fished, or are overfished. Nonetheless, the FAO forecasts a 17% fishery production increase by 
2025, with aquaculture providing a larger contribution than at present.  
Despite the obvious importance of the oceans to humanity,44  as well as global environmental 
health45, it has only been recently acknowledged that the world’s oceans are not effectively 
managed.46,47 For many years, increasing and unrestrained human activity has impacted the 
global marine environment in fundamental, and possibly irreversible, ways.48 For example, there 
has been a noticeable decline in the trophic standing of certain fished species since 195049, with 
such pressures appearing symptomatic of variable trends in food requirements since the 1960s. 
These observations mean that the common lexicon tend to depict current, and future, marine 
wild-capture harvesting as a "global fishing crisis".50 
Consequently, additional effort is being focused on ocean health which, once perceived inviolate, 
is undisputedly worsening with potentially significant and adverse consequences for both 
humanity and nature.51 Unless this trend is reversed, the livelihood of hundreds of millions of 
people remain at risk, as does the quality of life for billions worldwide.52 
Unsurprisingly, the noted global inadequacy in effective ocean management is associated with 
negative impacts on global fisheries, particularly in terms of ensuring that fish and other oceanic 
resources are not catastrophically overexploited.53 Unsurprisingly, global catches since the 
1860's have become progressively dominated by demersal and small pelagic species.54 Equally, 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks have also been heavily exploited, particularly in areas 
 
41 Environmental Outlook, above n 38. 




45 European Marine Board, ‘Linking Oceans and Human Health: A Strategic Research Priority for Europe’, 2013, Position Paper 
19. Ostend, European Marine Board. 
46  Agardy, T.S.’Casting Off the Chains that Bind Us to Ineffective Ocean Management: The Way Forward’, 2008, Ocean 
Yearbook, 22: 1-17. 
47 Pauly, D. and Zeller, D, ‘Catch reconstructions reveal that global marine fisheries catches are higher than required and 
declining’, 2016, Nature Communication, 7: 10244, 9 pp. 
48 Griffiths, C, et al. ‘Impacts on human activities of marine life in the Benguela: A historical overview’, 2004, Oceanography and 
Marine Biology: An Annual Review, 42: 303-392.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Jacques, P.J. ‘Are world fisheries a global panarchy?’, 2015, Marine Policy, 53: 165-170. 
51 Worm, B, et al., ‘Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Oceans Ecosystem Services’, Science, 2006, 314: 787-790. 
52 Pew Environment Group, above n 32. 
53 Pauly and Zeller, above n 47. 






where sustainable management remains a serious challenge and when such stocks spend 
significant time in international waters outside Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) or Fishing Zones 
(FZs).55 
Of nearly 600 species groups monitored by the FAO, only 23% are not fully exploited or are 
overexploited.56 Many fisheries practitioners and scientists consider this an optimistic 
assessment since some 90% of the world’s commercially valuable fish, such as tuna, have 
already disappeared, while close to one-third of the world’s commercial fisheries have 
collapsed.57 Such scenarios intimate that unless current trends are reversed, the remaining 
commercial fisheries will collapse by 2048; a suggestion not without controversy.58  
Whatever the global consequences of ineffective marine living resource management, a few key 
concerns are worth emphasising. Based on 2014 FAO figures, global fishing fleets comprise 
some 4.6 million vessels which harvest around 82 million metric tons of fish and invertebrates 
from the world’s oceans.59 Many believe that this level of harvest is beyond the global marine 
environment's sustainable limits. Furthermore, deployment of destructive fishing gear, along with 
other unsustainable or destructive fishing practices, cause significant long-term damage to vital 
breeding, nursery and feeding habitats for both fish and other marine life.60 For example, deep-
sea bottom trawling has been implicated, over a considerable period of time, in the destruction of 
the seamounts and deep-water corals providing critical habitats for marine biota in general.61 
In the CCAMLR Area, Antarctic krill (Euphausia superba) catches increased substantially over 
the past 5-10 years to around 306,000 tonnes in the 2017/18 season; a level last experienced in 
the mid-1980s. Conversely, catches of highly prized Toothfish (Dissostichus spp.) totalled just 
below 17,000 tonnes in 2017/18; a situation particularly attributable to effective and robust CMs 
countering IUU fishing in the Convention Area.62 The relatively small Antarctic Icefish 
(Champsocephalus gunnari) catch has remained stable at about +1,000 tonnes over the years. 
Involving some 55 vessels, these three CCAMLR fisheries are collectively valued at about 
US$210 million annually, with the krill fishery continuing to grow and exhibit significant potential 
for expansion.63 
 
55 Bjørndal, T. and Martin, S. 2007. The Relevance of Bioeconomic Modelling to RFMO Resources: Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations: Technical Study No 3, Chatham House, London. 48 pp.  
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/rfmotec
h3.pdf>. 
56 FAO, 2018. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2018. Available online at: 
<http://www.fao.org/3/i9540EN/i9540en.pdf>.  
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Nonetheless, fisheries trends in the CCAMLR Area have varied over the years, with krill catches 
even being dominant prior to the Convention's entry into force in 1982. Up until 1973, catch 
trends included overfishing of Marbled Rockcod (Notothenia rossii) as access to coastal fishing 
grounds became increasingly restricted due to a global increase of EEZ declarations in advance 
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the LOSC).64 However, they rose 
again once CCAMLR began developing its fishery regulatory regime. Further declines in catches 
accompanied dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and introduction of krill precautionary catch 
limits. Finally, although slightly affected by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), krill catches 
have exhibited a steadily increasing trend following the 2005/06 deployment of  Norwegian 
pumping technology that improves krill catch quality.65   
  
Compliance Enforcement  
Monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) provides for effective implementation of fisheries 
enforcement to ensure compliance with fisheries policy, standards and laws.66,67  Being able to 
evaluate compliance success and failure is vital to determining whether management measures 
are effective, or whether modification or redevelopment is required. Monitoring and evaluation 
are also crucial for identifying systemic non-compliance where common elements link vessel 
identity, vessel control, non-compliance deterrence, non-compliance sanction(s) and a need for 
cooperation from non-Contracting Parties (NCPs). 
Globally, effective compliance enforcement promotes responsible fishing to maintain long-term 
sustainable68 fisheries.69 It draws on three key elements: prevention, intervention and 
postvention. Prevention blocks an event, or effect, and relies on timely response to any high 
probability non-compliance event. It is usually the product of both monitoring and surveillance in 
the MCS paradigm. Intervention acts to prevent harm, or improve fisheries, and ecosystem 
functioning. It is analogous to the control element of MCS. Postvention aims to increase 
compliant activities to avoid negative consequences of non-compliance precedents and further 
incidents. In this respect, postvention learns from past prevention and intervention, thereby 
promoting compliance enforcement by not repeating past mistakes and learning from past non-
compliant events. 
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For CCAMLR, a primary objective is to minimise negative effects from direct, or indirect, effects 
of harvesting on the Antarctic marine ecosystem as a whole, recognising that effective 
compliance enforcement through MCS ensures that CMs are effective and complied with.70,71  
In addressing compliance enforcement, various CAMLR Convention Articles require that 
Contracting Parties (CPs):72  
(a) operate harmoniously and cooperatively,  
(b) comply with general principles and CMs,  
(c) ensure compliance by third parties, and  
(d) deal with compliance breaches.  
They include, inter alia, Articles X (third parties and CM integrity), XI (harmonization with 
adjacent jurisdictions), XX (information), XXI (compliance), XXII (third party compliance), XXIV 
(observation and inspection), and XXV (dispute settlement). In effect, the Convention's 
compliance-focused provisions guide how CCAMLR undertakes policing, monitoring and CM 
application to meet Convention objectives.   
Since 2002, the Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC),73 previously 
the Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection (SCOI), has overseen development of 
CCAMLR's compliance-enforcement regime and the provision of relevant advice to the 
Commission. Its compliance evaluation process has been extensively summarised by Miller and 
Murray.74 
It is noteworthy that CCAMLR's management and conservation  practices compare favourably 
with global best-practice in applying the PA and EBM to fisheries management ,as well as in the 
systematic provision of objective scientific advice drawn from the best scientific evidence 
available.75,76 CCAMLR posts a close to perfect mean score of 4/5 for these activities, but an 
obvious black mark persists for efforts addressing attendant complexities explicitly accounting for 
ecosystem considerations in management decisions.77  
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Nonetheless, CCAMLR has demonstrated significant progress in satisfying the conservation and 
management requirements78 identified by the international community at large.79 In this regard, 
the organisation has come a long way in developing guidelines for sustainable management 
practices, as well as in providing baselines against which future changes may be compared.80 
Akin with other Regional Fisheries Management Organisations' (RFMO) best compliance and 
enforcement practices, CCAMLR's efforts have focused on addressing its objectives to fulfil its 
governance obligations and conservation remit.81  
 
Compliance Evaluation 
Consistent with RFMOs as a whole,82 CCAMLR's institutional enforcement regime relies on 
individual Flag State control and CP actions to ensure CM compliance. Specifically, CPs are 
obligated to implement CMs under Convention Article IX, particularly Article IX.6. To optimise 
compliance enforcement, CMs may also include provisions to address MCS burden-sharing. This 
may result in joint enforcement action, as well as CP resource-sharing (e.g. vessels, at-sea 
inspection capabilities, information etc.).83 The CCAMLR System of Inspection84 is a notable 
example of such activities. 
Concerns over meeting compliance enforcement needs led to CCAMLR's 2008 adoption of terms 
of reference (TORs) for an intersessional Working Group (WG) on the Development of a 
CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure (WG-DOCEP).85 These TORs extended the remit of 
an existing intersessional Working Group at the time.86 Following the inaugural DOCEP 
Workshop in 2009, CCAMLR became the first regional marine management organisation to 
formally address compliance evaluation.87 The approach aimed to detect and rate CM 
compliance breakdowns generally, as well as potential ecosystem impact(s)88 where possible.89 
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This not only gave SCIC responsibility for providing general compliance advice to the 
Commission, but also responsibility for overseeing the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation 
Procedure's (CCEP) development. 
CCAMLR CPs are responsible for ensuring their vessels act in accordance (i.e. comply) with 
CMs in force (CAMLR Convention Article XXI.1). They are also obligated to take appropriate 
measures to ensure that this happens. Consequently, CPs are also required to ensure that 
CCAMLR is informed of any measures taken, "including the imposition of sanctions for 
violations".90 With Convention Article XXII.1 requiring CPs to make sure that "no one engages in 
any activity contrary to the Convention objective in a manner consistent with the United Nations 
Charter", a CP is also required to "notify CCAMLR of any such activity which comes to its 
attention" (Article XXII.2).  
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that when IUU fishing takes place, to the extent that it 
systematically undermines CCAMLR's conservation efforts, paragraph 84 of the 2001 FAO 
IPOA-IUU applies.91  CAMLR Convention Article XXII provisions may then be more broadly 
applied to target vessels and nationals engaged in IUU fishing activities contrary to CCAMLR 
CMs. In effect, CCAMLR can act collectively to bring non-compliance with its CMs to the 
attention of the State(s) concerned and, if these persist, are not rectified or acted upon, individual 
CCAMLR Members may adopt appropriate, international law consistent measures to counter 
perceived threat(s) to the Convention objective.92  
Both the Inter-Ministerial High Seas Task Force (HSTF)93 and 2016 UNFSA Review 
Conference94 emphasise the key role played by unsatisfactory Flag State performance in 
allowing IUU fishing to take place. The Conference95 in particular noted the need to promote: 
the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance as a valuable 
tool for strengthening compliance by flag States with their duties and obligations, and 
urge all flag States to implement the Guidelines as soon as possible, including, as a first 
step, by carrying out a voluntary assessment….  
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This invocation reinforced obligations regarding flagged vessels set out in the 1993 FAO 
Compliance Agreement96 and other relevant international instruments.97  
For CCAMLR, the question became - How can CP compliance with CMs be evaluated in 
operational terms? Drawing on Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
Licensing Obligations and International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna 
(ICCAT) Trade Reporting, CCAMLR made a case for more detailed analyses of its unique 
compliance purview.98 To standardise future analyses of 11 RFMOs, including itself, CCAMLR 
proposed a targeted and in-depth analyses of its compliance needs.99 It recognised that such an 
assessments should be objectively formulated and procedurally standardised to provide an 
institution-wide view of CCAMLR's compliance performance and underpin development of 
institutional best-practices. The strategy aimed to account for the unique nature and specificity of 
many CCAMLR CMs. However, comprehensive comparison of CCAMLR compliance measures 
with other identified RFMOs remains outstanding, despite the CCEP's development remaining a 
CCAMLR priority.100  
Early in the CCEP's development, SCIC recognised that the accrual of essential, and relevant, 
detail should focus on "core" rather than "absolute" standards in formulating "best practice" 
criteria. For example, deployment of scientific observers is not necessarily equivalent to 100% 
observer coverage, as the former is a core standard and the latter an absolute one. 
Consequently, comparable best practice endures as a key principle for CP optimisation of 
institutional CCAMLR compliance actions commensurate with higher-order considerations. 
CCAMLR stands alone in developing actions and measures to the extent that these address all 
the desired compliance qualities.101 Despite wide-ranging CMs having been agreed, CCAMLR 
has not universally applied these to all its fisheries for various reasons.102  
Recognising that risk and compliance are inclusive for any compliance evaluation, the 2009 
DOCEP Workshop proposed a compliance procedure model.103 In the model, scientific observers 
were seen to play an important role in providing relevant ancillary information to the CCEP 
process.104 A non-compliance, risk severity matrix was also constructed and substantially 
adapted to provide non-compliance assignations for perceived impacts on the Antarctic marine 
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ecosystem, as well as on harvested, dependent and related species as per Convention Article 
II.3.105  
Following the CCEP's formal adoption in 2012, SCIC extensively debated and trialled various 
processes before the current procedures were settled.106 These focused on the CCEP's 
implementation of consistent and cost-effective actions to address the compliance performance 
elements proposed by WG-DOCEP in 2009. They were extensively inter-woven with 
requirements attached to the production of CCAMLR CP and NCP IUU Vessel Lists under CMs 
10-06 and 10-07 respectively. Resultant summary and provisional versions of the CCAMLR 
Compliance Report are produced following the steps outlined in CM 10-10 paragraphs 2 and 3. 
The Final Provisional Compliance Report is considered and adopted by the Commission as the 
Annual CCAMLR Compliance Report.107  Notably, all CMs in the applicable Schedule of 
Conservation Measures in Force are eligible for CCEP evaluation.108   
The Secretariat uses a risk-directed approach to compile the Preliminary CCAMLR Compliance 
Report, which is the first opportunity for SCIC and the CPs to develop responses to non-
compliance.109 Such a generic approach is consistent with WG-DOCEP's original approach to 
CCEP development. 
Adoption of CM 10-10 in 2012 officially launched the CCEP, while subsequent modification of the 
CM in 2016 and 2017 merged DOCEP-identified compliance categories and actions. As already 
noted, WG-DOCEPP also compared compliance performance between CCAMLR and 11 
RFMOs, along with the attendant considerations or measures, underpinning CM performance 
assessments. The consequent inventory of implied provisions was subsumed into CM 10-10. 
Most notably, the 2017 CM 10-10 revision addressed:  
(a) assignation of compliance status (particularly specific categories);  
(b) procedures for determining further Member action;  
(c) reaching consensus on issues involving individual Members; and  
(d) methods for CCEP improvement to avoid future problems like those encountered 
when the 2017 CCAMLR Compliance Report was not agreed as China could not accept 
its non-compliance rating for CM 10-04.110   
 
This resulted in paragraph 1.(iii) of CM 10-10 being modified in 2018 to make it mandatory for a 
Member to propose a preliminary compliance status when responding to its Draft Compliance 
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Report.111 Other difficulties encountered, and associated solutions developed during the CCEP's 




Accepting that enforcement is "the act of compelling compliance with a law,”113 it is recognised 
that current understanding of enforcement in international law is largely State-centric, having 
been tempered and broadened in various ways.114 
Most commonly, it is accepted that a State's international law options to help itself include scope 
for implementing measures countering any violation of State rights. However, measures do not 
customarily include force, except when a State has the right to defend itself.115 This narrowing of 
permissible counter-measures has resulted in a growth of internationally-based enforcers, with 
self-help moving from an individual State right to bilateral or, more encompassing, multilateral 
arrangements that benefit all States.116 Consequently, States have become increasingly 
dependent on self-help assistance from international institutions, such as actions sanctioned by 
the United Nations Security Council, even when these provide limited collective, or unrealistic, 
enforcement options.117,118 
With self-help providing a limited international collective enforcement capability, self-judgement 
about perceived compliance violations, including assessment of appropriate responses, tends to 
be curtailed by collective processes, especially in the face of a widening range of non-state 
actors globally.119 To a large extent, therefore, the conformity of State conduct with international 
norms has come to rely on closer monitoring through reporting, periodic review and justificatory 
processes within international organizations or treaty-based institutions.120 In ancillary terms, this 
raises profound questions about voluntary compliance, when attendant implications for 
 
111 See paragraph 9.17 in CCAMLR, 2018. Report of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR-XXXVII). 
Hobart, CCAMLR. At:  https://www.ccamlr.org/en/system/files/e-cc-xxxvii.pdf.  
112 Ibid. 
113 Garner, B.A. Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004, Eighth Edition, West Group, USA. p. 569. 
114 Brunnée, J. Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law and International Environmental Law. Environmental Law 
Network International (ELNI), 2005, 1: 1-11.   
115 Ibid. 
116 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited Case (Second Phase), 1970. International Court of Justice Reports 
1970, p. 3: paras 33-34. At: <https://www.icj-c j.org/files/case-related/50/050-19700205-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>. 
117  Stein, T, ‘Decentralized International Law Enforcement: The Changing Role of the State as Law Enforcement Agent’. In 
Delbrück, J. (Ed.), Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International System, Proceedings of an International 
Symposium, Kiel Institute of International Law, 1995, p. 135. 
118 Barkin, J. S., & DeSombre, E. R. Unilateralism and multi-lateralism in international fisheries 
management. Global Governance, 2000, 6: 339–360. 
119 Brunnée, J above n 114. 
120 Maupain, F. ‘International Labor Organization Recommendations and Similar Instruments’, In: Shelton, D. (ed.), 






international legitimacy121 and behaviour122 are concerned. Notably, voluntary compliance has 
only recently evolved into a fisheries compliance-enforcement tool,123 but it requires further 
development. 
As the CAMLR Convention Area is remote and predominantly comprises the high seas,124 an 
added complication permeates the above. Under the LOSC Article 116, the right to fish is 
moderated by the requirement that States cooperate in taking, and supporting, measures 
necessary for the conservation of high seas living resources. While such conditions are generally 
applicable in the CCAMLR Area, there are notable exceptions. 
In particular, certain islands in the CCAMLR Area north of the Antarctic Treaty Area are subject 
to undisputed territorial sovereignty and some are not. This means the States concerned are 
effectively Coastal States enjoying all the rights and obligations attached to their adjacent 
territorial seas.125 These rights and obligations extend to the attached EEZ, 200 miles from the 
designated seashore baselines.126 Coastal States thus have the right to determine allowable 
catches (LOSC Article 62.1) in their EEZs, as well as to promote optimal use of living resources 
(Article 62.2) and allow other States to fish in the Zone (Article 62.3).   
To harmonise CCAMLR CMs and Coastal State measures in sovereign waters within the 
Convention Area, the latter measures are expected to be consistent with CCAMLR CMs applied 
on the high seas.127 For this reason, the Chairman's Statement, attached to the CAMLR 
Convention, outlines how CMs are to be applied in CCAMLR Area waters over which State 
sovereignty is recognised by all CPs.128 This has evolved into an intricate, and at times 
inconsistent, process aimed at applying CCAMLR CMs evenly throughout the Convention 
Area.129 Furthermore, the attached practice of certain CCAMLR Coastal States recording CM 
exceptions under the Chairman's Statement has been questioned.130    
Moreover, jurisdiction within, and management of, the CCAMLR Area  are explicitly linked with 
Antarctic Treaty provisions on sovereignty in the Treaty Area (south of 60oS)  and various 
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CAMLR Convention Articles explicitly elaborate these linkages.131 Fittingly, paragraph 7 of the 
1991 Final Act of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting in Madrid also 
notes that "nothing in the Protocol [to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection] shall 
derogate from the right and obligations under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources...".132 Such considerations raise questions concerning the extent to 
which the CCAMLR Area, as part of Antarctica as a whole, may be viewed as a global 
commons.133  
While it has been argued that a common heritage of humankind theme is applicable to the 
Antarctic, this is a notion with which many developing countries do not agree.134 As Suarez 
notes, "[t]he riches of the sea, and especially the immense wealth of the Antarctic region, are the 
patrimony of the whole human race’.135 He goes on to highlight the fact that consideration has 
not been given to: 
the interests of the moment, or of any particular country, but the general interest of 
mankind, which before long will have to draw upon the reserves of the sea to make good 
the inadequacy of the food production on land. It is our business to see that this step is 
not taken too late. 
The clear and present danger alluded to above is that the effects of CCAMLR CMs will be short-
lived if they cannot rely on long-term cooperation between, and the joint political will of, all 
CCAMLR CPs. To this extent CCAMLR's consensus-based decision-making could be 
strengthened, especially if CMs are agreed before their entry into force and are consequently 
supported in the absence of any substantive objection to their initial promulgation.136 This has 
important implications for the CCEP's implementation when 'push back' on non-compliant events 
results in a lack of agreement on non-compliance ratings within SCIC. On occasion, such 
circumstances have provoked seemingly self-serving explanations from China, Russia, South 
Africa, Uruguay and other SCIC Members, with a consequent lack of consensus on a particular 
CCEP-evaluated compliance status.137  
With potential capacity issues at play in addressing collective compliance problems, a perception 
of unilaterality by a CCAMLR coalition of the willing runs the risk of the CCEP being perceived as 
lacking legitimacy. This could result in concern for a process intended to improve compliance 
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within the CCAMLR Area, where the Area is being managed for a collective good.138 It could also 
pose a significant risk of being labelled trade protectionism. An obviously comparable example is 
the Shrimp-Turtle Case, where the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Appellate Body stressed 
that measures addressing international environmental problems are more appropriately agreed 
by a multilateral rather than a unilateral process139 - the exact solution CCAMLR seeks through 
its consensus-based decision-making regime.  
Such implied tensions are central to CCAMLR CCEP-directed decisions, and they clearly 
highlight the dangers of situations that are both reactive and confrontational,140 at least for some 
Members. There are several reasons for this. For example, difficulties in establishing unequivocal 
causal relationships between non-compliance and its detrimental effects, including associated 
counter-measures, are fraught with an erga omnes context.141 Additionally, capacity issues are 
probably better addressed in a climate of transparency, encouragement and engagement, rather 
than confrontationally, which is how the CCEP largely goes about its business.142  
Other complications include the Convention Area's size and remoteness, combined with the 
need for effective MCS over a substantial portion of the Area, and in the case of IUU fishing, 
beyond.143 These considerations not only result in challenging financial costs (e.g. for at-sea 
inspections and sophisticated surveillance strategies), they complicate effective application of 
Flag State jurisdiction where capacity disparities, cost-efficiency needs and jurisdictional 
determinants are likely to impact MCS execution.       
Despite such concerns, arguably, the CCEP has notably improved CCAMLR's compliance 
regime, without over-provoking adversarial confrontations. The current process promotes 
institutional transparency to allow CPs a fair opportunity to respond to non-compliant incidents 
and for CCAMLR to adopt a range of responses to CM issues, including necessary 
improvements enhancing technical operability.144 Consequently, there is a strong appreciation 
within CCAMLR that CM compliance remains central to meeting the Convention's objective. This 
is accompanied by increasing acceptance that the CCEP offers a fair and equitable way to 
achieve institution-wide compliance, where due weight is afforded fairness along with CCAMLR 
fishery values and sustainability needs.145 
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141 In legal terminology,  erga omnes rights or obligations are owed to all. 
142 Miller and Murray, above n 74. 
143 CCAMLR IUU catch estimates may be regarded as sub-global, or regional estimates, that are not applicable to all fisheries 
or ocean areas since they focus on 'far seas' IUU fishing, often by CCAMLR NCPs, which overlaps with other geographical 
areas and high seas fisheries in some cases.     
144 CCAMLR-XXXIII, 2014, Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of the Commission. Hobart, CCAMLR. Australia, paras 3.5 to 3.6. 
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It is also important to appreciate the extent to which the CCEP has emerged as an example of 
global best practice for compliance-focused developments within other RFMOs. As noted, 
CCAMLR has already considered a rudimentary and inventoried comparison of RFMO-adopted 
measures between such organisations.146 This contrasted compliance categories, actions and 
developments for 11 RFMOs, including CCAMLR. Subsequently, the Commission has suggested 
that there is a need for further consideration of the CCEP in a global best practice context. As 
noted, this remains work in progress.  
Despite CCAMLR largely standing alone in developing measures to address various CM 
compliance elements, there is still a need to standardise RFMO inter-comparability more 
rigorously. The expansion and elaboration of the rudimentary RFMO comparison highlighted 
further emphasises that additional in-depth analyses are required.147 These must account for the 
circumstantial specificity of CCAMLR CMs compared to other RFMOs, particularly in regards the 
type(s) of non-compliance being assessed and compared.  
The WCPFC has recently reviewed its Compliance Monitoring Scheme (CMS).148 Like the 
CCEP, the CMS is a three-stage process where: 
 (a) WCPFC Members, Cooperating Non-Members and Participating Territories (CCMs) 
provide compliance information to the WCPFC Secretariat; 
 (b) the Secretariat reviews the information and responds; and  
(c) the information is reviewed and assessed by a meeting of Parties. In the WCPFC's 
case, the collective institutional review is undertaken by the SCIC-analogous Technical 
and Compliance Committee (TCC). 
With the CMS being more complicated, onerous and wider-ranging than the CCEP, a case can 
be made that fisheries compliance evaluation regimes at the global level should, as far as 
possible, be simple, manageable, cost-effective and efficient for all concerned.  
In CCAMLR's case, irrevocable proof is not yet available to confidently indicate that the CCEP 
has substantially and unequivocally contributed to increased compliance overall.149 The 
attendant difficulty is that it is impossible to compare past and contemporary compliance histories 
objectively in the absence of a consistent and standardised information base for a period greater 
than the five plus years that the CCEP has been in existence. A lack of comparable non-
compliance metrics on either side of the CCEP's entry into force further compounds such 
 
146 CCAMLR, Report of the Workshop for the Development of a Compliance Evaluation Procedure (DOCEP), 2009. 
147 Miller and Murray, above n 74. 
148 WCPFC, Final Report from the Independent Review Panel to Review the Compliance Monitoring Scheme, 2004, 164 pp. At: 
https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/final-report independent-panel-review-compliance-monitoring-scheme-0. 





difficulties. Only the future will reveal whether CCAMLR CM compliance can ever be objectively 
compared, as CCEP data and the procedure's attached timeline grow. Meanwhile, the 
circumstances encountered in 2017150 suggest that the CCEP is still bedding down to the extent 
that its future trajectory and ultimate success remains unclear.  
Nonetheless, noting CCAMLR's global best MCS practice standing, there is no doubt that the 
CCEP offers a significant step forward for CCAMLR as a mature RFMO-like management 
organisation. In this regard, the CCEP could serve as a model from which other RFMOs may 
draw information and experience. This may prove useful in developing global standards to 
augment compliance evaluation as a crucial, best-practice management tool for the sustainable 
fisheries management 'toolbox'. However, a crucial question remains: What place do CCEP-like 
processes occupy in future efforts to cohesively address the global 'fisheries crisis' and to 
promote responsible fishing universally? 
The UN has long recognised that global "environmental problems are greater than the sum of 
those in each country,"151 meaning that the world must transcend national self-interest to 
embrace the collective interests of human survival.152 In context, the UN has highlighted two 
areas of particular concern: Antarctica and the oceans. For the former, the importance of 
widening cooperation within the ATS appears to benefit responsible global custodianship of the 
region.  
Three key imperatives underpin the above UN assertion in terms of mobilising the global 
commitment necessary to effectively manage the oceans. In particular, the UN has 
acknowledged that the: 
 Oceans' underlying unity mandates effective global management; Shared-resource 
nature of many regional seas requires regionally-focused  management, and 
 Land-based threats require effective national actions based on international cooperation. 
 
Implicit in these assertions is that, at a minimum, there is an essential 'commons' element 
attached to the responsible management153 of both Antarctica and the oceans. Apart from 
associated res communis considerations having been implicated in encouraging 
overcapitalisation and overexploitation,154 compliance-enforcement is essential to underpinning 
responsible fishing and ecosystem management along the lines posited here. This strongly 
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154 GESAMP, ‘A Sea of Troubles. Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection’, Report 





implies that effective and participatory compliance evaluation is paramount. Consequently, 
improving MCS integration with compliance evaluation implementation remain worth pursuing to 
promote the CEEP's development and refinement.  
Within the CCEP's framework and its highlighted key standing, we offer five key elements to be 
considered further in improving the Procedure's processes and outcomes, as well as address the 
data/information uncertainties, scenario prediction, contextual and scale considerations.  
 
Our suggested framework relies on:155 
 Using the best information available, especially scientific advice; 
 Ensuring transparency to underpin comprehensive, informed and effective 
stakeholder participation in a minimally-adversarial environment; 
 Where possible, avoiding reliance on false objectivity when taking decisions will avoid 
over-quantification of imprecise values, noting that the precision of non-compliance 
ratings are essentially a product of judging fulfilment of imprecise, or interpretable, CM 
provisions;  
 Striving for efficiency, but not at the expense of effectiveness; 
 Considering equity and vulnerability in terms of attached compliance costs and 
benefits; 
 Ensuring global accountability by providing regular non-compliance monitoring and 
evaluation; and 
 Where possible, considering cumulative and cross-scale effects to assess tradeoffs 
between the benefits of specific ecosystem services. 
 
It has recently been suggested that global fisheries are really a panarchy, where four key 
dimensions drive the emergence of ocean hazards. These dimensions have profound 
implications, particularly in terms of their attached potential to drive global fisheries to collapse,  
as well as in improving risk-based, EBM approaches.156 
 
Improved understanding of factors most likely to affect compliance evaluation successes and 
failures remains crucial to resolving the above panarchy, as compliance evaluation is a primary 
driver of success and failure, as well as of effective compliance evaluation procedures in their 
own right. Here, effectiveness is a product of contextual factors, such as governance and 
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socioeconomic considerations, rather than simply a consequence of how a compliance 
evaluation procedure has been designed and implemented.   
 
Consequently, robust policies should counter potentially negative effects from unacceptable non-
compliance risks, particularly where policies are predicated by a need to build/rebuild harvested 
stocks and area resilience so as to minimise pervasive, persistent, and irreversible disturbances 
and effects (i.e. "changes"). The potential for unforeseen, and extreme, events to negatively 
impact ocean management must therefore be taken into account.157  
Six interrelated, concerns drive human vulnerability to oceanic risk(s):158  
(a) lack of recognition that the oceans are inherently sensitive systems;  
(b) inappropriate ocean financial and economic management mechanisms; 
(c) inadequate scientific information and knowledge;  
(d) human disconnection from the full range of ocean values;  
(e) lack of political will and corporate leadership to address ocean risk(s) specifically; and  
(f) ineffective implementation of appropriate governance.  
Interlinking qualities of communication, ocean literacy, urgency and scale stand with these 





We consider that the CCEP, and compliance evaluation more generally, are essential for 
effective CCAMLR fisheries management, with MCS being a key integrating factor. We also see 
CCAMLR withstanding scrutiny as a worthy, and complete, example of best global MCS practice 
to date. 
Based on the information and thoughts presented here, we conclude that the CCEP offers a 
useful model for developing compliance evaluation regimes more broadly. It could also be 
suggested that the merits of enhancing fisheries compliance via a CCEP-like process would 
improve fishery resilience and provide valuable input into a globally co-ordinated fishery 
governance regime, such as that proposed by Barkin and DeSombre.159 An obvious advantage is 
that a more holistic approach to the global fisheries “crisis” might emerge.   
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Stressing global conformity (i.e. "compliance" in fisheries parlance) targets established norms 
and standards. However, it has been, and is still, difficult to address non-compliance directly due 
to its diffuse and complex nature. Consistent compliance evaluation therefore infers that on-going 
monitoring would vitally facilitate, and narrow down, global conformity with regulatory measures. 
The principle that monitoring and evaluation benefits us all has been famously illustrated by 
Suzanne Massie's "trust but verify" notion.160. Elaborated further by President Regan at the 1982 
signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,161 it became the need for 
"extensive verification procedures that would enable both sides to monitor compliance with the 
[INF] Treaty". As a policy, trust but verify mutated further with Hilary Clinton's comment on the 
2015 framework Iran nuclear deal that, "my approach will be to distrust and verify"162. A further 
contemporary interpretation emerged as the "trust, but don't verify"163 United States (US) policy 
on drone rendition. It seems to us that the simplicity of Massie's original initial rendition is at the 
core of fisheries compliance enforcement evaluation, offering as it does a sensible mantra to 
pursue.  
Highlighting the role of monitoring and trust in important international arrangements illustrates 
that such arrangements rely on compliance with an agreement's 'spirit' to meet its objectives. 
This is in keeping with the notion that compliance is as important as an arrangement itself, while 
it recognises that compliance enforcement evaluation is heavily nuanced by the prevailing 
expectations of the parties involved.  
Obviously the financial and political costs of ensuring compliance vary immensely, depending on 
the attendant norms and standards to be met, as well as on how these are defined by policy, 
precedent or practice. Viewing the CCEP as a step in the right direction offers hope for improving 
MCS rendition as a fisheries management tool. In other words, by understanding how well MCS 
and compliance enforcement work through effective evaluation and monitoring of non-
compliance is likely to comprehensively improve ocean management in the future.   
We also recognise that recent closure of the Central Arctic Ocean to fishing for at least 16 years 
is a step in the right direction, "to  better understand this ever-changing ecosystem and its marine 
life and to determine if fishing there could be ecologically sustainable".164 Examining the role that 
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compliance evaluation plays in the remote Arctic, as in the Antarctic is therefore probably worth 
exploring.  
Equally, the notion that the CCEP offers a useful precedent for considering what might be 
achieved in reinforcing Arctic fisheries compliance enforcement along CCEP lines. To this extent, 
it should be borne in mind that the Antarctic and Arctic continue to attract significant international 
attention due to their perceived strategic, ecological, economic and political value. Both regions 
invoke profound ecological interest, and their resources are seen as potentially important 
economically. Nonetheless, concerns remain that the Arctic and Antarctic's strategic importance 
continue to pose significant risks to the international order.165 The additional risks of non-
compliance and unsustainable fishing practises would thus add to such concerns, particularly in 
light of the important role that seafood and common-access fisheries are likely to play in future 
global food security.166 
It is vitally important to, "cast off the chains that bind us to ineffective ocean management."167 
This entails:  
(a) improving the flow of relevant information by utilising/upgrading available technology;  
(b) expanding cross-sectional stakeholder involvement; 
(c) engaging the private sector more; and  
(d) enhancing regional-scale MCS and management.  
In effect, the CCEP is striving for these attributes within the current framework of legal norms.  
Therefore, as we strive for common understanding, considerably more effort must be directed at 
adaptive compliance evaluation to attain the best possible societal outcomes and minimise 
potential conflict(s).168 Only public, industrial and academic discourse will achieve an effective, 
common and universal framework to underpin compliance evaluation globally. 
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The inherent weakness of the international fisheries regime has led certain States and individuals 
to conclude, on a cost/benefit analysis, that there is more to be gained from fishing outside 
international regulations than within them.1  The lack of prescription within the LOSC on the 
nature and scope of flag State obligations has made clear and discernible sanctions almost 
impossible to identify.  Additionally, the likelihood of being apprehended and often minimal 
implications for the perpetrator in the event of apprehension, means that RFMOs globally are 
facing an uphill battle with regards to achieving compliance with conservation measures.2   
 
In recent years, RFMOs have had to adapt their compliance approach to include novel and 
targeted compliance-related conservation measures relevant to the specific challenges they face. 
Monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) conservation measures aim to achieve conservation3 
targets and ensure sustainable fishing practices are implemented appropriately. These terms 
were defined in 1981 by the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Expert 
Consultation as: 
 
 ‘Monitoring’ - continuous measurement of fishing characteristics and resource yields, 
which implies supervising and observing relevant activities with appropriate reporting, 
 ‘Control’ - regulatory conditions under which exploitation of fishery resources may be 
conducted, and 
 ‘Surveillance’ - degree and types of observations required to maintain compliance with 
regulatory controls ('measures') imposed on fishing activities.4 
 
 
1 Baird, R, 'Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: an Analysis of the Legal, Economic and Historical Factors Relevant to 
its Development and Persistence' (2004) 14(5) Melbourne Journal of International Law 299. 
2 Carl-Christian Schmidt, 'Economic Drivers of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing' (Paper presented at the 
Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, St. Johns, Canada, 
May 1-5 2005). 
3 In this context, 'conservation' includes the concept of sustainable resource use to allow the environment to yield the greatest 
net benefits to current generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations. 
4 Flewwelling P. An introduction to monitoring, control and surveillance systems for capture fisheries. Rome, FAO. FAO 
Fisheries technical paper no. 338: p. 10.; FAO, 2001. Report on an expert consultation on MCS for Fisheries management. 





It is the ultimate aim of MCS to minimise the potential benefits to be gained from undertaking 
non-compliant activity.5 While MCS measures seeking to ensure compliance with conservation 
measures, enforcement actions seek to address, and rectify, violations. 
 
This chapter identifies and examines the range of compliance-related conservation measures 
which may be adopted by RFMOs in their pursuit of compliance. It establishes three categories 
of compliance-related conservation measures and analyses some of the specific measures that 
may fall under each (refer Figure 1, Attachment A).   
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that there are categories of approach RFMOs can pursue to improve 
rates of compliance by flag States which include policy approaches, diplomatic action, and 
countermeasures.  The thesis argues that under each of these categories, a range of actions can 
be employed by the RFMO to encourage or require compliance by the flag State.   
 
Certain approaches, such as cooperative policies, function by pre-empting instances of non-
compliance by flag States while others, such as trade-related measures and graded sanctions, 
allow a RFMO to respond to a specific or continuing instance of non-compliance.  As such, the 
course of action an RFMO adopts to combat non-compliance will depend upon whether the non-
compliance is a perceived threat or an actual occurrence. 
 
The chapter then goes on to identify how the compliance-related conservation measures under 
examination in this thesis may be categorised and why. The measures under examination 
include:  
 cooperative policies,  
 policies relating to non-contracting parties,  
 policies relating to cooperating parties,  
 vessel lists,  
 requests and negotiations,  
 diplomatic demarches,  
 trade-related measures,  
 graded sanctions and  
 monitoring and inspection procedures.  
 
The primary purpose of this chapter, however, is to collect data to determine which AusRFMOs 
have implemented which compliance-related conservation measures.  This data will to used in 
 
5 Sumaila UR. ‘The cost of being apprehended fishing illegally: Empirical evidences and policy implications’. 2004. Organisation 





Chapter 6 to allocate each AusRFMO a compliance ranking of basic, developing or established. 
These findings highlight the limitations of AusRFMOs when it comes to implementing effective 
compliance regimes and it is emphasised that compliance must now be viewed as a challenge to 
both the flag State, and industry, if progress it to be made.6  
 
Regardless of the capacity of each of the AusRFMOs under examination, it is clear that 
compliance enforcement is pivotal to the success of the individual RFMO.7  This thesis is limited 
to discussion of enforcement action that can be brought by RFMOs against flag States.  Under 
international law, flag State jurisdiction grants States, not individual vessels, the jurisdiction to 
fish the high seas.8  
 
As such, if there is a breach of an obligation that has been accepted by the flag State via their 
RFMO commitment, it is the flag State and not the vessel that will be liable.  As a result of flag 
State jurisdiction, there is often more to be gained in terms of fisheries management by targeting 
the actions of the non-compliant flag States rather than targeting the actions of the individual 
vessel fishing the high seas.9   
 
However, that is not to say that the actions of the flag State are separate from those of the vessel 
it has authorised to fish the high seas.  In some cases, in order to effectively penalise the flag 
State for not controlling the actions of their vessels on the high seas, it is necessary to consider 
enforcement action that can be taken against an individual vessel.10  As a result, this chapter 
considers specific examples of enforcement actions that target vessels for the impact that such 




In considering compliance with conservation measures, a unique difficulty presents itself: the 
problem of RFMO membership.  Today, several categories of RFMO membership exist. These 
include contracting parties (CPs) and non-contracting parties (NCPs) and what will be referred to 
for the purposes of this thesis as a Cooperating Non-Party (CNP).   
 
 
6 Andre Nol kaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework’ (2013) 34 
Michigan Journal of International Law at 365. 
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Regulation' in J Sundberg (ed), Fish, Trade and Development (in press.)  
8 Rosemary Rayfuse, Non-flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries (2004) 21. 
9 Davor Vidas, 'IUU Fishing or IUU Operations? Some Observations on Diagnosis and Current Treatment' in D D Caron and H 
N Scheiber (eds), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (2004) 3. 
10 For example, RFMO ‘non-compliant vessel lists’ (formerly referred to as vessel ‘black-lists’) target individual vessels however 





Differing levels of membership imply different responsibilities for the flag State in respect of the 
relevant RFMO and its conservation measures.  Legally, CPs are obliged to adhere to the 
conservation measures that they accept upon becoming a party to an RFMO.11  In this way, 
enforcement action can be bought against a CP in the event of non-compliance.  In the case of 
NCPs, however, RFMOs have no legal standing to enforce their conservation measures in the 
case of non-compliance.12    
 
In an attempt to overcome this problem, UNFSA provides that all States, regardless of their 
membership, have an obligation to ensure their vessels comply with the conservation measures 
of RFMOs.13  In addition, the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (hereafter 
referred to as the ‘FAO Compliance Agreement’) provides that States should take measures to 
ensure that their vessels do not engage in activity which undermines the effectiveness of 
conservation measures.14   
 
Unfortunately, since its inception, ratification or accession to the FAO Compliance Agreement 
has been low,15 a situation which has challenged the application of this agreement.  As a general 
rule, however, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the LOSC) also imposes an 
obligation on all State parties to cooperate in the conservation and management of high seas 
resources.16   
 
The difficulty that arises is that international agreements only apply inter partes.17  This means 
that only States that agree to the provisions of UNFSA and the FAO Compliance Agreement 
have an obligation to adhere to the conservation measures of RFMOs even when they are not a 
CP.  Logically, it is unlikely that a State that has failed to become a member of an RFMO would 
agree to the provisions of either of these agreements. 
 
As a result of the voluntary nature of high seas conservation attempts, there is some debate as 
to the extent to which RFMOs have the jurisdiction to create compliance mechanisms which 
 
11 Lodge, Michael W et al, ‘Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an 
Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’, (2007). 
12 This is because States must voluntarily agree to adopt and implement RFMO conservation measures. If a States chooses not 
to then they cannot be penalised, however there are exceptions to the rule.  R. Quentin Grafton et al, Handbook of Marine 
Fisheries Conservation and Management (2010) 160. 
13 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, article 18(1). 
14 FAO Compliance Agreement, article 3(1). 
15 Kevern L. Cochrane and David J. Doulman, 'The Rising Tide of Fisheries Instruments and the Struggle to Keep Afloat' (2005) 
360 (1453) Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 77, 80. 
16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, articles 116-118. 
17 The term inter partes literally means ‘between parties’.  In a legal sense it is used to define a relationship that is between 






apply to NCPs.18 Despite this, certain RFMOs have adopted conservation measures which aim 
to penalise non-compliant NCPs19 and there are examples of NCPs demonstrating an 
acceptance of their responsibility to RFMOs by ordering their vessels to comply with these 
measures.20   
 
Finally, CNPs hold a different status altogether within the RFMO framework.  To encourage 
compliance, many RFMOs have invited CNPs to accept ‘cooperating non-member’ status.21  It is 
up to the individual RFMO to determine matters such as how CNPs will participate in the 
organisation (including their attendance at annual meetings), procedures for attaining CNP status 
and which conservation measures will apply to CNPs.  There is great variation in the approach 
different RFMOs have to CNPs, with certain RFMOs only recognising CNPs for their participation 
in specific conservation measures.22  For practical purposes, this chapter considers compliance 
mechanisms that could theoretically be adopted by an RFMO to combat non-compliance by flag 






RFMO policies and their approach towards both CPs and NCPs are essential to the 
effectiveness of the regional system of fisheries management.23  Without guidelines to determine 
how the individual RFMO will deal with CPs and NCPs differently, there can be no common and 
consistent approach to implementing conservation measures.  As such, policies and approaches 
play a large role in determining how individual RFMOs will tackle the problem of non-compliance 
by different parties.  While RFMO policies and approaches govern a vast array of matters, 
 
18 The debate as to whether RFMOs might impose their conservation measures on non-contracting parties arose between 
States at CCAMLR XXVIII held in Hobart, Tasmania in 2010.  See Paragraphs 12.95 – 12.100 of the 2010 Commission Report 
available on line at < http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cr/09/i12.pdf>. 
19 For instance, the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) has established a trade-related 
measure to address IUU fishing by NCPs.  Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, 'CCAMLR XXII Meeting Report', 24 
October - 7 November 2003, Hobart, Australia, 6.  Available on line at: 
<http://www.asoc.org/Portals/0/ASOC%20final%20report%20CCAMLR%20XXII,%20Dec%2003.pdf>. 
20 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement' (2004) LI Netherlands International Law 
Review 41, 62. 
21 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2002) accessed on line at 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0098e/a0098e00.htm>  
22 For example, the only cooperating party status the CCAMLR recognises is that of the ‘non-Contracting Party cooperating with 
CCAMLR by participating in the Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp.’  See Daniel Owen, ‘Practice of RFMOs 
Regarding non-Members: A Report to Support the Independent High Level Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance 
by RFMOs’, Cambridge, United Kingdom, February 2007, 4. 
23 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by consensus at the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI, Rome, Italy, adopted on 23 





including transparency and new and exploratory fisheries,24 this section is specifically concerned 




Cooperation is the foundation of regional fisheries management.  It is through cooperation that 
RFMOs seek to enforce their mandate and implement their regime.  By encouraging both CPs 
and NCPs to cooperate with the objectives of an RFMO, the instances of non-compliance will be 
minimised.  In the alternative, a lack of cooperation from flag States reduces the control 
exercised by an RFMO, particularly when trying to impose restrictions on a flag State that is not a 
party to the relevant RFMO.   
 
The importance of cooperation arises as a result of the duty to cooperate contained in the LOSC.  
The LOSC determines that States are ‘to cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries 
organisations’25 in the interests of conservation, and therefore one of the purposes of a RFMO is 
to act as a forum for negotiations between States on conservation matters. 26  As such, many 
RFMOs have formulated policies directly relating to cooperation between and amongst CPs, 
NCPs and CNPs.   
 
The manner in which policy can be used to encourage cooperation can be demonstrated by the 
conservation measures of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR).  The CCAMLR has sought to overcome the threat posed by NCPs to its 
effectiveness by adopting a ‘Policy to Enhance Cooperation between CCAMLR and Non-
Contracting Parties’.27  This policy codifies the duty to cooperate contained in the LOSC and 
extends awareness of the need for NCPs to accede to the convention.   
 
The aim of the Policy is to encourage and build the capacity of NCPs to cooperate and to keep 
them informed of developments in conservation measures.28  The Policy requires the Chairman 
of the CCAMLR to write to NCPs to, inter alia, ‘invite and encourage non-Contracting Parties to 
attend as observers at meetings of the Commission’29 and ‘request non-contracting Parties to 
 
24 A Willock and M Lack, Follow the Leader: Learning from Experience and Best Practice in Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations (2006) 16. 
25 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 118. 
26 Tore Henriksen, 'Revisiting the Freedom of Fishing and Legal Obligations on States Not Party to Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations' (2009) 40(1) Ocean Development & International Law 80 , 87. 
27 Adopted and CCAMLR-XVIII and amended at CCAMLR-XXV.  Available on line http://www.ccamlr.org/Pu/e/cds/policy-to-
enhance.pdf. 
28 Lodge et al, above n 11, 64. 





prevent their flag vessels from fishing in the Convention Area in a manner which undermines the 
effectiveness of measures adopted by CCAMLR’.30   
 
In another example of how cooperative policies can target non-compliance, certain RFMOs have 
moved to make policies more effective by including provisions that provide positive incentives for 
cooperation. The framework provisions of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) and the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) expressly 
refer to ‘cooperation quotas’ implying that if States chose to cooperate, their catch quotas will be 
increased.31   
 
In other cases, the treaty establishing a RFMO can refer to the benefits to be derived from 
cooperation.  It is the policy of both the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC) and the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO) that non-parties ‘shall 
enjoy benefits from participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply 
with … conservation and management measures in respect of the relevant stocks’.  In this way, 
cooperative policies can encourage compliance from NCPs and reduce the incentive for States 




One of the primary challenges facing RFMOs and their ability to implement conservation 
measures effectively is the problem of incomplete membership.  Many States continue to operate 
outside of the relevant fisheries regimes, threatening the conservation and management goals of 
RFMOs.32  Significant damage can result from the activities of NCPs, with the conservation 
measures of the ICCAT, for instance, frequently undermined by ships registered in non-member 
States.33  In fact, it is estimated that about 10 percent of the total catch in ICCAT fisheries is 
undertaken by vessels flagged to non-member States34 which can thereby diminish incentives to 
comply with the RFMO.   
 
As such, many RFMOs have designed compliance policies and approaches targeting the 
activities of NCPs, their nationals and their vessels.  For instance, the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission (IOTC) has a scheme to promote compliance by the vessels of NCPs whereby any 
evidence that such vessels have been fishing contrary to IOTC regulations should be reported. 
 
30 Policy to Enhance Cooperation, above n 27.  
31 Henriksen, above n 26. 
32 Willock and Lack, above n 24, 1. 
33 Elizabeth R. DeSombre, 'Fishing Under Flags of Convenience: Using Market Power to Increase Participation in International 






Similarly, CCAMLR’s Resolution 14/XIX urges all NCPs not participating in the CCAMLR Catch 
Documentation Scheme (CDS) to implement it fully.  By implementing a single approach towards 
the actions of NCPs, RFMOs are able to achieve consistency and promote a consistent message 




While the control or regulation of NCPs is one of the key objectives of any RFMO, achieving 
compliance by those parties that have agreed to implement RFMO mandates is not a given. 
Indeed, the performance reviews of certain AusRFMOs recently noted low levels of compliance 
by contracting parties as one of the major problems facing the effectiveness of the individual 
RFMO.35  As such, achieving compliance by those parties that have committed to implementing 
conservation measures as well as empowering those States to achieve compliance from their 
nationals is crucial to the functionality of all RFMOs.  
 
In an example of a policy approach directed at CPs, the Commission for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) recently implemented their ‘Resolution on action plans to ensure 
compliance with Conservation and Management Measures’.  This Resolution requires CPs and 
CNPs to submit an action plan to the Secretariat concerning, inter alia, how the State will certify 
catch data and information on ecologically related species. Further to this the CCAMLR has 
adopted Conservation Measure 10-08 requiring CPs to take measures to deprive IUU fishing 
operators of the benefits obtained from their behaviour. This approach requires that the flag State 




As outlined in Figure 2, the second tactical measure to be examined for its ability to enable 
RFMOs to take action against non-compliance, is that of diplomacy.  While significant difficulties 
have arisen as a result of the law of the sea being founded in the notion of the freedom to fish,36 
it is arguable that this situation has also strengthened the ability of diplomatic pressures to 
control the actions of States.  Meetings of RFMOs are replete with examples of States 
undertaking diplomatic negotiations which continue intersessionally to allow States to reach 
agreement on conservation measures.37   
 
35 Anonymous (2009). Report of the IOTC Performance Review Panel: January 2009. Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. See 
also Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Report of the Performance Review Working Group, Canberra, 
Australia, July 2008.  Available on line at <http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_15/report_of_PRWG.pdf>  
36 Rayfuse, above n 8. 
37 For example, in the commission reports of CCAMLR XXVIII, the USA reiterated its commitment to continued intersessional 







However, the diplomatic ambitions of a State or group of States can also be made entirely 
tangible through the creation of IUU vessel lists or the issuing of a diplomatic demarche.  While 
such tensions do not always resolve themselves in favour of conservation, diplomacy is certainly 





Today, it is common policy for a RFMO to compile an annual list of vessels it has found to be 
engaged in IUU fishing in its area of competence and undermining their conservation 
measures.38  The CCAMLR was the first RFMO to adopt a scheme for an IUU vessel list at its 
twenty-second annual meeting in 2003.39  Since then, numerous other RFMOs have adopted 
similar schemes.  
 
On a tactical level, the compilation of these lists could be considered to be a policy approach, 
however, for the purposes of this chapter, they are analysed for their effectiveness as a 
diplomatic measure aimed at ‘naming and shaming’ 40 those flag States whose vessels appear 
on lists compiled by the RFMO.   If the flag State of a listed vessel is a CP, the pressure imposed 
upon the non-compliant flag State at both meetings of the RFMO and intersessionally is 
considerable and such pressure can often lead to the State taking action to remove the vessel 
from their register.41   
 
However this does not resolve the problem of IUU vessels that are flagged to NCPs.  As a result 
many RFMOs have compiled separate lists of IUU vessels of CPs and NCPs.42  There are 
several kinds of activities that will lead to inclusion on IUU vessel lists.  According to the 
Chatham House Report these can include: 
 
 being sighted engaged in illegal activity, 
 fishing with a vessel not registered on a required register, 
 landing after being denied port access, 
 landing or transhipment pursuant to relevant measures, 
 
38 CCAMLR’s IUU list can be found at <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/sc/fish-monit/iuu-vess.htm>, 
39 Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Illegal, Monitoring IUU Fishing Vessels in Southern African Ports (2009) 
<http://www.iuufishing.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1> at 15 March 2010. 
40 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'The Anthropocene, Autopoiesis and the Disingenuousness of the Genuine Link: Addressing 
Enforcement Gaps in the Legal Regime for Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction' (Paper presented at the Fourth J.W.H. Verzijl 
Memorial Symposium on ‘The Legal Regime of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Current Principles and Frameworks and 
Future Directions, University of Utrecht, 21 November 2008)  
41 Lodge et al, above n 11, 68. 





 fishing without quota, catch limit or effort allocation, 
 failing to report or record catches (or making false reports), 
 fishing during closed seasons or in closed areas, 
 using prohibited fishing gear, or 
 transhipping to vessels on the IUU fishing list.43 
 
Generally, these are all activities considered to be ‘serious violations’ under UNFSA. 44  
 
The quality of information included in the IUU vessel lists of different RFMOs has been found to 
vary greatly.45  However, it appears that there is considerable commonality amongst RFMOs 
when it comes to determining what actions should be taken against vessels appearing on these 
lists.46  In terms of compliance enforcement, it is the effect that IUU vessel lists have on the 
actions of States that is of the greatest significance. While technical measures such as denying 
port access and prohibiting chartering of the vessel might occur, the public notoriety associated 
with listing is sometimes enough to prompt the flag State itself to penalise the non-compliant 
vessel in question.47   
 
Regardless of the penalties that flow from an IUU listing for the vessel, it is clear that the IUU 
vessel lists represent an important diplomatic tool that can be utilised by RFMOs in order to 




Due to the voluntary nature of RFMO membership, these organisations function largely via 
diplomatic negotiations and the issuing of requests to achieve compliance with conservation 
measures.  By enacting measures to promote membership, a RFMO may encourage NCPs with 
a real interest in a fishery to join or at least accede to the convention and apply its conservation 
and management measures.   
 
The IPOA-IUU provides that where the actions of individual States fail to achieve participation, 
RFMOs themselves should facilitate cooperation through the ‘implementation of measures 
adopted by the relevant organisations.’48  The ability of a RFMO to achieve comprehensive 
 
43 Lodge et al, above n 11, 63. 
44 Ibid. 
45 The PEW Environment Group, Port State Performance (2009) 
<http://www.portstateperformance.org/index.php/content/execsummary>  
46 Lodge et al, above n 11, 63. 
47 The PEW Environment Group, above n 45. 






membership of all States with a potential to influence the fishery in question is a prerequisite for 
effective management.49  A specific RFMO might issue a request for cooperation from a vessel 
or flag State to cease non-compliant behaviour by providing a deadline by which time compliance 
is to be achieved.50  Alternatively, it may request a State to recall its vessel to port so that 
enforcement action might ensue.51   
 
However, it is more common for the RFMO itself to engage in requests and negotiations whereby 
such action will encourage a specific NCP to become a CP.  The CCSBT, for instance, used its 
Japanese contacts to place diplomatic pressure on Korea to become a CP to the commission.52  
Such efforts, however, are not always  rewarded and despite continued pressure, Indonesia 
remains outside of the CCSBT.53 
 
In a positive example of how negotiations can instigate compliance, in 1997, CCAMLR requested 
Namibia and Mauritius to attend its next meeting as observers following negotiation efforts 
instigated by France, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.54 These negotiations were aimed 
at encouraging these States to close their ports to illegal trade in Patagonian Toothfish.55  Three 
years later, in June 2000, Namibia acceded to the CCAMLR and in 2001 they became a 
permanent member.56    
 
However, achieving this level of success in respect of NCPs as a result of negotiations is not 
always successful.  Both the ICCAT and the CCSBT have undertaken lengthy negotiations with 
NCPs promising that in becoming CPs, these States will be allocated a certain quota in the 
fishery in question.57 Unfortunately, these States have often held off on becoming CPs until they 
are offered a substantial quota in the fishery or, in choosing not to join, have continued to fish in 





49 Willock and Lack, above n 24, iv. 
50 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries (2005), 20. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
(2009) 34. 
53Ibid. 
54 Rachel Baird, 'Coastal State Fisheries Management: A Review of Australian Enforcement Action in the Heard and McDonald 
Islands Australian Fishing Zones' (2004) 9(1) Deakin Law Review 91. 
55 Ibid. 
56 ‘Report of the CEP Observer to CCAMLR XIX and SC-CCAMLR XIX’, 23 October to 3 November, 2000, Information Paper 
IP-26, Australia.  Report available on line at <http://cep.ats.aq/cep/MediaItems/ml_376387248032407_ip026e.pdf> 
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Although similar to diplomatic action instigated through negotiations and requests, diplomatic 
demarches by definition, involve a formal representation or warning made to a public authority.59  
The formal nature of this exercise distinguishes it from the negotiation process and while 
diplomatic demarches are traditionally sent by a State or group of States to another State, 
RFMOs (as a collaboration of States) are also able to issue diplomatic demarches to States that 
have engaged in non-compliant behaviour.   
 
The use of diplomatic demarches to persuade States to fish responsibly is well established.60  In 
1998, Australia and France sent a joint demarche to Mauritius in regards to a vessel illegally 
fishing in the CCAMLR conservation area.61   Australia and France requested that the Salvora, 
an IUU vessel, not be allowed to unload its catch without an investigation into its fishing 
activities.62  In this instance, Mauritius agreed to intervene if the Salvora offloaded its catch at a 
specific port and in this case, the demarche achieved its intended outcome.63 The success of this 
measure resulted in a ruling in the Mauritius Supreme Court that the Salvora had caught 
Toothfish in the French exclusive economic zone (EEZ) resulting in the vessel being unable to 
land its catch.64   
 
However, there are also cases where RFMOs themselves have issued diplomatic demarches.  In 
the case of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the Commission encountered 
problems with non-compliance when, in 2002, it issued a total closure of all purse seine65 
fisheries.  While it was understood that CPs complied with the closure, vessels from Bolivia and 
Colombia (both NCPs) continued to fish using purse seine nets.66  The IATTC then issued 
diplomatic demarches to both these States to no avail.   
 
A greater level of success, however, was achieved by the IATTC when the vessels of several 
NCPs were found to be targeting yellowfin tuna in its area of competence.  In this case, the 
vessels withdrew from the area as a result of a ‘series of diplomatic demarches’67 which 
persuaded the flag States to exercise control over their vessels.  
 
59 A ‘demarche’ is defined as ‘a political step or proceeding’. See McIntosh (ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English (1964) 323. 
60 Deep Sea 2003: Conference on the Management of Deep Sea Fisheries, 2003, Queenstown New Zealand at 695. 
61 Baird, above n 54. 
62 Baird, above n 54. 
63 Greenpeace, The Case of the Salvora (2000) 
<http://archive.greenpeace.org/oceans/southernoceans/expedition2000/pirate/report_salvora.html>  
64 Ibid. 
65 The Australian Fisheries Management Authority describes purse seine fishing as a technique whereby the top of a net is 
floated at the ocean’s surface and the bottom of the net is held under the water by lead weights. A wire that is threaded through 
the bottom of the net can be tightened to close the bottom of the net trapping the fish inside. The net is then pulled in toward 
the boat and the catch is either pumped or lifted out with small nets or the whole net is brought aboard. See Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority, Purse Seine (2005) 
<http://www.afma.gov.au/information/students/methods/purse_seine.htm>  









International law concerning countermeasures is founded in the concept of flag State 
responsibility.68  Where an obligation, owed to the international community as a whole, is 
breached, State responsibility may be invoked to allow for action to be taken against the 
offending State.  Under normal circumstances, such action would lie in contravention of 
international law; however, when countermeasures are taken in conformity with certain 
requirements, coercive action can be justified.69  However, countermeasures are viewed as 
exceptional measures, the scope of which is limited to ‘the cessation of the internationally 
wrongful act.’70 
 
In the context of international fisheries law, countermeasures could allow a flag State to take 
action against another State which might have failed to comply with its obligation to cooperate 
with other States in the conservation of marine living resources.71  However, there are certain 
conditions restricting what types of action may be taken.   
 
In 1997, it was decided by the International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
case that countermeasures must: 
a) be taken in response to an unlawful act; 
b) be preceded by a demand for compliance by the injured State/s; 
c) be proportionate, and; 
d) have the purpose of inducing the ‘wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations under 
international law’.72 
 
Rosemary Rayfuse73 argues that countermeasures must be reversible and they must not involve 
the threat or use of force.74  As a result of the above requirements, the State or group of States 
taking action must be considered injured.  This occurs when an obligation is owed to a group of 
States or to the international community as a whole and a breach of that obligation can radically 
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72 International Court of Justice, 'Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)' (1997). Judgment 
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change the position of all other States.75  In the context of RFMO actions, CPs who are acting in 
compliance with conservation measures may be considered injured by the actions of a non-
compliant flag State allowing IUU vessels to fish.76   
 
The potential for a RFMO to take countermeasures against uncooperative flag States was 
considered a viable option for RFMOs to achieve compliance at a 2008 United Nations Food and 
Agriculture (FAO) workshop on flag State responsibilities.77  At this workshop it was discussed 
that so long as countermeasures are transparent, non-discriminatory and compatible with the 
regulations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), they represent an effective tool to 




Trade-related measures are probably the largest remaining category of countermeasures 
available to induce other States to comply with international law.  Article 68 of the IPOA-IUU 
envisages that States should cooperate through RFMOs to adopt, ‘appropriate multilaterally 
agreed trade-related measures consistent with the WTO that may be necessary to prevent, deter 
and eliminate IUU fishing for specific fish stocks or species.’79  
 
This agreement defines what types of actions might constitute trade-related measures in a 
RFMO context as multi-lateral catch documentation and certification requirements and import 
and export controls or prohibitions.80  As a result of such clarification, trade-related measures 
may be said to consist of port State measures which prevent the landing, transhipment or 
processing of fish unless the vessel has established that they were taken in a manner consistent 
with conservation and management measures.81  
 
As a result of the restriction that trade-related measures impose on the fundamental legal 
principle of free trade, the rules and articles of the WTO are of integral importance to the legal 
application of these measures.  In an early case that challenged US environmental protection 
legislation, Mexico and other countries82 asked for a panel of the WTO to decide whether the US 
 
75 Rayfuse, above n 26, 45. 
76 Katselli, above n 70. 
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78 Ibid.  
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had the right to ban imports of tuna that had been caught in a manner that did not meet US 
dolphin protection standards.83   
 
The panel concluded that the US could not prevent the imports of tuna simply because of the 
way it was produced and that the GATT rules did not allow one country to take trade action for 
the purposes of enforcing its domestic legislation in another country.84  As this was an early 
case, however, it was not decided under the present system of WTO dispute settlement and the 
report of the panel does not have the status of a legal interpretation. 
 
In November 1998, the Shrimp-Turtle Case85 came before the WTO.  This case was brought by 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand against a ban imposed by the US on imports of shrimp 
which had been caught without the use of ‘turtle excluder devices’.86  On an appeal by the US, 
the four countries succeeded based on a finding of the WTO that in implementing this measure, 
the US has failed to provide for the non-discriminatory allocation of technical and financial 
assistance.87   Howeve, this finding fails to reflect the positive outcome of this decision for the 
protection of the marine environment.   
 
In passing down its decision, the WTO Appellate Body also clarified in its report that countries 
have the right to take action to protect the environment, especially endangered species and 
exhaustible resources.88  It held: ‘...we have not decided that sovereign nations that are 
members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as 
sea turtles.’89  It found that measures to protect the marine environment will fall under article XX 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade90 (GATT) which provides a general exception to 
all GATT trade rules.91 
 
In December 2000, the European Community (EC) initiated a case against Chile before the WTO 
for prohibiting the unloading and transit of swordfish cases taken from the high seas bordering 
Chile’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), when taken in contravention of Chile’s conservation 
rules.92 This highly controversial case involved a challenge to the jurisdiction of the WTO, with 
 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid. 
85 World Trade Organisation, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 12 October 1998, 
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87 Ibid. 
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89 Ibid.  
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Chile asserting that the appropriate dispute settlement body in this case would be the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (the Tribunal).93   
 
As a result, both cases before both the Tribunal and the WTO were suspended and the 
fundamental environmental issues at hand remain undecided.  Ultimately, the decision in this 
case has fallen to the two parties, with a memorandum of understanding finally being 
implemented in December 2009.94  This understanding provides for access of EC vessels to 
Chilean ports in exchange for commitments on cooperation in the management of stocks.95 
 
While it is clear that not every breach of a flag State obligation will be serious enough to warrant 
the imposition of trade-related measures, if a flag State undermines the effectiveness of an 
RFMO conservation measure it appears that trade-based action on the part of that RFMO would 
currently be consistent with international law.96   
 
The IPOA-IUU specifically calls on States to exercise trade-related measures against non-
compliant States and so long as certain conditions are met it increasingly appears that trade-
related measures are legitimate under both WTO regulations and other forms of international 
law. In addition, article 20(7) of UNFSA authorises CPs, individually or in concert, to take action 
to deter vessels not complying with relevant RFMO measures until such time as appropriate 




Today it is seen as best-practice for RFMOs to ensure compliance by providing punishments for 
non-compliance.97 This notion is reiterated in the FAO Compliance Agreement which is a legally 
binding agreement clarifying the importance of punitive sanctions. The FAO Compliance 
Agreement states that where ‘serious offences’ result in ‘serious violations’ of the Agreement, 
sanctions are applicable. 
 
The FAO Compliance Agreement also states that such sanctions shall include refusal, 
suspension or withdrawal of the authorisation to fish the high seas for serious violations.  It 
provides that sanctions are to be ‘of sufficient gravity as to be effective in securing 
 
93 Jiaxiang Hu, 'The Role of International Law in the Development of WTO Law' (2004) 7(1) Journal of International Economic 
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compliance...and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities.’98  
Excluding the use of trade-related measures, however, other such penalties that might be 
available to RFMOs to achieve compliance include the use of fines, reduced fishing 
opportunities, vessel confiscations, denying non-compliant States access to national fisheries.99   
 
Certain RFMOs continue to resist the use of sanctions or penalties to address non-
compliance.100  At a meeting of the Tuna RFMOs in 2007,101 one of the key challenges for the 
five RFMOs was identified as being the application of penalties and sanctions of ‘adequate 
severity’ to deter IUU fishing by both CPs and NCPs.102  In 2009, the ‘Second Joint Meeting of 
Tuna RFMOs noted with concern the need establish a comprehensive system of non-
discriminatory sanctions to address the actions of States that repeatedly fail to comply with their 
obligations.103  It was decided that this system should include incentives to encourage 
transparent recognition of overfishing and reinforced sanctions for unreported overfishing.104 
 
However, certain RFMOs have taken steps towards imposing penalties in instances of non-
compliance.105  The ICCAT, for instance, provides that a CP that is deemed to have seriously 
undermined conservation measures will be subject to a review process which might impose 
penalties against the offending State.106  Given the range and scope of sanctions available to 
RFMOs, it is submitted that RFMOs should continue to implement policies which provide for such 




RFMOs may seek to implement strict monitoring and inspection requirements to address the 
potential for vessels to fail to comply with their conservation measures.  Not all RFMOs have 
adopted monitoring and inspection schemes, and no single RFMO provides for a positive right of 
arrest, detention or prosecution in the event of non-compliance. Yet despite this, effective 
monitoring and control on the high seas, ‘represents the best hope for preventing, deterring and 
eliminating IUU fishing’.107 
 
 
98 FAO Compliance Agreement, article 3(8). 
99 Implementation of the International Plan of Action, above n 21. 
100 Including the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. See <http://www.iotc.org/English/index.php> 
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Paragraph 80.8 of the IPOA-IUU clarifies that the inspection and arrest of non-compliant vessels 
falls within the ambit of RFMO mandates.108 The 2002 FAO Technical Guideline entitled, 
‘Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’, specifically deals with the implementation of the IPOA-IUU 
by RFMOs. At Section 8, the Guideline clarifies:  
 
In one sense, RFMOs can be only as effective in dealing with IUU fishing as their 
members (and others who participate in their work) direct or allow them to be. In 
another sense, however, RFMOs can often accomplish things that their members, 
acting individually, cannot. One reason for this is that governments are generally 
more willing to impose controls on their fishing fleets if other governments do so as 
well.109  
 
While vessel inspections for example and the monitoring of non-compliance are often considered 
the responsibility of individual States, RFMOs can collect and disseminate information relating to 
IUU fishing, identify vessels that are engaging in IUU fishing and coordinate measures to be 
taken against them.110 The information-sharing facility provided by RFMOs in particular is of 




This section examines the compliance-related conservation measures currently in place in 
AusRFMOs to identify, apprehend and punish non-compliance.  To do this, it is important to 
highlight that AusRFMOs utilise both legally binding and non-legally binding measures to 
regulate the activities of States, vessels and nationals.  The terminology adopted by RFMOs to 
distinguish between legally binding and non-legally binding compliance measures varies 
significantly and so for the purposes of this thesis, legally binding measures are referred to as 
‘formal’ compliance measures whereas non-legally binding measures are referred to as ‘informal’ 
compliance measures.    
 
This section considers each AusRFMO in turn to identify their compliance mandate and discuss 
the extent of the regulatory compliance measures they have implemented.  
 
 
108 Implementation of the International Plan of Action, above n 21. 
109 Implementation of the International Plan of Action, above n 21, Section 8. 







Article IX(6) of the CAMLR Convention states that conservation measures, ‘shall become binding 
upon all Members of the Commission’ within 180 days unless a CP notifies the Commission that 
it is unable to accept the measure.  While not a compliance enforcement mechanism per se, this 
provision is significant as without its inclusion the obligation for States to comply would not be 
recognised by the CCAMLR.  
 
Under article X of the CAMLR Convention, the Commission is required to draw the attention of a 
NCP to any activity undertaken by its nationals or vessels which affects the implementation of the 
objectives of the CCAMLR.  Under article X(2), the Commission shall do the same in regards to 
CPs and draw their attention to any activity which affects the compliance by the CP with its 
obligations under the Convention.  The obligation to make States aware of acts of non-
compliance is a common compliance enforcement tactic among RFMOs as often the mere 
recognition of such behaviour can place political pressure on a State to better control its actions 
or those of a vessel or national.    
 
Under the CAMLR Convention, CPs are also under a direct obligation to ensure that they take 
‘appropriate measures’111 within their competence to ensure compliance with the provisions of 
the CAMLR Convention and CCAMLR conservation measures under Article XXI.  The CAMLR 
Convention foresees the imposition of sanctions by States in response to non-compliance by 
their flagged vessels or nationals.112  Article XXI requires States to report on the taking of any 
such action to the CCAMLR, presumably to ensure that non-compliant activities do not go 




Formal compliance measures imposed by CCAMLR are referred to by the Commission as 
‘Conservation Measures,’ with each measure allocated a number and a title.113  Informal 
measures may be referred to either as ‘Regulations’ or ‘Policies.’    
 
In a measure aimed at promoting compliance by the vessels of NCPs, CCAMLR’s Conservation 
Measure 10-07 provides for the development of an ‘IUU vessel list’ to name and shame non-
 
111 Article XXI, The Chairman of the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 'Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources' (1982). 
112 Ibid. 
113 For instance, CCAMLR’s ‘Scheme to promote compliance by non-Contracting Party vessels with CCAMLR conservation 





compliant vessels and their flag States.114  As outlined in Chapter 3, IUU vessel lists are a key 
compliance enforcement mechanism adopted by many RFMOs to tackle the problem of IUU 
fishing.  Conservation Measure 10-07 provides that at each annual meeting, the Commission 
identify NCPs whose vessels are engaged in IUU fishing in the Convention Area.115   
 
Further to the formal CCAMLR IUU vessel list, Conservation Measure 10-02 was passed in 2010 
to require all CPs to ensure their vessels are licensed to fish in the Convention Area. This 
measure provides that a CP may only issue a licence to fish if it is satisfied of its ability to 
exercise its responsibilities under the Convention. Conservation Measure 10-02 specifies the 
monitoring requirements a flag State must be able to exercise over its vessels.  
 
The taking of action that is consistent with international law to address non-compliance is a 
common thread among CCAMLR conservation measures.  However, a clause is often included 
to ensure that there is no abuse of the use of sanctions, penalties or other trade-related 
measures.  Conservation Measure 10-07 goes on to provide that CPs should not take any trade 
measures or other sanctions against vessels as a result of their inclusion on this list.   
 
This provision is without prejudice to the rights of States to take proper action consistent with 
international law. This provision foresees the potential for States to incorrectly use the IUU 
Vessel List as an indication of proof of non-compliant activities by those vessels listed. The same 
provision is contained in Conservation Measure 10-06 which relates to promoting compliance by 
the vessels of CPs rather than NCPs.  
 
Under Conservation Measure 10-07, CPs are still able to cooperate to adopt trade-related 
measures, consistent with their obligations to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to prevent, 
deter and eliminate IUU fishing.  It states that such measures may be used, to support 
cooperative efforts to ensure that trade in Patagonian toothfish does not encourage IUU fishing 
or diminish the effectiveness of CCAMLR’s conservation measures.116  Additionally, 
Conservation Measure 10-05 states that the Commission is committed to taking steps, consistent 
with international law, to ensure that fish was caught in a manner consistent with CCAMLR 
conservation measures.  
 
Conservation Measure 10-08 also recognises the right of flag States to take action in response to 
acts of non-compliance by CP nationals. It states that CPs shall take measures to effectively 
 
114 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07 ‘Scheme to promote compliance by non-Contracting Party vessels with CCAMLR 
conservation measures’, paragraph 2. Available on line at <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/09-10/all.pdf> 






deprive any participants in IUU fishing of the benefits obtained from their behaviour. Furthermore, 
Conservation Measure 10-03 entitled ‘Port inspections of vessels carrying toothfish’ provides that 
in the event that a vessel has fished in contravention of CCAMLR conservation measures, the 
CP will cooperate with the flag State of the vessel to take appropriate action and, if necessary, 
apply sanctions to the vessel.117  
 
Additionally, Conservation Measure 10-04 was adopted in 2010 to require CPs to ensure that 
their flagged vessels are equipped with automated satellite-linked vessel monitoring systems 
(VMS). CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-09118 also seeks to address IUU fishing by requiring 
notification of any transhipments occurring within the Convention Area. This CM required that all 
Contracting Parties notify the CCAMLR secretariat with 72 hours’ notice regarding transhipments 
between vessels in the Convention Area.   
 
Finally, and significantly, the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure119 addresses flag State 
non-compliance and establishes a process which in a ‘responsible, open, transparent and non-
discriminatory nature’ the Commission should be made aware of any information regarding non-
compliance with conservation measures. This CM also provides for a procedure by which this 
information will be shared and disseminated. Chapter 4 has elaborated widely on this topic and 




The informal compliance measures adopted by CCAMLR are generally aimed at expressing 
agreement within the Commission on matters of significance.  Many of CCAMLR’s informal 
measures, or ‘Resolutions’, are aimed at urging non-compliant States, vessels or nationals to 
comply with CCAMLR provisions.  For instance, Resolution 14/XIX urges all CCAMLR Acceding 
States120 and NCPs not participating in the CDS to implement it as soon as possible.  Resolution 
15/XXII builds from this to urge all CPs to require that their vessels should land catches in States 
that are fully implementing the CDS.  Resolution 19/XXI contains a more general provision that 
urges all CPs and NCPs to take measures or cooperate to ensure that their nationals do not 
engage in or support IUU fishing.  
 
 
117 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-03 ‘Port inspections of vessels carrying toothfish’, paragraph 3. Available on line at 
<http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/09-10/all.pdf> 
118 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-03, ‘Notification system for transhipments within the Convention Area’. 
119 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-10 (2018) https://www.ccamlr.org/en/measure-10-10-2018 






The difference in wording adopted in CCAMLR formal and informal measures is due to the 
difference in the strength of these provisions.  Informal measures can only ‘request’, ‘urge’ or 
‘encourage’ States to act in a certain manner, whereas formal measures can require States to 
comply with their provisions. Resolution 25/XXV,121 for instance, urges all CPs to pursue 
diplomatic and other action, in accordance with international law, to encourage NCPs to 
recognise CCAMLR conservation measures. Such diplomatic action could be achieved via the 
imposition of diplomatic demarches, requests or entering into negotiations with the flag State/s 
concerned.122   
 
Finally, the ‘Policy to Enhance Cooperation between CCAMLR and Non-Contracting Parties’ (the 
CCAMLR Policy) is a unique approach adopted by the CCAMLR to improve compliance. Neither 
a regulation nor a conservation measure, the CCAMLR Policy requests the Executive Secretary 
to, inter alia: 
 
 invite and encourage NCPs to attend as observers at CCAMLR meetings, 
 encourage NCPs to accede to the Convention, and 




The founding Convention of the WCPFC includes a comprehensive suite of provisions aimed 
atachieving compliance from both CPs and NCPs. Among these, notable provisions for the 
purposes of this thesis include those relating specifically to the compliance duties and 
responsibilities of flag States, as well as port State measures and trade-related measures.  
 
Article 27 of the Convention provides that port States are under an obligation to promote the 
effectiveness of subregional, regional and global conservation and management measures. In 
this regard, a port State may not discriminate against the fishing vessel of any State; however 
they may adopt regulations to prohibit landings and transhipments where the catch has been 
taken in a manner which undermines the objectives of the WCPFC.  
 
This notion is reinforced in article 25(11) of the Convention which provides that CPs may take 
action to deter vessels which have engaged in such activities.  To this effect, the Commission is 
authorised, when necessary, to develop procedures which allow for non-discriminatory trade 
 
121 See Resolution 25/XXV ‘Combatting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Convention Area by the flag vessels of 
non-Contracting Parties’. Available on line at <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/09-10/all.pdf> 






measures to be taken against any State, ‘whose fishing vessels fish in a manner which 
undermines the effectiveness of the conservation and management measures adopted by the 
Commission.’  The inclusion of this provision reflects the commitment of CPs to allowing the use 
of trade-related measures to be adopted and recognises that the taking of such measures by an 
RFMO is consistent with international law.   
 
While the flag State obligations embodied in the Convention are many and varied, they are 
largely concerned with the commitment of States to comply and to allow easy exchange of 
information in the case of a breach of compliance.  Part V deals with the duties of flag States and 
provides that no CP shall allow vessels to be used for fishing the species covered by the 
Convention in areas beyond national jurisdiction, unless authorised to do so.123  Furthermore, 
CPs must take measures to ensure that nationals and fishing vessels comply with the provisions 
of the Convention.124  
 
More specifically, CPs are required to cooperate to establish mechanisms for effective 
monitoring, control and surveillance; including the use of vessel monitoring systems (VMS).125  
Where it has been established that the vessel of a CP has been non-compliant, States must 
ensure that the vessel ceases fishing activities until sanctions have been complied with.126 
Finally, CPs must establish arrangements for making available information required to allow for 




In the WCPFC, formal and binding decisions are referred to as ‘Conservation and Management 
Measures’ (CMMs).  Such decisions are numbered and include the year of adoption.  Informal 
measures are referred to as ‘Resolutions’ and describe non-binding statements and 
recommendations addressed to CPs and CNPs.  The WCPFC also has a third category of 
measures referred to as ‘Other Decisions of the Commission’. 
 
The formal measures the WCPFC has implemented in respect of compliance range from 
boarding and inspection measures to IUU vessel lists.  Due to the comprehensive nature of the 
WCPFC Convention on all aspects of compliance, the need for some of the formal measures 
adopted by other RFMOs has been reduced.  CMM 2006-08 entitled ‘Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission Boarding and Inspection Procedures’ provides that each CP must 
 
123 Article 25, WCPFC Convention. 
124 Art 23(5), WCPFC Convention.  
125 Article 10(1)(i), WCPFC Convention. 
126 Article 25(4), WCPFC Convention. 





ensure that their vessels accept these procedures and that any evidence obtained in the contrary 
should be referred to the authorities of the fishing vessel. 
 
The ‘Conservation Measure to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried Out Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’ 
provides for identification of such vessels at each annual meeting.  Under this measure, CPs are 
obliged to forward to the Secretariat a list of vessels presumed to be carrying out IUU activities in 
the Convention Area.128  Once the list has been adopted, CPs must take all necessary measures 
to eliminate these activities including non-discriminatory trade measures or withdrawing the 
registration of fishing license of the vessels involved.129 
 
The ‘Conservation and Management Measure for Vessels Without Nationality’ provides that 
vessels without nationality are presumed to be operating in contravention of the Convention.  As 
such, the measure actively encourages all CPs to take action, including enacting domestic 
legislation to prevent such vessels from undermining the effectiveness of the Convention.   
 
Additionally, ‘Conservation and Management Measure – Commission VMS’ (2014-02) embodies 
the Convention’s requirement that all vessels operate vessel monitoring systems when fishing in 
the region. ‘Conservation and Management Measure for Minimum Standards for Port State 
Measures’ (2017-02) requires all vessels fishing in the Convention Area to adhere to certain 
requirements as outlined in the ‘Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing FAO Port State Measures Agreement’.130 
 
Significantly, the ‘Conservation and Management Measure for Compliance Monitoring Scheme’ 
(CMS) (2018-07) seeks to ensure compliance with obligations arising under conservation 
measures adopted by the Commission. The purpose of the CMS is to assess the action of States 





128 Paragraph 4, ‘Conservation Measure to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried out Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’, available on line <http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-
and-management-measures> 
129 Paragraph 16, ‘Conservation Measure to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried out Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’, available on line <http://www.wcpfc.int/conservation-
and-management-measures> 
130 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Adopted in 
November 2009 by the FAO Conference at its Thirty-sixth Session through Resolution No 12/2009, under Article XIV, 





The primary objective of the CCSBT is to ‘ensure, through appropriate management, the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna.’131  Article 5 of the Convention for 
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna132 provides that Parties shall take all action necessary 
to ensure enforcement and compliance with binding measures which should be developed at the 
earliest possible time to monitor all fishing activities relating to SBT.133 
 
The Convention goes into considerable depth on the need to promote membership and 
compliance by NCPs. To this end, the Commission should invite membership by any State not 
party to the Convention whose nationals, residents or fishing vessels harvest SBT.134  Parties 
must cooperate with each other in this regard under article 13 and should act to encourage 
accession by States ‘where the Commission considers this to be desirable.’  Upon signing the 
Convention, Parties agree to invite the attention of any NCP to any matter which might affect the 
attainment of the objective of the Convention.135 
 
Under article 15(3), Parties should take appropriate measures to prevent their registered vessels 
from transferring registration to avoid compliance with the conservation measures of the CCSBT.  
Furthermore, article 15(4) provides that Parties should cooperate in taking measures to deter 
fishing activities for SBT where such action could affect the attainment of the objective of the 
Convention.   
 
The CCSBT has implemented both formal ‘Resolutions’ and informal ‘Recommendations’ to give 




The CCSBT has implemented a ‘Resolution on action plans to ensure compliance with 
Conservation and Management Measures’136 requiring CPs and NCPs to submit an action plan 
on compliance with conservation and management measures.  This plan must include a scheme 
concerning how the State will systematically verify catch data and information on ecologically 
related species to the Secretariat.   
 
Following the findings of the 2008 Performance Review, the CCSBT implemented a ‘Resolution 
on Establishing a Program for Transhipment by Large-Scale Fishing Vessels’ in recognition of 
 
131 Article 3 ‘Text of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna’, (entered into force 20 May 1994) 
132 ‘Text of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna’, (entered into force 20 May 1994), Available on line 
at <http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/convention.pdf> 
133 Article 8 ‘Text of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna’, (entered into force 20 May 1994)  
134 Article 14 ‘Text of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna’, (entered into force 20 May 1994) 






the need to ensure monitoring of such transhipment in areas beyond national jurisdiction. It was 
updated in 2015 to include requirements for monitoring transhipments in port.   
 
Similarly, in 2015 the CCSBT adopted a ‘Resolution for a CCSBT Scheme for Minimum 
Standards for Inspections in Port’. Under this scheme, a member wishing to grant port access to 
a foreign fishing vessel must meet certain notification and inspection requirements. This 
Resolution entered into force in 2017 and was updated in 2018.   
 
The ‘Resolution on establishing the CCSBT Vessel Monitoring System’ recognises the need for 
monitoring, control and surveillance measures to apply to all sectors of the global southern 
bluefin tuna fishery.  This measure provides that all CPs and CNPs must ensure that no vessels 
under their registry carry out IUU fishing activities and also must take necessary measures to 
ensure that the owners of vessels are citizens or legal entities within the flag State itself to allow 
for punitive action to be taken. Additionally, the Executive Secretary is to maintain a CCSBT 
Record of fishing vessels registered to fish for SBT and to ensure this information is published.137  
 
On 1 January 2010, the CCSBT implemented a Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) to replace 
the redundant Trade Information Scheme (TIS).  The ‘Resolution on the Implementation of a 
CCSBT Catch Documentation Scheme’138 covers all landings, transhipments, exports, imports 
and re-exports of SBT whereas the TIS only covered international trade in SBT.139 It requires 
whole SBT to be tagged at the time of the kill and that the tag remain until the first point of 
domestic sale.140 The CDS was updated in 2014. 
 
The CCSBT has also adopted a ‘Resolution on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to have 
Carried Out Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing Activities for Southern Bluefin Tuna’141 
that replaced the previous Resolution adopted at the CCSBT15 in 2008.142  The 2008 Resolution 
was not designed to be a specific list of vessels considered to be undertaking IUU fishing for 
southern bluefin tuna.  The current Resolution is designed to identify vessels that have 
undermined the effectiveness of the CCSBT. 
 
 
137 Paragraph 5, ‘ Resolution on establishing the CCSBT Vessel Monitoring System’, available on line at 
<http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/Resolution_VMS.pdf> 
138 ‘Resolution on the Implementation of a CCSBT Catch Documentation Scheme’ 
 Available on line at <http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about the commission/Resolution CDS.pdf> 
139 Bob Kennedy, Executive Secretary, Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, <rkennedy@ccsbt.org> 
‘Compliance in the CCSBT’ (25 May 2010) (personal e mail). 
140 Ibid. 
141 CCSBT, Monitoring, control and surveillance, available online at <https://www.ccsbt.org/en/content/monitoring-control-and-
surveillance> 







The CCSBT Compliance Action Plan143 provides a framework to improve compliance and 
address priority compliance risks within the Commission. The RFMO has adopted three 
compliance policies in accordance with the Plan which include: 
 ‘Minimum Performance Requirements to Meet CCSBT Obligations’, 
 ‘Corrective Actions Policy’, and 
 ‘MCS Information Collection and Sharing’.144 
 
The CCSBT has also implemented a Quality Assurance Review (QAR) program to help 
members identify how well they are performing with respect to their CCSBT obligations and 
provide recommendations on where improvement required.145  Despite the development of these 
new compliance measures, the 2014 Review found that the CCSBT should continue to improve 




The IOTC Agreement includes several references to the need for the IOTC to promote 
cooperation amongst CPs.   Such provisions provide an important basis for promoting productive 
relationships between CPs which is an essential tool in improving compliance.  Article IV of the 
IOTC Agreement provides that CPs shall cooperate to encourage any State which is entitled to 
become a CP to accede to the Agreement.  Furthermore, article V states that the IOTC shall 
‘encourage, recommend and coordinate’146 information sharing activities and recognise the need 
for participation by all CPs.  
 
The IOTC Agreement also makes reference to the need for CPs to ensure that they take action 
under national legislation to ensure that penalties are implemented for violations of conservation 
and management measures.147  It is specifically stated that such measures are binding upon CPs 
under paragraph 1 of article IX.  Significantly, under article X(3), CPs are also required to 
cooperate in the establishment of an appropriate system to review the implementation of 




144 Ibid.  
145 Ibid.   
146 Article V, Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, adopted by the FAO Council 25 
November 1993, Rome, Italy. 
147 Article X, Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, adopted by the FAO Council 25 





The IOTC adopts the terminology of ‘resolutions’ rather than ‘conservation measures’ to describe 
the measures it adopts to regulate the activities of its CPs.148  These resolutions are binding on 
CPs in the same manner that conservation measures are binding on CPs of the CCAMLR, 
however in the IOTC, CPs are not bound if they make a specific objection to the resolution.149   
The informal measures adopted by the IOTC are referred to as ‘recommendations’ which, in light 




The IOTC has adopted a series of measures aimed at enhancing cooperation with both CPs and 
NCPs.  Resolution 98/05, for instance, provides that the Chairman of the IOTC should send a 
letter to all NCPs known to have vessels fishing in the IOTC Area to urge them to become CPs.  
Such an approach is an important compliance enforcement measure to maintain relationships 
between the IOTC and interested parties.   
 
Resolution 01/03 is more direct in targeting the vessels of NCPs and refers to the establishment 
of a scheme to promote compliance. Under this resolution, evidence that NCP vessels are fishing 
contrary to IOTC regulations should be reported to the authorities and the flag State made aware 
of the situation. Such vessels are to be inspected and all landings and transhipments by the 
vessel should be prohibited by all CP ports.  Finally, Resolution 07/01 is aimed at promoting 
compliance by nationals of CPs and cooperating NCPs.  It provides that relevant agencies of 
CPs should cooperate to investigate allegations concerning the engagement of their nationals in 
IUU fishing and that they should take action in this respect.    
 
The IOTC has created several resolutions concerning the need for improved vessel control of 
IUU fishing vessels.  Resolution 99/02 calls for specific action to be taken against the fishing 
activities of large scale ‘flag of convenience’ longline vessels.  This is to occur via CPs denying 
such vessels a license to fish and refusing landing and transhipment by such vessels.  
 
Resolution 09/03 provides for the creation of a list of vessels presumed to have carried out IUU 
fishing in the IOTC Area.  IUU vessel lists are noted in Chapter 3 to be a key compliance 
enforcement mechanism in their ability to ‘name and shame’ the perpetrating States and vessels. 
Other associated and supporting resolutions include Resolution 99/03 which provides for a 
control and inspection scheme to be set up under the IOTC as well as Resolution 06/03 which 
 







establishes a vessel monitoring system in the IOTC Area to standardise the systems adopted by 
CPs.   
 
Significant steps were taken at the meeting of the IOTC in Busan, Korea in 2010 to address non-
compliance.151  At this meeting, the IOTC adopted Resolution 10/10 on trade-related measures 
which, importantly, provides a legally binding measure to allow the IOTC to take measures 
against CPs who repeatedly fail to discharge their obligations as well as NCPs who fail to 
discharge their obligations under international law.   
 
This resolution allows the Compliance Committee to propose to the IOTC to adopt non-
discriminatory WTO-consistent trade-related measures against non-compliant States.   It 
provides that in the case of CPs, actions such as the reduction of existing quotas or catch limits 
should be carried out before consideration is given to trade-related measures which should be 
considered only where other actions have proven unsuccessful or would not be effective.   
 
Resolution 10/09 was also agreed in 2010 to change the manner in which the IOTC Compliance 
Committee conducts its business.  Concerned about the level of flag State compliance, the 
Commission agreed that amongst other responsibilities, the IOTC Compliance Committee should 
develop a scheme of sanctions to provide greater direction in dealing with issues of non-
compliance.  This measure also serves to clarify the obligation of all CPs to ensure the proper 




Recommendation 03/04 concerns the enhancement of effectiveness of IOTC measures to 
eliminate IUU activities in the IOTC Area.  This recommendation recognises that the Commission 
has endorsed the cooperative management frameworks that have been concluded between the 
Seychelles, Vanuatu and Japan.  It further notes that the Commission urges these three States 
to implement the frameworks properly and to continue to report on an annual basis concerning 











The SPRFMO Convention comprehensively outlines the duties of States parties and provides a 
clear picture of the manner in which compliance is to be achieved within the RFMO.152  The 
Convention begins with a statement under Article 3(ix) that CPs, the Commission and subsidiary 
bodies should ensure compliance by implementing sanctions to deprive offenders of the benefits 
to be gained from their activities.   
 
In this regard, the Convention establishes the obligations of CPs of the Commission as including 
taking all necessary measures to ensure the effectiveness of conservation measures under 
Article 24.  CPs are required to report to the Commission on an annual basis to demonstrate how 
measures have been implemented and how compliance has been achieved. Each CP must take 
measures to ensure compliance by nationals or fishing vessels owned by its nationals and 
immediately investigate any alleged violations against them.   
 
In addition, under Article 8 of the Convention, the Commission itself must: 
 
 develop and establish of effective monitoring, control, surveillance, compliance and 
enforcement procedures, including non-discriminatory market-related and trade-related 
measures; 
 develop processes in accordance with international law to assess flag State performance 
with respect to the implementation of their obligations under this Convention and adopt 
proposals, if appropriate, to promote implementation of such obligations; and 
 adopt measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. 
 
Article 11 of the SPRFMO Convention provides for the creation of a Compliance and Technical 
Committee to ‘monitor and review the implementation of, and compliance with, conservation and 
management measures adopted under this Convention and provide advice and 
recommendations to the Commission’.  However where the SPRFMO Convention stands out 
against other RFMOs is its recognition of the special requirements of developing States.   
 
Article 19 of the Convention is dedicated to formally recognising the role of developing States 
within the SPRFMO and provides that CPs must cooperate to enhance the ability of developing 
States to conserve and manage fishery resources.  The Convention articulates that such 
cooperation should occur via the provision of financial assistance, technical assistance, transfer 
of technology and through joint venture arrangements directed towards monitoring, control, 
surveillance, compliance and enforcement.  
 
152 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean.  Full text of 







The Convention contains separate provisions relating directly to flag State and port State Duties.  
Under Article 25, concerning flag State duties, the Convention provides that CPs must take all 
necessary measures to ensure compliance by fishing vessels flying its flag and do not conduct 
unauthorised fishing within waters under national jurisdiction adjacent to the Convention Area.  
This interesting provision extends the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RFMO beyond the high seas 
to the EEZs of States.  No similar provision is present in the other AusRFMOs examined in this 
thesis which is most likely to be explained as a consequence of the strict adherence of the 
SPRFMO to the provisions of the UNFSA.   
 
Article 26 of the Convention provides that port States have a duty to take measures to promote 
the effectiveness of conservation measures; but that the State should not discriminate in form or 
fact. Provisions relating to the implementation of vessel monitoring systems (VMS), 
transhipment, the implementation of market-related measures and IUU vessel lists are contained 
in Article 27 of the Convention relating to monitoring, compliance and enforcement.   
 
These procedures are available to the Commission to be applied to any state, member of the 
Commission, or entity whose vessels engage in activities that diminish the effectiveness of the 
conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission.  In this respect, the 
reason for non-compliance and degree of non-compliance should be taken into account and 
where trade-related measures are implemented, they must be consistent with the CP’s 
international obligations.  
 
Finally, the SPRFMO contains provisions for the implementation of an observer programme in 
Article 28 and provisions relating to the deterrence of non-compliance by non-parties are 
contained in Article 32.  Article 32 provides that CPs shall take measures consistent with the 
Convention to deter activities of vessels flying the flags of NCPs.  Such incidences should be 




The first compliance-related conservation measure adopted by the SPRFMO was their Boarding 
and Inspection Procedure in 2015.  This Procedure was adopted as an interim measure and 
specifies that Articles 21 and 22 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 2015 will apply as the 






Prior to taking action under this article, inspecting States shall, either directly or 
through the relevant subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement, inform all States whose vessels fish on the high seas in the subregion 
or region of the form of identification issued to their duly authorized inspectors. The 
vessels used for boarding and inspection shall be clearly marked and identifiable as 
being on government service. At the time of becoming a Party to this Agreement, a 
State shall designate an appropriate authority to receive notifications pursuant to this 
article and shall give due publicity of such designation through the relevant 
subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement. 
 
Details submitted by States parties to the SPRFMO in accordance with this measure are 
available on their website.153 This measure is supported by CMM 16, ‘The SPRFMO Observer 
Programme’ which entered into force in April 2019.  
 
In 2016, the SPRFMO adopted CMM 15-2016, ‘Vessels without Nationality in the SPRFMO 
Convention Area’, as well as CMM 05-2016; ‘Establishment of the Commission Record of 
Vessels Authorised to Fish in the SPRFMO Convention Area’.  The list of vessels authorised to 
fish in the Convention Area is updated annually and is accompanied by reports of vessels that 
have fished the Area in any given year.  
 
More recently, in 2017 the SPRFMO established an IUU list via conservation and management 
measure 04-2017 entitled, ‘Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried Out IUU 
Fishing Activities in the SPRFMO Convention Area’. Combatting IUU fishing is an important 
objective of the SPRFMO and is reflected in Articles 8, 23, 24, 25, 27 and 31 of the SPRFMO 
Convention.  
 
According to CMM-04, vessels are presumed to have carried out IUU fishing if they: 
 
a) Engage in fishing for fishery resources and are not registered on the SPRFMO list of 
vessels authorised to fish in the Convention Area; 
b) Engage in fishing for fishery resources whose flag State has exhausted or has no 
quotas, catch limit or effort allocation, including, if applicable, those received from 
another Member or CNCP under relevant SPRFMO conservation and management 
measures; 
 
153 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, ‘SPRFMO Conservation and Management Measures’, 





c) Do not record or report their catches or catch related data made in the Convention 
Area, or make false reports; 
d) Take on board, tranship or land undersized fish in a way that undermines SPRFMO 
conservation and management measures; 
e) Engage in fishing during closed fishing periods or in closed areas, without or after 
exhaustion of a quota or beyond a closed depth, in contravention of SPRFMO 
conservation and management measures; 
f) Use prohibited or non-compliant fishing gear in a way that undermines SPRFMO 
conservation and management measures; 
g) Tranship with, or participate in joint operations such as re-supply or re-fuelling vessels 
included in the IUU Vessel List; 
h) Are without nationality and engage in fishing for fisheries resources in the Convention 
Area, or 
i) Engage in fishing activities contrary to any other SPRFMO conservation and 
management measures.  
 
In 2017, the SPRFMO adopted their ‘Minimum Standards of Inspection in Port’ (CMM-07). This 
measure is inherently linked to CMM-04 in that it is designed to assist in apprehending IUU 
fishers when they dock at port. Similarly, CMM 12 ‘Regulation of Transhipment and Other 
Transfer Activities’ was adopted in 2018 to support the detection and apprehension of IUU fishing 
activities. 
 
The SPRFMO also has an active and mandatory vessel monitoring system in place via CMM 06. 
Their Compliance and Monitoring Scheme, CMM 10, was established in 2019 to identify and 
address instances of non-compliance by States parties, and cooperating non-parties, with the 
conservation measures of the organisation.  
   
5.4.6. Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement 
 
The SIOFA Agreement sets out compliance measures relating to CP obligations, the control of 
NCPs, boarding and inspection, transhipment regulations and the creation of a compliance 
committee.154  Article 6 of the Agreement sets out the general duties and obligations of the 
‘Meeting of the Parties’.  In particular, article 6(1)(g) provides that the Meeting of Parties should 
promote cooperation among CPs to ensure that conservation measures are adopted in a manner 
compatible with the fishery resources.   
 
 






By placing responsibility for the actions of fishing vessels and nationals on CPs, Article 10(3) of 
the Agreement makes the flag State responsible for any breach of a conservation measure that 
might occur.  This is developed further in Article 10(4) which provides that each CP should 
investigate an ‘alleged serious violation’ by that flag States’ national or fishing vessel and report 
to all CPs as soon as practical concerning actions taken in response to the alleged breach.  
 
CPs are also required to take all measures necessary to ensure that fishing vessels comply with 
the provisions of the Agreement and that fishing vessels do not conduct unauthorised fishing in 
waters under national jurisdiction (Article 11[1][a]).  The role that CPs have in assisting 
developing States to the Agreement is expanded in Article 13(3)(a) and (b), both of which provide 
that CPs have a duty to ensure that they enhance the ability of developing States to conserve 
and manage fisheries resources, as well as assist them in achieving this goal.  
 
The Agreement contains several provisions relevant to NCPs,155 calling for cooperation, 
information exchange and the taking of internationally acceptable steps against NCPs in 
instances of non-compliance.  Outlining the role of the Meeting of Parties, Article 6.1 proposes 
that the parties shall ‘in accordance with international law and any applicable instruments’ draw 
the attention of NCPs to activities which undermine the objectives of the Agreement.  This, as 
suggested in Article 6(3), might including the setting aside of fishing opportunities for NCPs if 
necessary.   
 
Article 6(4) provides that the Meeting of Parties can review the ‘participation in fishing 
opportunities of non-contracting Parties’ by taking into account their implementation of 
conservation measures.  Interestingly, this article appears to extend the ambit of the Agreement 
beyond control of CPs, however, the Agreement remains unclear as to what kind of ‘review’ 
might be undertaken and how any restrictions might actually impact upon NCPs.  
 
Finally, a cooperation provision is inserted in Article 17.4 that requires CPs to ‘request’ NCPs to 
cooperate fully in the implementation of conservation measures.  It goes on to provide that 
cooperating NCPs will enjoy benefits from the fishery commensurate to their commitment to 
comply.  In other words, those vessels that cooperate fully might enjoy a certain quota in respect 
of the relevant stocks.    
 
 
155 Daniel Owen, ‘Practice of RFMOs Regarding non-Members: A Report to Support the Independent High Level Panel to 





The Agreement goes into little detail on how a system for boarding and inspection might be 
installed.156  While there is scope for conservation measures to be implemented in this respect, it 
would be beneficial to the Agreement to contain a provision concerning when and how boarding 
and inspections would be expected to take place.  Reference is made in Article 6(1) to the 
provision that the Meeting of Parties shall develop ’rules concerning the boarding and inspection 
of vessels operating in the Area’, however, this is contained in a side note to the more broad 
provision relating to monitoring, control and surveillance. 
 
As discussed in relation to the duties of CPs, Article 11(1) establishes that CPs should take 
measures to ensure that they develop and implement a ‘satellite vessel monitoring system’ for 
fishing vessels flying their flag.  The implementation of a vessel monitoring scheme is one of the 
means through which CPs could act to fulfil their concurrent obligation to develop rules and 
procedures for effective monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities as mentioned in 
article 6(1).  
  
The SIOFA Agreement contains a provision to establish a compliance enforcement regime.  
Article 12(2) of the Agreement states that CPs shall not permit ‘landings, transhipment or supply 
services’ to fishing vessels unless satisfied that the fish on board have been caught in a manner 
consistent with conservation measures. However the Agreement does not detail how CPs are to 




Given its recent entry into force, the SIOFA has taken some significant steps towards building a 
strong suite of compliance-related conservation measures. The 2016 meeting established CMM-
04, ‘Conservation and Management Measure on Vessels without Nationality’, to make publically 
available the actions the SIOFA will take to address the implications of un-flagged vessels fishing 
in the Agreement Area. 2016 also saw the adoption of CMM-06, the SIOFA IUU Vessels List, to 
name and shame those vessels, and their associated flag-States, whose activities connect them 
with IUU fishing activities.  
The SIOFA has also adopted significant measures to ensure all States parties implement port 
state inspections to detect and apprehend IUU fishing activities via CMM-08. CMM-07 similarly 
implements requirements to assist in the detection of non-compliance by establishing processes 
to authorise vessels to fish in the Agreement Area and associated notification processes. 
 
156 Clark, E. A. 2010. ‘Compliance Enforcement and the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement’ SIODFA Tech. Rep. 





The 2018 meeting of the SIOFA established Conservation and Management Measure 2018-10 
entitled, ‘Conservation and Management Measure for the Monitoring of Fisheries in the 
Agreement Area’. This measure gives effect to Article 6 of the SIOFA Agreement by specifying 
requirements for a SIOFA vessel monitoring system, entry and exit reporting and outlining 
restrictions on vessel transhipments.  
2018 also saw the adoption of CMM-09, ‘Conservation and Management Measure for Control of 
Fishing Activities in the Agreement Area’, and, significantly, a compliance and monitoring 
scheme for the organisation via CMM 2018-11. In line with the practice of other RFMOs, the 
SIOFA Compliance and Monitoring Scheme establishes a compliance review mechanism to 
assess the performance of States parties and cooperating non-parties to the SIOFA with their 
obligations under the Agreement.  
5.5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter began by identifying and categorising the compliance enforcement mechanisms 
specifically under examination in this thesis. These mechanisms included: 
 cooperative policies,  
 policies relating to non-contracting parties,  
 policies relating to cooperating parties,  
 vessel lists,  
 requests and negotiations,  
 diplomatic demarches,  
 trade-related measures,  
 graded sanctions, and  
 monitoring and inspection procedures.  
 
Figure 1 demonstrates how these mechanisms can be categorised to better understand their 
purpose within the compliance regime of AusRFMOs.   
 
This chapter then detailed the compliance-related conservation measures in place in the 
AusRFMOs under examination in this thesis. The review clarified that there is significant variation 
in the nature and number of conservation measures implemented across the range of 
AusRFMOs. This situation is likely to pose challenges when attempting to understand the 






Various factors which may have influenced AusRFMOs’ uptake of regulatory compliance 
measures include the political inclinations of the parties to the organisation, the number of parties 
to the organisation, and the timing and reasons behind the creation of the organisation. 
 
By considering the founding agreement upon which individual AusRFMOs have been formed, as 
well as the formal and informal compliance measures each have in place, this chapter has 
provided an in-depth assessment of the actual methods currently operating in AusRFMOs to 
encourage compliance.  This information provides the data necessary to understand the 
relationship between the performance of the RFMO, and their uptake of compliance-related 

















The ability of AusRFMOs to enforce compliance with the conservation measures they administer 
is a critical factor in addressing the decline of high seas fish stocks.1  However the performance 
of RFMOs in this regard has been poor;2 with discontinuity between the compliance approaches 
of individual RFMOs cited as one of the key contributing factors to the challenges facing regional 
fisheries management.3  The question of how to improve compliance in RFMOs has been widely 
addressed in academic literature to date,4 but almost exclusively from the perspective of how flag 
State compliance can be strengthened to improve the compliance of the RFMO overall.5 
 
While it is indeed the flag State who is responsible for upholding compliance with the 
conservation measures of RFMOs,6 this thesis suggests that limiting discussion of regional 
fisheries compliance to a consideration of flag State compliance alone is an unhelpful one. 
Instead it suggests that under the principle of shared responsibility,7 the resource-user shares 
the responsibility for management of the species in question.   
 
By examining the compliance measures currently in place across all six AusRFMOs, this thesis 
provides a comprehensive picture of the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs as a group. It 
demonstrates that there are marked gaps in their implementation of the range of compliance-
related conservation measures available and that the founding agreements that underpin 
AusRFMOs are similarly varied in their approach to compliance.  
 
The thesis posits that the strongest regional regimes are those which extend beyond 
conventional notions of flag State compliance, to leverage industry compliance mechanisms and 
engage with the opportunities they provide.  With wild-capture fisheries facing overexploitation, 
 
1 Michael W Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: Report of an 
Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, (2007), ix. 
2 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1072, ‘Performance Reviews by Regional Fishery Bodies: Introduction, 
Summarise, Synthesis and Best Practices’, (2012) available online at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2637e/i2637e00.pdf> at 
56. 
3 Lodge et al, above, n 1. 
4 Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries (2010) 57; Rosemary Rayfuse, 
'Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement' (2004) LI Netherlands International Law Review 41. 
5 The principle of flag State jurisdiction is embodied in article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). 
6 Articles 63 and 64 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea require States to cooperate via regional and 
subregional organisations for the purposes of conserving and managing the marine living resources of the high seas. 
7 Andre Nol kaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework’ (2013) 34 





this thesis asserts that AusRFMOs can, and should, engage more with the private-sector to 
address gaps in their implementation of compliance measures.  
 
The introductory section of this chapter establishes the context in which this analysis is 
undertaken with a discussion of incentive-based approaches to compliance and how such 
approaches interact with the principle of shared responsibility. The legal status of the resource-
user in RFMOs is also examined to demonstrate the difficulties faced by the private-sector 
seeking to engage directly via the forum provided by the RFMO.  
 
Following this introduction, the chapter undertakes an analysis of the data presented in Chapter 
5 and Table 1. Table 1 comprises a summary of the compliance-related conservation measures 
of each AusRFMO contained in Chapter 5. This table provides a quick reference guide and also 
demonstrates the respective strengths and weaknesses of each AusRFMO.  
 
Based on this information, the analysis is undertaken by allocating each AusRFMO a status of 
‘basic’, ‘satisfactory or ‘established’ with regard to its compliance capacity. This finding is then 
considered in light of the performance of the RFMO as determined by their most recent 
performance review outcome and other factors. Areas for improvement are identified and 
discussed to highlight the key compliance concerns of each AusRFMO as determined by this 
thesis.  
 
The chapter concludes that the six AusRFMOs under examination have a vastly different 
approach to compliance and have implemented different compliance-related conservation 
measures with differing levels of success. There is little uniformity across AusRFMOs with 
respect to their compliance regimes and this has resulted in a confusing situation for the 
resource-user. It is argued that notions of legitimacy are undermined when there is insufficient 
collaboration and cooperation between and amongst regulators.  
 
In light of the above finding, this chapter examines the ways in which the private-sector can 
contribute to the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs. Figure 2 is introduced to highlight how 
avenues for private-sector engagement can be categorised into cooperative measures, 
benchmarking measures, and political measures to assist in understanding their operation and 
desired effect.  
 
Finally this chapter highlights that private-sector engagement represents a viable alternative to 
regulatory reform with regards to the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs. To demonstrate this 
point, specific and practical recommendations for how both AusRFMOs and the private-sector 





chapter concludes there is significant work to be done to rebuild perceptions of the legitimacy of 
compliance conservation measures in AusRFMOs and that private-sector engagement can assist 




The term ‘shared responsibility’ has, to date, been rarely used in legal literature8 and the concept 
is one relatively new to the academic discourse.9 It is a term that refers to the underexplored 
problem of allocation of responsibilities amongst multiple states and other actors, and has 
particular relevance in international environmental law.10  In fact, the example of high seas fish 
stocks management is often cited as demonstrative of the principle of shared responsibility in 
that it poses challenging questions relating to who is responsible for the over-exploitation of high 
seas fish stocks.11 
 
The principle of shared responsibility provides the conceptual framework for the research 
methodology adopted.  The premise of the thesis is that fishing industry associations and 
individuals can and have assumed responsibility for regional fisheries failures and in doing so, 
have assumed a significant compliance function in this regard.  By documenting this trend in 
AusRFMOs and analysing its impacts upon the compliance capability of these organisations, this 
thesis presents a unique insight into the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs.  
 
It is well recognised that regulatory authorities should constantly be concerned with maintaining 
the involvement of participants in the regime they administer.12 This thesis applies the principle of 
shared responsibility to suggest that RFMOs will benefit from increased engagement with the 
resource-user in the regulatory compliance sphere.  It seeks to demonstrate that the strongest 
regional regimes are those which extend beyond conventional notions of flag State compliance to 
leverage industry compliance mechanisms and engage with the opportunities they provide.   
 
As the frequency and variety of cooperative action between States and non-State actors 
increases, there is a need for new perspectives that help to address how RFMOs might develop 





10 Andrew Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos, ‘Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the 
State of the Art’ (Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2014) 27. 
11 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, above n 7, 362. 
12 Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos, above n 10. 





According to Andrew T Guzman, compliance is one of the most central questions in international 
law.14  This is exceptionally true of international fisheries law. Compliance, under international 
fisheries law, is achieved via the resource user being controlled by the state which is in turn 
governed by the decisions of the RFMO. However because RFMO membership is voluntary, 
there exists significant opportunity for non-compliance to occur unchecked.  Even where RFMO 
membership exists, rates of non-compliance within the regime are high.15  
 
In areas where the resource is the property of the ‘commons’,16 such as international fisheries, it 
has been demonstrated that compliance is easier to achieve when resource users support 
effective monitoring and rule enforcement.17  In a fisheries context, numerous studies have 
reinforced the success of co-management regimes, or regimes which engage the resource user 
throughout different stages of governance.18  While co-management may not be possible under 
an international regime which is founded in the principle of flag State compliance, industry 
initiatives have nevertheless been occurring and have been successful in respect of achieving 
compliance with the objectives of RFMOs.19  
 
Hilborn, Orensanz and Parma20 found that successful fisheries management usually includes 
institutional systems that provide incentives to individual operators.21  Such an approach, they 
suggest, leads to behaviour compliant with conservation.22 One of the key challenges that arises 
when regulators and the regulated do not ‘talk to’ or cooperate with one another is that of 
misunderstanding. Without the ability to determine accurately why a certain conservation 
measure may be unsuccessful, assumptions can distort reality and result in the unnecessary 
diversion of precious time and effort.  
 
Communication is at the heart of effective cooperation and to achieve such communication, 
incentive-based management has proven very successful in a fisheries management context.  
To understand how incentive-based management works best, it is vital to first understand who 
the key players are in a regulatory regime akin to an RFMO. In this respect, there are two key 
stakeholders in the fishery management process: the fishing community and the RFMO.23   
 
 
14  Andrew T. Guzman, ‘A Compliance Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1826. 
15  FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular, above n 2. 
16 Garret Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (1968) 162 Science 1234. 
17 Thomas Dietz et al, ‘The Struggle to Govern the Commons’ (2003) 302 Science 1907.  
18 Robert S Pomeroy et al, ‘Conditions affecting the success of fisheries co-management: Lessons from Asia’ (2001) 25 Marine 
Policy, 197. 
19 For example, in 2003 the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators was formed by industry members to eliminate illegal, 
unreported and unregulated catch of Patagonian toothfish and to improve the sustainability of the stock.   
20 Institutions, incentives and the future of fisheries Ray Hi born, J.M. (Lobo) Orensanz and Ana M.Parma Phil.Trans.R. Soc. B 








RFMO governance consists of a system which imposes rules or regulations on the resource-user 
in the interests of conserving the resource.24  Regional fisheries management can then be said to 
comprise: 
 
The division and/or delegation of decision-making responsibilities to the most appropriate 
institutional or governance structures and level of society given the circumstances of the 
fishery (fisheries) or marine regions concerned.25 
 
This thesis has suggested that incentive-based approaches to management represent a currently 
underutilised tool at the disposal of RFMOs.  This approach incorporates incentives for fishers to 
engage constructively in the management of the resource.  
 
For instance, CCAMLR has a Resolution to the effect that States must require, as a condition of 
granting a vessel a license to fish for Patagonian toothfish,26 that vessels only land catches in 
ports that are fully implementing the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS).  Resource-
users engaging in the CDS fetch a higher price for their product at market and in turn gain an 
incentive for participating in the conservation measure.  
 
By incentivising compliance, the RFMO achieves the ‘buy-in’ of the resource-user which is in 
turn, necessary for the successful management of the resource.27  If fishers are not provided the 
opportunity to engage constructively in fisheries management then they are likely to become 
suspicious of the regulation and fail to implement it.28 Incentive-based management represents 
an approachable, effective and implementable alternative to traditional regulation.   
 
While certain RFMOs have incorporated incentives into their conservation measures to the 
benefit of the fishery, there remain those that are resistant to recognising the fundamental role 
that engagement by the resource-user can play in achieving sustainable fisheries management.  
RFMOs must become adaptable and flexible to preserve global fisheries resources and 
encouraging communication with the resource-user via participation in conservation measures is 
an ideal place to begin such communication.  
 
 
24 Participatory Deliberation, Risk Governance and Management of the Marine Region in the European Union, Journal of 
Environmental Policy and Planning, 16(4) October 2014. Available online at 
<http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/11/1/7> 
25 ‘Regional Governance: Making it work for fisheries and the environment’, Conference Paper, Conference on Regional 
Fisheries Management Brussels, 29th September 2009, available online at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/docs/pew annex2 en.pdf>  
26 See Resolution XXII entitled “Use of ports not implementing the Catch Documentation Scheme”, available on line at  
<http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/09-10/all.pdf> 
27 J Beddington, D Agnew, and C Clark, ‘Current Problems in the Management of Marine Fisheries’, Science 22 Jun 2007: Vol. 
316, pp. 1713-1716. 





This thesis recognises that voluntary corporate activity can be more effective in achieving 
sustainable fisheries management than traditional regulation.29  However it also recognises that 
approaches to corporate sustainability can vary greatly, as can the motivation behind such 
sustainability efforts.  
 
That said, many major corporations now report to their stakeholders on a regular basis on the 
social and environmental impact of their business. They consider this to be ‘good for business’30 
and to mitigate the need for externally imposed regulation in that the reporting is said to positively 
influence the sustainability practices of the organisation.31  By securing the active support of 
resource-users, voluntary compliance can result in a greater willingness to comply with relevant 
legal and regulatory frameworks.32  
 
Consultation with parties who have a vested interest in the management decisions of any given 
regulatory authority is considered a critical step in the process of fisheries management.  The 
FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 4: Fisheries Management33 provide that 
fisheries management is: 
 
The integrated process of information gathering, analysis, planning, consultation, 
decision-making, allocation of resources and formulation and implementation, with 
enforcement as necessary, of regulations or rules which govern fisheries activities in 
order to ensure the continued productivity of the resources and the accomplishment of 
other fisheries objectives.34 
 
Information gained during consultation can, and often is, influential at all stages of the 
management process.  
 
For example, information gathering on the nature of a management challenge, analysis of the 
underlying causes of the challenge, and planning of reform will all be informed by and often 
prompted by consultation with the individual or organisations being managed. While their role is 
not to make any binding decisions to address the situation, open streams of communication and 
cooperation between the regulator and the regulated will clearly be fundamental to the ultimate 
management decision appropriately addressing the initial challenge.  
 
29 Susan Wild, Sustainability Reporting in Fishing Industry Management - Regulation versus Voluntarism, Australasian 
Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 2(3), 2008, 57-75. Available online 
<http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=aabfj> 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid at 57. 
32 ‘Marine Regions Forum provides multi-stakeholder platform for regional ocean governance’, Stop Illegal Fishing, 22 October 
2019, <https://stopillegalfishing.com/news-articles/marine-regions-forum-provides-multi-stakeholder-platform-for-regional-
ocean-governance/> accessed 10 July 2019. 
33 FAO. Fisheries management. ‘Marine protected areas and fisheries. FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries’. 







To reinforce this point, Cochrane’s Guidebook provides that ‘communication, consultation and 
co-management should underlie all stages of management’35 and ‘genuine participation in the 
management process by fully-informed users is consistent with the democratic principle...and 
encourages compliance with laws and regulations.’36  This is a critical point if we are to achieve 
effective fisheries management globally and one which can be better implemented by RFMOs to 
ensure that the resource-user is viewed not as the source of the problem; but instead the source 
of the solution.  
 
The next section of this chapter examines the legal status of the resource-user within the 
governance framework of RFMOs to understand their capacity to contribute to the decisions of 




While the ability of States parties to RFMOs to effect change in the organisation is one matter, 
the status of the private-sector in the RFMO is quite another. While States can elect to engage in 
an RFMO, the private-sector is only able to engage in an RFMO in a limited capacity or may not 
be given the opportunity to engage at all. This legal limitation on engagement exists because 
RFMOs are created via treaty agreement and States are the principal actors.37   
 
Upon joining a RFMO convention, States indicate a willingness to be bound by the convention 
and its associated conservation measures.38 This includes implementing the intent and effect of 
the conservation measures on an international level and reporting against those measures 
accordingly. With domestic implementation of conservation measures, vessels and individuals 
regulated by the responsible flag State are held to account for the conservation measures 
implemented by the RFMO. 
 
This distinction means that the private-sector is often not engaged in the decision-making that 
occurs at an international level which directly impacts them until negotiations for domestic 
implementation commence. By this stage, of course, the domestic implementation must reflect 
the international agreement and so any potential modifications under domestic law are limited. 
While some States engage the relevant private-sector prior to making commitments at an 
international level, this is not always the case.  
 
 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Hjortur B. Sverrisson, Countermeasures, the International Legal System and Environmental Violations (2008) 337. 





Ideally, this thesis contends, States would be required to reflect the position of the private-sector 
in their deliberations and decision-making at an international level. However what is in the best 
interests of the State is not always in the best interests of the private-sector. Complaints 
regarding a lack of transparency and lack of implementation of decisions made at a regional level 
have often been associated with RFMO decision-making for this reason.39 
 
This is not to say that the private-sector cannot influence decision-making by RFMOs.  Article 12 
of the UNFSA requires RFMOs to be transparent in decision-making and to permit observers at 
meetings of the RFMO.40  Article 12 of the UNFSA also states that RFMOs should provide timely 
access to the reports and records of the RFMO, subject to procedural constraints.41  
 
Formally, many RFMOs have allocated resource-users ‘observer status’ which incorporates the 
right to make statements at meetings of the RFMO and the right to listen to deliberations to 
encourage increased participation and engagement by the private-sector.42  However the attitude 
towards observers and their participation in meeting proceedings varies greatly amongst 
AusRFMOs.43 
 
While granting private-sector entities observer status at RFMO meetings is clearly a positive 
move to promote engagement and transparency, it is clear that the role of the private-sector is 
one of participation, rather than influence. To add to this, there is a lack of consistency with 
regards to whether, how and when observer status will be granted across different RFMOs.44  
 
Another factor impacting upon the ability of the private-sector to engage with the decision-making 
of the RFMO is their capacity to attend such meetings and to be represented appropriately. In the 
CCAMLR, for example, the regulated species represent economically strong stocks such as 
Patagonian toothfish and krill; both of which require extensive financial backing to fish for and a 
high-value for the catch in return. In this way, the private-sector in the CCAMLR, for the most 
part, have the financial backing required to participate actively in the organisation.45  
 
 
39 Routledge Handbook of Maritime Regulation and Enforcement, Warner and Kaye (eds), Routledge Taylor and Frances 
Group at 55. 
40 Article 12, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Law and politics in ocean governance: the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and regional fisheries management regimes, Tore 
Henriksen, Geir Hønneland, and Are Sydnes, 2006 at 41. 
43 The quest for sustainable international fisheries: regional efforts to implement the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement: an overview for the May 2006 review conference, 2009, Evelyne Meltzer at xxxvi. 
44 Ibid. 
45 The CCAMLR does not consider itself to be an RFMO in that it regulates the marine living resources of the Antarctic; not 
simply the fisheries resources. However for the purposes of this thesis, it will be referred to as an RFMO as it is considered 





This lack of consistency has led Michael Lodge46 to recommend that all RFMOs ensure that the 
private-sector be ‘afforded an opportunity to participate in meetings on reasonable terms.’47 
Lodge also states that RFMOs should streamline applications for observer status, grant long-
term approval to observers and grant observers access to all official documentation of the 
RFMO. He emphasises that the standard of transparency in RFMO meetings which include 
observers, compared to those meetings where observers are not involved, should not differ. 
 
Given the significance of the actions of the private-sector in determining whether an RFMO 
conservation measure achieves compliance outcomes, this thesis argues that their current status 
is insufficient. Some States have come a long way towards integrating legislative consultation on 




Table 2 (see below) is designed to assist in identifying key areas where compliance gaps exist in 
AusRFMOs, as well as to summarise the compliance mechanisms that these organisations have 
implemented.  This section draws directly from Table 2 and comprises the analytical basis of the 
thesis. It starts by considering the ‘compliance capacity’ of each RFMO in comparison to other 
AusRFMOs.  
 
The term ‘compliance capacity’ when used in this thesis refers to the extent to which AusRFMOs 
have embedded compliance tactics in their founding agreement as well as the range of 
compliance-related conservation measures they have adopted. A status is allocated to each 
AusRFMO based on their compliance capacity. These include: 
 
 Basic –  the RFMO has demonstrated some degree of commitment to compliance in its 
founding agreement and has adopted minimal measures to give effect to this 
commitment;  
 Satisfactory – the RFMO has demonstrated an adequate commitment to compliance in 
its founding agreement and has adopted satisfactory measures to give effect to this 
commitment; and 
 Established – the RFMO has demonstrated a strong commitment to compliance in its 




46 Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for RFMOs, above n 1.  





This section considers the status of each AusRFMO alongside the findings of the most recent 
performance review of the AusRFMO to offer new insights on the key areas requiring attention. 
This analysis demonstrates that while this group of organisations is slowly moving closer to 
achieving a greater sense of unity across their collective compliance approach,48 there remain 




Status: Established  
 
The CCAMLR has a long history of encouraging compliance actions, as demonstrated in Table 1 
below. With a strong foundation of compliance-related provisions enshrined in its Convention, the 
CCAMLR has developed and implemented an effective compliance enforcement procedure 
which has provided a model for other RFMOs (as discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
The most recent (2017) CCAMLR Performance Review found that the CCAMLR Compliance 
Evaluation Procedure (CCEP) could be strengthened by requiring enhanced reporting on the 
actions taken by states to address infringements. Where, for example, a Contracting Party failed 
to report on follow up investigations, such failures should be identified as ‘serious, frequent or 
persistent non-compliance’.49 
 
The CCAMLR IUU-vessel list, established by CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07, is 
reviewed at each annual meeting and made publically available. With respect to the CCAMLR 
IUU-vessel listing procedures, the performance review panel had some minor recommendations 
to make and suggested that the list could be strengthened to provide for listing of ‘stateless’ 
fishing vessels.50 In addition, any vessel owned by an individual or company named on the IUU 
vessel list could also be added to the list by association.51   
 
Finally, recommendation 16 of the CCAMLR performance review suggested that the CCAMLR 
encourage Members to undertake bilateral and sub-regional actions to achieve effective 
cooperation by non-Members with CCAMLR conservation measures.52  Cooperative action such 
as this is a key mechanism through which AusRFMOs can promote compliance with their 
conservation measures both formally and informally.  
 
48 As demonstrated by the adoption of compliance evaluation or compliance monitoring schemes across AusRFMOs in recent 
years.  
49 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Performance Review Panel, ‘Second Performance 
Review of CCAMLR – Final Report of the Panel’, 2017, available online at: <https://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/second-ccamlr-
performance-review> at 4. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid. 






Today, the CCAMLR has made significant progress in implementing the recommendations 
contained in its first performance review which was undertaken in 2008.53 The 2017 performance 
review reflected this finding providing that: ‘CCAMLR has adopted an impressive array of 
monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) measures and cooperative mechanisms to monitor 
compliance and detect non-compliance and IUU fishing activities.’54 The report went on to note 
that the adoption of the CCEP, and the role of the compliance committee in assessing 
compliance with CCAMLR conservation measures, demonstrates notable progress by the 
CCAMLR organisationally.55  
 
Most significantly, however, is the success of the CCEP. This is demonstrated in the finding of 
the 2019 meeting of the CCAMLR in October in Hobart, Tasmania that the CCEP is functioning 
as intended to identify and address instances of non-compliance in relation to CCAMLR 
conservation measures.56 The ‘Summary CCAMLR Compliance Report’ consolidates responses 
received from Contracting Parties and the draft Report identified 16 potential compliance issues 
that had arisen over the period 1 August 2018 until 31 July 2019.57  
 
These compliance issues related to infringements to seven CCAMLR compliance measures and 
six Contracting Parties were involved.58 While some infringements were minor, others were more 
serious including the retrieval of a ‘ghost net’, or discarded fishing net that continues to fish while 
it remains in the water, which was located in the CCAMLR Convention Area.59 The discussion of 
such infringements at the CCAMLR Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance 
(SCIC) is a critical factor in ensuring Contracting Parties are accountable for their actions.  
 
If the CCAMLR can continue to strive for this level of transparency in decision-making and 







53 Ibid at 6. 
54 Ibid at 8. 
55 Ibid at 9 
56 ‘CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure – Summary Report and Analysis’, available online at: 
<https://www.ccamlr.org/en/ccamlr-38/13-rev-2> 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.  





The treaty underpinning the IOTC, the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission (IOTC),60 has failed to sufficiently incorporate modern compliance provisions. 
The IOTC treaty was formed under article XIV of the FAO Constitution which means that since its 
inception, the RFMO has been somewhat limited in its autonomy.61 In fact, whether the IOTC 
constitutes an ‘international legal personality’62 was, in 2007, a topic of debate between the 
organisation and the FAO.  
 
Perhaps because of the limitations of the treaty underpinning the IOTC, the Commission has 
recently recognised, discussed and sought to extend its compliance capacity via the adoption of 
compliance-related conservation measures. It now has measures in place to address inspections 
and transhipments, including via the introduction of IOTC Resolution ‘2018 - 06 on Establishing a 
Programme for Transshipment by Large - Scale Fishing Vessels’. This Resolution requires that 
all transshipments of tuna, tuna-like species and sharks taken by large-scale fishing vessels 
must take place in port and in accordance with rules outlined in the Resolution.  
 
To support the implementation of IOTC Resolution 2018-06, ports and landing States are 
required to verify the accuracy of the information received.63 The recently formed IOTC 
Compliance Committee has been a positive step for the organisation, however this Committee 
needs to take action to better support the implementation of requirements in accordance with the 
FAO Agreement on Port State Measures.64 This Agreement was formulated in August 2009 
under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution65 and seeks to establish common procedures for 
inspection and agreed measures against illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing 
vessels.66  
 
The IOTC has also been encouraged to strengthen monitoring, control and surveillance 
measures, such as vessels monitoring systems and their regional observer scheme and develop 
trade-related measures to penalise non-compliance.67 While the IOTC has implemented a 
process for reviewing compliance by Contracting Parties, this process does not assess 
 
60 Treaty available online at: <http://www.fao.org/fishery/docs/DOCUMENT/iotc/Basic/IOTCA_E.pdf> 
61 Edeson, W. R. (2007). An International Legal Extravaganza in the Indian Ocean: Placing the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
outside the Framework of FAO. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 22 (4), 486. 
62 Ibid at 485. 
63 Global Fishing Watch, ‘Analysis of Poss ble Transshipment Activity in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Convention Area 
in 2017 through the Use of AIS Data’, 2017, at 11. Report available online at: <https://globalfishingwatch.org/wp-
content/uploads/GFW IOTC TranshipmentReview 2017.pdf>  
64 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Adopted in 
November 2009 by the FAO Conference at its Thirty-sixth Session through Resolution No 12/2009, under Article XIV, 
paragraph 1 of the FAO Constitution. 
65  Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries (2010) 64. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Bernadette Carreon, ‘At IOTC meeting, calls made to save yellowfin tuna stocks from potential collapse’, SeafoodSource, 19 






compliance with the individual obligations of States parties.68 This should be amended to bring 
the IOTC into line with the practice of other RFMOs.  
 
The latest performance review of the IOTC recommended that the process for reviewing 
compliance should identify reasons for why such non-compliance may have occurred.69 In this 
way, the need for capacity assistance or whether it is wilful or repeated non-compliance, can 




Status: Satisfactory  
 
During a 2009 meeting of the CCSBT Strategy and Fisheries Management Working Group, the 
need to promote membership and compliance by non-contracting parties was recognised as 
fundamental to the performance of the RFMO.70 Indeed, the CCSBT Convention identifies 
membership and compliance by non-contracting parties with the conservation measures of the 
organisation as being something Contracting Parties must encourage and promote. This is 
reflected in Resolutions of the CCSBT which make provision for CCSBT members to continue to 
encourage non-Contracting Parties to become Members or Cooperating non-members.71 
 
However, it is argued that the ability of CCSBT Contracting Parties to review their own 
compliance and be open to a round table discussion on the topic is an area which still requires 
development. To address this, the CCSBT has implemented a Quality Assurance Review 
program to provide independent reviews and help Members identify how well their management 
systems function.72 This Review process also recommends areas where improvement is needed.  
 
Developments in recent years have also strengthened the performance of the CCSBT with 
regards to its monitoring, control and surveillance measures; including via the introduction of a 
‘Resolution on action plans to ensure compliance with Conservation and Management 
Measures’73. Most recently, in 2015 the Commission adopted a Resolution on Port State 
 
68 Report of the Second IOTC Performance Review, 2015 at 26. Report available online at: https://iotc.org/documents/report-
2nd-iotc-performance-review. 
69 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Report of the Performance Review Working Group, 2016, 
available online at <https://www.iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2016/04/IOTC-2016-PRIOTC02-RE - FINAL 0.pdf> 
70 CCSBT Report, Compliance with CCSBT Management Measures, CCSBT-CC/0910/04 rev4, available online at 
<https://www.ccsbt.org/en/system/files/resource/en/4d9169534e0d4/cc04 rev4.pdf>  
71 ‘Resolution on Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU) and Establishment of a CCSBT Record of Vessels over 24 
meters Authorized to Fish for Southern Bluefin Tuna’, October 2014, available on line at 
<https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/ccsbt.org/files/userfiles/file/docs english/operational resolutions/Ammended resolution on autho
rised 24m vessel list.pdf>  
72 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, ‘Monitoring, Control and Surveillance’, available online at: 
<https://www.ccsbt.org/en/content/monitoring-control-and-surveillance>  





Measures74 to place restrictions on the landing of catch and assist in the detection of illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). Significant other compliance measures that are 
currently operational in the CCSBT include measures to regulate transhipments, an IUU fishing 
vessel list, a catch documentation scheme and a resolution on the use of vessel monitoring 
systems.  
 
Some of the recent improvements by the CCSBT with regards to its compliance capacity were 
driven by the findings of the 2014 CCSBT performance review. Steps that may still be taken by 
the Commission, however, include the harmonisation of CCSBT monitoring, control and 
surveillance measures with the measures adopted by other RFMOs. Additionally, while the 
design and function of the CCSBT Compliance Committee has been clarified in recent times, it 
has yet to be seen how the Committee will influence positive change within the organisation.  
 
Due to the relative newness of many of the compliance measures adopted by the CCSBT, at the 
time of writing, this organisation is ranked ‘Satisfactory’ with regards to its compliance capacity 






The WCPFC in general has a good track record with regards to its compliance and enforcement 
measures. At the forefront of compliance evaluation, this RFMO has gained the commitment of 
its members with respect to self-reporting and voluntary compliance for many years. Indeed the 
Compliance Monitoring Scheme of the WCPFC was adopted in 2011 and has been updated 
regularly, most recently in May 2019.75  
 
The WCPFC committed to undertaking a review of their Compliance Monitoring Scheme in 2018.  
The Review found that the Scheme is fundamentally sound, robust and comprehensive.76 It also 
found that the Scheme seems to be having a positive effect on compliance with the conservation 
measures of the WCPFC.77 However it did find that the process is overly burdensome on 
WCPFC contracting parties and is ‘at risk of collapsing under its own weight’78 if reporting 
obligations are not simplified.  
 
74 Ibid. 
75 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, ‘Compliance Monitoring Scheme’, available online at: 
<https://www.wcpfc.int/compliance-monitoring>  
76 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, ‘Final Report from the Independent Panel to review the Compliance 









To address these concerns, the 2019 meeting of the WCPFC considered a discussion paper on 
‘Streamlining WCPFC Reporting Requirements’.79 The paper made recommendations for 
consolidating certain reporting requirements under the compliance monitoring scheme without 
compromising the integrity of the process.  
 
With respect to the performance review of the WCPFC, it made very some very positive findings 
with respect to the compliance regime of the organisation. However there were other less 
glowing findings with the Panel communicating: ‘grave concern about failures by many CCMs to 
report fishery data as required.’80 It advised that where Members were late, or failed to provide 
operational data before the required deadlines, this should be considered a serious problem to 
be addressed as a matter of urgency.81  
 
The review also found that in 2012, the WCPFC was lagging behind other RFMOs in developing 
port State measures to combat IUU fishing. They recommended that a new conservation 
measure on port State measures be adopted and implemented at the earliest opportunity. Since 
this time, the WCPFC has adopted a conservation measure on port State measures and the use 
of unique vessel identification numbers.82 
 
The performance review Panel also recommended that clearer mechanisms be established to 
ensure that Members follow-up on infringements by their vessels and that guidelines be 
established for a range of penalties to be applied in these instances.83  However the WCPFC has 
yet to adopt the review’s suggestion to make a range of penalties, or market-related 
measures, available in instances of non-compliance.84  
 
Due to the commitment of the WCPFC to continually reviewing its processes and specifically, to 
reviewing their compliance monitoring procedure, a ranking of ‘established’ has been awarded to 





79 The Commission for the Conservation and Management of  Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean, Summary Report of the Fifteenth Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee, 1 Dec 2019, available 
online at:  
<https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC162019TCC15%20TCC15%20Summary%20Report_issued%201%20December.pd
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80 Ibid at 194. 
81 Ibid at 200. 
82 PEW Environment Group, International Fisheries Managers’ Response to Performance Reviews Insufficient, 1 May 2019, 
available online at <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/05/international-fisheries-managers-
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The first performance review of the SPRFMO was released in January 2019 by a panel 
comprising four international independent experts, two of whom were nationals of SPRFMO 
members and two who were external to the SPRFMO.  
 
At the time of the first performance review of the SPRFMO, the organisation was still in the early 
stages of implementation. The Panel reported a range of compliance-related recommendations 
for the SPRFMO however acknowledged that the organisation was still in the early stages of 
implementation. As such, it should focus most of its effort on conservation measures relating to 
management of relevant species.   
 
The Panel recommended, inter alia, that the RFMO should: 
 revise its Port Inspection measure to specify that all potential IUU vessels should be 
inspected, 
 continue to work towards the adoption of its own high seas boarding and inspection 
regime, 
 continue to develop the SPRFMO observer programme, 
 consider requiring all transhipments to be observed, and 
 take a more proactive approach towards identifying vessels of non-Members and CNCPs 
undertaking fishing operations in the Convention Area.85 
 
The Panel noted that the SPRFMO had not yet adopted any market-related measures or a CDS, 
however at this stage, it did not recommend pursuing these objectives until the RFMO had 






At the time of writing, the SIOFA has not published a performance review. However it adopted a 
range of compliance-related conservation measures in 2018, including CMM 2018/09 for Control 
of Fishing Activities and CMM 2018-10 which specifies requirements for a SIOFA VMS and 
transhipments occurring in the SIOFA area. While the 2018 suite of measures represent a 
significant turning point in implementing the compliance requirements embedded in the SIOFA 
 







founding Agreement, at the time of writing the effectiveness of these provisions has yet to be felt. 




The analysis undertaken above suggests that there are three key areas AusRFMOs can focus on 
to achieve greater consistency across their respective compliance regimes. In doing so, their 
individual regimes will also be strengthened and enforcement capacity bolstered. These three 
areas, it is suggested, include trade-related measures, graded sanctions and provisions relating 




One of the key ways in which AusRFMOs can promote an incentive-based approach to 
regulation is by adopting trade-related measures. Such measures represent one of the few 
effective, enforceable and legally justifiable mechanisms available to RFMOs in their efforts to 
conserve the marine environment.   
 
In a publication considering the application of countermeasures in environmental violations, 
Hjortur B. Sverrisson notes that the cases that appear the most compatible with the use of trade-
related measures against States involve the law of the sea and high seas fisheries.86  Without a 
clear and substantive legal obligation to conserve and protect the environment, he suggests that 
countermeasures, in the form of trade-related measures, appear to have been one of the few 
options that have provided some relief for RFMOs.87 
 
However, countermeasures remain a controversial topic in RFMOs. This is largely due to 
differences in opinion concerning the scope of application of RFMOs and their enforcement 
capabilities. Those who disagree with the use of such measures by RFMOs argue that under 
international law, RFMOs do not have the competence to sanction States and it would not be fair 
practice to do so.88  In relation to the application of trade-related measures to non-contracting 
parties, it has also been argued that such action would infringe upon the principle of pacta tertiis 
nec nocent nec prosunt under which a treaty cannot establish rules or obligations with regard to 
a third State.89   
 
 
86 Hjortur B. Sverrisson, Countermeasures, the International Legal System and Environmental Violations (2008) 337. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the 






This thesis contends that so long as trade-related measures are consistent with international 
legal principles, there is nothing preventing AusRFMOs from adopting internationally sound 
measures in this regard. Certain RFMOs have already adopted measures to this effect, with the 
IOTC Resolution 10/10 allowing the Commission to take measures against CPs and NCPs who 
repeatedly fail to discharge their objections.   
 
In line with the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing90 (IPOA-IUU), it is clear that the adoption of trade-related measures 
should only occur, ‘in exceptional circumstances, where other measures have proven 
unsuccessful to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, and only after prior consultation with 
interested States.’91 Unfortunately, such instances do arise and this thesis suggests that it is best 
that RFMOs have the capacity to take action where appropriate.  
 
However RFMOs must exercise great caution with respect to trade-related measures and place 
limitations and restrictions upon their operation to prevent discrimination against developing or 
developed States.92 Certain RFMOs have overcome this hurdle by providing that trade-related 
measures should only be carried out in accordance with international law. For instance, Article 8 
of the SPRFMO Convention provides that the Commission must adopt procedures, including 
non-discriminatory trade-related measures, to ensure compliance. 
 
Notable academics93 have suggested that today, trade-related measures may be the key to 
achieving compliance on a regional scale if carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 




One of the primary roles of RFMOs is to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing on the high seas: an objective delegated to these organisations 
primarily via the International Plan of action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing (IPOA-
IUU).95 The IPOA-IUU also provides that RFMOs should develop additional compliance 
 
90 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted by consensus at the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI, Rome, Italy, adopted on 23 
June 2001 at the 102th Session of the FAO Council. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Rayfuse, Rosemary, Regional Allocation Issues or Zen and the Art of Pie Cutting (March 1, 2007). UNSW Law Research 
Paper No. 2007-10. Available at on line at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=966686>.  
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the University of Wollongong, Australia. 
94 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
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measures, including graded sanctions, to promote compliance by their members.96  Paragraph 
21 of the IPOA-IUU calls on States to ensure that sanctions are ‘of sufficient severity...to deprive 
offenders of the benefits accruing from such fishing.’97  
 
A range of graded sanctions may be adopted by RFMOs in response to acts of non-compliance.  
Such measures may be targeted towards individual vessels, nationals or non-compliant States.98 
Sanctions may include prohibiting the importation of products caught by non-cooperating fishing 
vessels, refusal to enter into negotiations, denial of port privileges, prohibitions on the import of 
fish and fish products from a certain vessel or certain State, and the application of other 
economic sanctions.99 Sanctions should be transparent and, most importantly, consistent, in 
order to avoid potential or perceived discrimination.100 
 
The conventions of certain AusRFMOs specifically grant the capacity to apply sanctions in the 
face of non-compliance, however others fail to raise the question of sanctions in their convention 
text.101 Where conservation measures regarding the use of graded sanctions are in place in 
AusRFMOs, the use of such sanctions are often applied narrowly or do not specify the type of 
sanctions to be imposed.102 
 
Better defining graded sanctions and establishing a unified approach to such measures should 
now be one of the primary tasks on RFMO agendas. These organisations have been hesitant to 
impose any sanctions upon non-compliant States due to perceived discrimination or concerns 
that it is not within the jurisdiction of the RFMO to do so. However, this thesis contends that the 
imposition of monetary fines, confiscation of fishing vessels and denial of fishing licences103 
should be a common resource relied upon by AusRFMOs to achieve compliance. 
  
Enhanced communication and information sharing regarding the imposition of sanctions by 
AusRFMOs is also essential to improving compliance.104  If it is seen that there is a precedent for 
the adoption of sanctions against a specific act of non-compliance, the logical conclusion is that 
other RFMOs can and should adopt similar measures.  With the success of IUU vessel lists in 
 
96 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2002). 
97 Ibid.  
98 Jackie Alder, Gail Lugten, Robert Kay and Bridget Ferriss, 'Compliance with International Fisheries Instruments in the North 
Atlantic' in Tony Pitcher, Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Daniel Pauly. (eds) Fisheries impacts on North Atlantic ecosystems: 
Evaluations and Policy Exploration. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 9(5). 
99 Mary Ann Palma, 'Combatting IUU Fishing: International Legal Developments' in Q.Hanich and M. Tsamenyi (eds), 
Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fishery Instruments in the Western 
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100 IPOA-IUU, above n 90. 
101 The founding texts of the IOTC, CCSBT and SIOFA fail to specifically mention the use of sanctions in appropriate 
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102 For instance, CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-03 provides that sanctions should be applied to non-compliant vessels, 
however detail is not provided in this respect.   
103 Diane Erceg, 'Deterring IUU fishing through state control over nationals' (2006) 30(2) Marine Policy . 






RFMOs, it is apparent that these organisations are well placed to adopt specific strategies such 




In the 1970s, RFMOs began to recognise the need to undertake management and conservation 
of activities and deter the activities of non-contracting parties (NCPs).105  The CCAMLR was one 
of the first to recognise the problems caused by an increasing incidence of fishing by NCPs in 
their Convention Area106 and have since implemented cooperative mechanisms aimed at 
targeting this behaviour.107  
 
International agreements have also sought to address the problems posed by NCPs, with the 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing calling on States Parties to RFMOs to prevent landings from vessels flagged to non-
members.108  One of the key mechanisms by which RFMOs can seek to improve compliance by 
NCPs is by developing cooperative policies and schemes to encourage participation.109  
 
All of the AusRFMOs under examination have adopted framework provisions or conservation 
measures to deter the non-compliant actions of NCPs.  For example, the SPRFMO has adopted 
significant framework provisions which require members of the Commission to take measures to 
deter the activities of vessels of NCP States.110 Furthermore, article 27 of the SPRFMO 
Convention provides that the measures adopted by the RFMO relating to market measures, IUU 
vessel lists and transhipment will apply equally to CPs and NCPs.    
 
Despite such measures being in place, the ability of AusRFMOs to address the non-compliance 
actions of NCP nationals and vessels is limited. There remains an open debate as to the extent 
to which an RFMO can impose upon the sovereignty of non-members.  The principle that 
international agreements can only apply inter partes has restricted the breadth and scope of 




105 Ibid at 2.  
106 Baird Rachel, ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An Analysis of the Legal, Economic and Historical Factors 
Relevant to its Development and Persistence’, 2004 5(2), Melbourne Journal of International Law 299. 
107 For instance, CCAMLR Resolution 14/XIX urges NCPs to cooperate with the Commission by implementing the provisions of 
the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme.  
108 IPOA-IUU, above n 90. 
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This thesis has provided evidence to demonstrate that intangible considerations such as operator 
attitudes towards the legitimacy of regulation, the method of compliance enforcement employed 
and perceptions as to the likelihood of apprehension can contribute to the decision to fish 
responsibly or otherwise.  The result is that the decision to fish responsibly or otherwise can be 
influenced by factors beyond the control of AusRFMOs.  
In positive examples of effective regional fisheries management, certain fishing corporations and 
non-government actors have assumed an important role in creating a powerful counteractive to 
the activities of irresponsible fishers. Throughout the CCAMLR’s history, for example, a range of 
non-regulatory entities with an interest in responsible and sustainable fishing of the marine living 
resources of the high seas have sought to engage with the regulator to the benefit of cooperative 
efforts within the Commission.    
Certain fishing companies have taken it upon themselves to promote compliance within their own 
networks and have created initiatives to preserve the marine resources. Other corporations have 
engaged in such behaviour in the interests of upholding their corporate social responsibility 
obligations.111  Some representative bodies or environmental non-government organisations 
have also run effective interference programs to tackle irresponsible fishing on all levels of its 
operation.112  
Figure 2 clarifies a range of ways in which the private-sector can engage in the compliance effort 
of AusRFMOs. This list can be categorised based on the ways in which the private-sector may 
influence compliance outcomes; whether they seek to strengthen compliance by building 
cooperation between like-minded companies or individuals, utilise sustainability standards to gain 
accreditation for their fishery or look to engage with the political process inherent in RFMO 
governance.      
 
The labels given to these categories include: 
 Cooperative measures – where the private-sector utilises cooperation between fishing 
corporations to achieve sustainability outcomes. For example, fishing corporations 
operating in the same sector may share information to monitor the overall take for the 
fishery amongst themselves. 
 Benchmarking measures - driven by an individual company or association to leverage 
corporate benchmarking measures and achieve compliance outcomes.  For example, a 
 
111 Susan Wild, above n 29. 





sustainable leadership fisheries association can allocate resources to gain accreditation 
by a reputable sustainability certification scheme. 
 Political measures – where an individual or association seeks to achieve compliance 
outcomes by engaging in the political environment of RFMO governance. For example, a 
fisheries association may seek to influence the outcomes of an RFMO meeting by 




Approaches to corporate sustainability reporting vary greatly in content, as does the motivation 
behind such reporting. Many major corporations now report to their stakeholders on a regular 
basis on the social and environmental impact of their business. They consider this to be ‘good for 
business’113 and to mitigate the need for externally imposed regulation in that the reporting is 
said to positively influence the sustainability practices of the organisation.   
 
By securing the active support of like-minded companies, voluntary compliance can result in a 
greater willingness to comply with relevant legal and regulatory frameworks.114 It can occur via 
the development of responsible fishing associations, where members of the same fishing sector 
band together to promote compliance in their fishery. Such associations can then promote these 
actions and improve the value of their product as an ethical and sustainable option.  
 
Companies in a fishery may also formally or informally elect to undertake voluntary information 
sharing activities as an exercise incidental to their operation fishing on the high seas. Such 
information sharing improves the likelihood of apprehension and reporting of illegal, unreported 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing occurring in an RFMO area. Finally, the private-sector may elect to 
undertake their own monitoring and surveillance activities by funding efforts themselves, or with 
the support of research and development organisations.   
 
Benchmarking Measures  
 
Voluntary engagement in the regulatory sphere by the private-sector is a tactic belonging to the 
category of ‘benchmarking’ whereby the company benchmarks their progress against their 
competitors and measures their performance accordingly. The popularity of voluntary 
engagement is built upon the premise that voluntary corporate activity can be more effective in 
achieving sustainable fisheries management than traditional government regulation.115  
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Voluntary sustainability reporting is an important element of voluntary engagement by the fishing 
sector as it has served as a valuable prompt to instigate other kinds of voluntary engagement in 
governance. This measure involves the private-sector undertaking monitoring of their own 
performance with regards to their sustainability and often publishing and promoting the 
outcomes. Such measures can lead to positive outcomes for both the fishery and the company.  
 
Sustainability reporting is often linked to the use of accreditation schemes, such as the Marine 
Stewardship Council.116 These registered organisations serve to certify fisheries that 
demonstrate that they can achieve certain sustainability requirements. Fishers then receive a 
label for the marketing and promotion of their product as a sustainable choice and are often able 
to obtain a greater value to their product.  
 
Engaging in the use of market-related measures is another way in which the seafood industry 
can actively promote the purchase of seafood from sustainable sources.117 By voluntarily 
engaging in a catch documentation scheme (CDS) of an RFMO, or creating their own CDS, 




Another critical way that the private-sector can engage in the outcomes of RFMO meetings is to 
lobby politicians and relevant State organisations in an effort to encourage them to adopt their 
desired approach. Direct engagement such as this can help States to understand the 
implications of a certain conservation measure on the private-sector and raise awareness of the 
need for consideration of issues that may not have previously been understood.  
 
In a similar way, the private-sector may work together to promote certain research outcomes in 
areas where there remains scientific uncertainty. By funding projects, either individually or by 
working with government organisations, the private-sector can influence the approach of States 
parties to RFMOs by providing evidence to support their decisions.  
 
Direct contributions to the work of RFMOs and regional fisheries bodies in general is another way 
in which the private-sector can leverage political influence to achieve conservation outcomes. By 
attending meetings of RFMOs, contributing to the conversations of State representatives and 
sharing lessons learned in the fishery, the private-sector can make critical contributions to the 
outcomes of RFMO meetings.    
 
116 Marine Stewardship Council, ‘Sustainable Fishing’, available online at: <https://www.msc.org/>. 
117 International Centre For Trade and Sustainable Development, ‘Natural resources, international trade and sustainable 






While the idea that industry can and should take a more proactive approach in influencing 
management outcomes is not new, the application of this principle to the field of RFMO 
management requires further investigation. The benefits of engaging the private-sector in 
fisheries governance are well understood.  They range from improving relationships between 
government and the governed, to increasing industry stewardship and simplification.  
  
The above categorisation of specific techniques the private-sector might use when engaging with 
RFMOs provides a reference point to promote further discussions in this area. It is clear that 
where it appears the private-sector is acting from a sense of corporate social responsibility, 





This chapter will now make recommendations in support of compliance actions that may be 
implemented by AusRFMOs and the private-sector as alternatives to a traditional regulatory 
approach. These recommendations are made in support of the notion that the private-sector 
must perceive the conservation approach of AusRFMOs as legitimate, appropriate and 
worthwhile if they are to effectively comply with the regime.  
 
To this end, recommendations for adoption by AusRFMOs are explored in the first instance. 
These recommendations include options to improve the profile of the private-sector within 
AusRFMOs and to increase their engagement in the decision-making processes of AusRFMOs. 
Second, recommendations that may be adopted by the private-sector to support their 
engagement in AusRFMO forums are provided. Options include the development of industry 
guidelines for engagement in AusRFMOs and initiatives for the private-sector to work with 





The below recommendations seek to address the issue of the need for increased cooperation 
between AusRFMOs and the private-sector to prevent against the occurrence of failures in the 
regional compliance regime. One of the key challenges which arises when AusRFMOs and the 






Without the ability to determine accurately why a conservation measure may be unsuccessful in 
controlling a certain behaviour by fishers, or unsuccessful in eliciting a certain behaviour, 
assumptions can distort reality and result in the unnecessary diversion of precious time and 
effort. Recommendations to improve high seas governance efforts should, in that case, be 
targeted towards improving engagement and finding synergies. It is suggested that where 
responsible members of the private-sector work with AusRFMOs, this can result in successful 





Successful fisheries management usually involves a system that provides incentives to individual 
operators.118 Incentive-based management and voluntary engagement represent just two key 
techniques available to RFMOs that show promise for increasing cooperative efforts between the 
resource-user and the regulator.  Such approaches will likely encourage fishers to assume a 
sense of shared responsibility for the making, and successful implementation, of RFMO 
conservation measures.119 
 
Incentive-based approaches to management represent a currently underutilised tool at the 
disposal of RFMOs. Participation by the private-sector in the conservation measures of the 
RFMO has been demonstrated to have been of key importance and in fact, necessary to the 
successful management of the resource.120 If fishers are not provided the opportunity to engage 
constructively in fisheries management then they are likely to become suspicious of the 
regulation and fail to implement it.121  
 
This thesis suggests that if AusRFMOs can primarily look to shape any compliance approach 
around the need to incentivise, rather than penalise, this will improve the strength of their 
compliance capacity. While certain AusRFMOs have taken positive steps towards incorporating 
incentives into their conservation measures to the benefit of the fishery, there remain those that 
are resistant to this approach.   
 
 
118 Ibid at 47. 
119 The Fisheries Secretariat, ‘Towards Sustainable Fisheries’, available online at: <http://www.fishsec.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/Annex-2-Regionalisation-to-improve-governance.pdf> 
120 Beddington et al, above n 29. 









This recommendation recognises that the role of the private-sector and observers in meetings of 
AusRFMOs is often negligible, or vague at best. In accordance with Lodge’s findings in relation 
to the role of observers in meetings,122 this thesis suggests that one of the best ways to ensure 
that the private-sector be ‘afforded an opportunity to participate in meetings on reasonable 
terms’123 is by clarifying what that role is in the form of a policy position on the role of the private-
sector.  
 
Such a position might take the form of a policy issued by the RFMO, or may simply be agreed in 
the form of a paper submitted to a commission meeting, however an open discussion of the 
types of documentation observers/the private-sector should be privy to, how their perspectives 
should be communicated in meetings and how they should be consulted would be beneficial for 
all. Such a policy may even formally recognise their role in encouraging compliance with the 
management objectives of the RFMO. Of course, consultation by the private-sector groups 
concerned would be critical in ensuring the policy was appropriate and reasonable.  
 
To effectively address the challenges of globally depleted fisheries, fisheries management 
regimes must be flexible and adaptive enough to address challenges as they arise and this 
thesis suggests that the need to formally recognise the role of the private sector in RFMO 
management is a current challenge to be addressed. It is suggested that where the RFMO 
regime does not have a clear position and in-built techniques to encourage engagement with the 





In 2010, Lodge argued that RFMOs should streamline applications for observer status, grant 
long-term approval to observers and grant observers access to all official documentation of the 
RFMO.124 He also emphasises that the standard of transparency in RFMO meetings which 
include observers, compared to those meetings where observers are not involved, should be no 
different. Transparency results in trust and good faith between States parties to RFMOs but also 
in trust and good faith with the private-sector being impacted by the decisions of the RFMO. 
 
122 Lodge, Recommended Best Practices for RFMOs, above n 1.  
123 Lodge, above n 1. 






This thesis has argued that there is nothing preventing AusRFMOs from reconsidering the role of 
observers within their organisation. In 2019, many RFMOs are still working towards the 
appropriate engagement of observers in meetings to ensure transparency standards are met.125  
 
A 2019 report argued that any performance review undertaken by an AusRFMO should include 
consideration of the perspectives of observers to the meetings and, importantly, the views of the 
private-sector.126 This thesis would agree and suggests that without requiring RFMO 
performance reviews to take into account the perspective of the private-sector and other 
observers, any attempt to identify and acknowledge the key issues within the organisation are 




The work of Henrik Österblom has provided the theoretical basis for this thesis and prompted the 
finding that the private-sector can drive institutional change in AusRFMOs.127 Österblom’s work 
demonstrates that the private-sector can and should contribute to the compliance capability of 
AusRFMOs. This finding has arisen as a result of research he has undertaken that demonstrates 
the positive impact of private-sector engagement in the CCAMLR.128 
 
The below recommendations are based on the author’s view that the private-sector and 
AusRFMOs share responsibility for the effective management and conservation of regional 
fisheries. There is no need to debate who is more responsible than the other; simply to 
acknowledge that any degree of responsibility entails the need to act in a manner that complies 
with the conservation measures of RFMOs. The recommendations can be considered by the 
private-sector as practical suggestions to potentially increase their engagement in the 





While AusRFMOs are encouraged to adopt policies to clarify their position with respect to 
observers and the private-sector, by the same token, it is recommended that the private-sector 
 
125 WWF and Greenpeace International, Deep Sea Conservation Coalition, ‘Performance reviews of regional fisheries 
management organizations and arrangement’, available online at: <http://www.savethehighseas.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/Joint-observer-submission-on-Performance-Reviews-of-RFMOs-March-30-2019-final.pdf>. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Henrik Österblom, PhD, Associate Professor, Deputy Science Director, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, 
SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden. 
128 Orjan Bodin and Henrik Osterblom, ‘International fisheries regime effectiveness: activities and resources of key actors in the 





adopt guidelines for their agreed approach to engaging with AusRFMOs. By empowering the 
private-sector to develop guidelines on how to best engage with AusRFMOs, experiences can be 
shared and successful approaches to working with different groups can be implemented.  
 
Such guidelines could be led by an organisation such as the World Oceans Council,129 or by a 
new group of interested parties comprised of private-sector groups operating in any given 
AusRFMO regardless of their target stock. This group could then communicate developments 
and liaise with the Secretariat of different organisations. The private-sector today must adapt to 
ensure business, social and ecological sustainability130 and recognise the benefit of uniting in 





This thesis has argued that today, a combination of sustainable leadership by corporations and 
flag State responsibility exists to govern global fisheries. Keystone actors in fisheries regimes are 
today, ‘profoundly involved in fisheries and aquaculture decision-making’132 however many have 
yet to assume the responsibility that comes with this role.133   
 
What is clear is that sustainable leadership by keystone actors could enable a critical transition 
towards improved management of marine living resources and ecosystems under the principle of 
corporate social responsibility.134 This principle can be utilised by corporations to frame their 
operations in a positive ethical light with the consumer; thereby enabling them to gain a business 
edge and often charge more for the product being sourced.135   
 
The adoption of corporate social responsibility by a corporation or otherwise will depend upon the 
willingness of the corporation to invest in sustainability and to trust in their counterparts within the 
relevant fishery.136  If corporations better engage their corporate social responsibility obligations, 
this would mean that AusRFMOs would be in a better position to engage with the private-sector 
and the private-sector would be in a better position to ensure compliance with the regime of 
AusRFMOs.    
 
129 Ibid. 
130 Suzanne Benn, Dexter Dunphy, Andrew Griffiths, Organizational Change for Corporate Sustainability, 3rd Ed, ‘Understanding 
Organizational Change’. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Österblom H, Jouffray J-B, Folke C, Crona B, Troell M, Merrie A, et al. (2015) Transnational Corporations as ‘Keystone 
Actors’ in Marine Ecosystems. PLoS ONE 10(5): e0127533. Available online at: 
<http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0127533>. 
133 Ibid 
134 Crane et al, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories’, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, 24. 
135 Ibid.  
136 Henrik Österblom and Orjan Bodin, ‘Global cooperation among diverse organisations to reduce illegal fishing in the Southern 









The private-sector may choose to engage in the work of an AusRFMO individually, or as a group, 
where a number of actors with similar incentives and values will band together to develop 
mechanisms in the interests of sustainability.137  Indeed, many methods of engagement by the 
private-sector in the compliance sphere of AusRFMOs are self-imposed, or association-based 
and can involve leveraging certification schemes to give effect to sustainable leadership.138   
 
As previously discussed, the principle of shared responsibility refers to situations where a 
‘multiplicity of actors contributes to a single harmful outcome, and legal responsibility for this 
harmful outcome is distributed among more than one of the contributing actors’.139 If the private-
sector can accept shared responsibility for regional fisheries compliance, they can benefit greatly 
from this responsibility. This can occur via an increase in the market value of their product, or, for 
example, by being allowed to fish in areas or for fisheries that have previously been restricted.  
 
If the private-sector can band together to undertake their own research into a fishery, or work 
with governments towards this same end, AusRFMOs will have a better scientific understanding 
of stock levels and can make better decisions as a result. It is suggested that these decisions 




The compliance mechanisms implemented by AusRFMOs have significantly contributed to 
strengthening the high seas fisheries regime by enforcing the conservation objectives of each 
region.140 This chapter has demonstrated that AusRFMOs have adopted a wide range of 
compliance mechanisms, but that more still needs to be done particularly in the field of trade-
related measures, graded sanctions and provisions relating to NCPs.  
 
The introductory section of this chapter explored how incentive-based approaches to compliance, 
when viewed in light of the principle of shared responsibility, represent the most effective 
approach to achieving compliance with conservation measures. The legal status of the resource-
 
137 Ibid.  
138 For example, utilising the Martine Stewardship Council for the purposes of certifying the fishing practices of individual 
entities or the sustainable nature of a fishery.  
139 Nollkaemper, above n 7. 
140 For instance, IUU Vessel Lists have been demonstrated to be effective in contributing to combat the mounting pressure of 
IUU fishing on increasingly vulnerable fish stocks.  Kristin Gunnarsdottir von Kistowski, 'Do RFMO IUU Vessel Lists Work? An 
Assessment of Compliance and Effectiveness' (Paper presented at the 5th International Forum on Illegal, Unreported and 





user in RFMOs was also examined to demonstrate the difficulties faced by the private-sector 
when seeking to engage directly via the forum provided by the RFMO.  
 
The chapter then undertook an analysis of the data presented in Chapter 5 to highlight the 
respective strengths and weaknesses of each AusRFMO. The analysis was undertaken by 
allocating each AusRFMO a status of ‘basic’, ‘satisfactory or ‘established’ with regard to their 
compliance capacity. This finding was then considered in light of the performance of the RFMO. 
 
The summary of compliance measures in place across AusRFMOs provided by Table 1 revealed 
that significant inconsistencies currently exist in terms of the degree and extent to which 
compliance mechanisms have been implemented in AusRFMOs.  While certain RFMOs might 
have recognised the need for action on a specific compliance problem within their framework 
agreement, this recognition must be translated into conservation measures if their true effect is to 
be felt.  
 
The chapter concludes that the six AusRFMOs under examination currently have a vastly 
different approach to compliance as demonstrated by the analysis of their founding agreements, 
as well as the compliance measures they have implemented. There is little uniformity across 
AusRFMOs with respect to their compliance regimes and this has resulted in a confusing 
situation for the resource-user.  
 
This chapter has also examined the ways in which the private-sector can contribute to the 
compliance capacity of AusRFMOs. Figure 2 was introduced to highlight how avenues for 
private-sector engagement can be categorised into ‘cooperative measures’, ‘benchmarking 
measures’, and ‘political measures’ to assist in understanding their operation and desired effect. 
Using this discussion of private-sector engagement mechanisms, the chapter went on to make 
recommendations for reform that may be adopted by both the AusRFMOs and the private-sector 
as they work together towards a stronger regime for regional fisheries.  
 
This chapter concludes that there is still significant work to be done to rebuild perceptions of the 
legitimacy of compliance-related conservation measures in AusRFMOs. In addition, there are 
challenges regarding the uniform implementation of compliance-related conservation measures. 
One way this may be addressed is by recognising that strengthening the legal mandates of 
AusRFMOs via additional conservation measures is not the only way to progress positive 
change.  
 
It is suggested that an alternative vision of compliance enforcement, where the private-sector 





significant promise in a modern regional fisheries climate. While it is indeed the flag State who is 
responsible for compliance with relevant RFMOs, this thesis suggests that limiting discussion on 
how to improve this compliance to consideration of flag State capacity alone does not reflect the 
practical influence of the private-sector. 
 
It concludes that instead, it should be recognised that private-sector engagement in the 
regulatory mandate of AusRFMOs represents an important opportunity to increase compliance 
rates by improving industry perceptions of regulatory legitimacy in AusRFMOs. There is 
significant work to be done to rebuild perceptions of the legitimacy of compliance conservation 
measures in AusRFMOs, and if we start to engage better with those who are directly impacted by 




























This thesis has established that effective fisheries management is the responsibility of numerous 
stakeholders including fishers, fisheries management authorities, fishery scientists and other 
groups engaging in the sustainability, regulation and exploitation of the resource.1 The 
implications of this reality are that fisheries managers alone are not always the best placed to 
take action to address problems within a particular fishery, or to fully understand the underlying 
causes of the problem in order to effectively address the situation.2  Co-operation and 
communication between all stakeholders in order to ensure open channels for information 
exchange, is fundamental to achieving sustainable global fisheries.3  
 
In addition to increased cooperative and communication efforts, the ability of the regulator to 
employ incentives to encourage the (often voluntary) engagement of the private sector in the 
regulatory sphere has proven an effective alternative where traditional governance approaches 
have failed.4 Today, fisheries regulators have an increasing body of evidence before them to 
suggest that leveraging the knowledge, information and skills of the resource-user to tackle new 
threats to stock sustainability is both logical and effective in achieving improved compliance 
rates.5 
 
This thesis has argued that where the regulator does not take into account the governance 
contribution of the private-sector, or where the private-sector does not demonstrate sustainable 
leadership, this can pose a significant risk to the sustainability of any given fisheries regime. It 
has been demonstrated that fishers and researchers working together can; ‘promote better 
science and management for fisheries, as well as effective communication and collaboration 
among fishing professionals in the region.’6 
 
 
1 Cochrane, K.L. (ed.) A fishery managers guidebook. Management measures and their application. FAO Fisheries Technical 
Paper. No. 424. Rome, FAO. 2002. 231p.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Andrew R Smith, Papers presented at the Expert Consultation on Sustainable Fishing Technologies and Practices: St. John's, 
Newfoundland, Canada, 1 - 6 March 1998 pp 145. 
4 Heather Goldstone, WGBH, ‘How Cooperative Research Could Ease Tensions Between Fishermen, Regulators’,  July 9 2013 
5 Tim S. Gray, ‘Participation in Fisheries Governance’, Springer Science & Business Media, 9Jan, 2006 - Science at 46.  
6 National Oceans and Atmospheric Administration, ‘Northeast Cooperative Research Program’ available online at 





One reason that engaging the private-sector in implementing regulatory effort has proven so 
effective may be that in doing so, responsibility transfer occurs, empowering those who are best 
placed to address the problem.7 This approach evokes the principle of shared responsibility. 
Instead of stock level declines and depleted fisheries being viewed as a problem for which the 
regulator is solely responsible, responsibility transfer occurs and onus is shared with the private-
sector.8  
 
An increase in the popularity of participative decision-making and compliance effort9 by the 
private-sector has resulted in important developments for the regional fisheries sector. In the 
case of one regional fisheries management organisation to which Australia is a party, the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, it has been argued that 
this engagement has improved the quality of decision-making by the organisation. In this way, 
the CCAMLR provides a model AusRFMOs may wish to adopt or learn from in developing and 
implementing their own version.  
 
Today, there is an increasing impetus for the private-sector to contribute to the governance of the 
fishery and innovate to adopt their own solutions to fisheries governance challenges. This thesis 
has argued that commentary on reform to fisheries governance all too often considers scientific, 
legal and institutional efforts to advance governance without recognising the importance of 
engaging the private-sector throughout this process.  
 
In this final chapter, the thesis will make its final conclusions to support the proposition that the 
ability of AusRFMOs to increase their engagement with the private-sector will be a critical 
determinant of their future compliance capacity.10 The results of the thesis demonstrate that a 
holistic, multi-sectoral and collaborative approach represents the best option for achieving 
effective reform to regional fisheries governance.  
 
To support these assertions, this chapter begins with a recap of the content and findings of 
previous chapters. When read as a whole, this thesis contains evidence to suggest that 
AusRFMOs can and should increase their engagement with the private-sector in the interests of 
achieving improved compliance outcomes for their respective fisheries. Additionally, the private-
sector should be encouraged to demonstrate sustainable leadership and assume shared 
 
7 United Nations Development Program, Civic Engagement, 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/topics_civic_engagement.html> 
accessed 1 November 2019. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Gray T.S. (2005) Theorising about Participatory Fisheries Governance. In: Gray T.S. (eds) Participation in Fisheries 
Governance. Reviews: Methods and Technologies in Fish Biology and Fisheries, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht available online 
at: <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/1-4020-3778-3_1#> 






responsibility for the resource, if it wishes to see an impact on the sustainability of global fish 
stocks. 
 
The next section of this chapter outlines a series of conclusions that are primarily based on the 
data and analysis contained in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. Chapter 6 demonstrates that 
there are commonalities in the type of compliance challenges facing AusRFMOs. This also 
means that there are commonalities when it comes to identifying how AusRFMOs may improve 
their compliance capacity.  
 
As outlined in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the author’s thesis submitted in fulfilment of 
the requirements for the Degree of Master of Laws (Thesis)11 in 2011 found little evidence of 
consistency across AusRFMOs in existence at the time with regard to the type of compliance 
measures in place. This thesis has found that almost a decade later, little has changed and the 
same group of organisations must continue to work towards a greater sense of unity in their 
compliance approach.  
 
This thesis goes a step further to demonstrate that the solution to the inconsistency across the 
compliance approach of AusRFMOs is likely to reside in their ability to engage the private-sector 
in their regulatory effort. It argues that by becoming a part of the solution, rather than the 
problem, the private-sector will be better placed to understand the impacts of their behaviour 
whether it be compliant or non-compliant behaviour.  
 
This chapter also concludes that based on the analysis undertaken in Chapter 3, there is no legal 
barrier preventing AusRFMOs from increasing private-sector engagement in their governance 
processes. AusRFMOs have the potential to better contemplate how they engage with the 
private-sector; constitutionally, philosophically, legislatively and procedurally. AusRFMOs also 
have significant scope to re-consider how and whether they are effectively engaging with the 
private-sector in the interests of improving their compliance capacity.   
 
The voluntary nature of international law means that there is a need for AusRFMOs to increase 
their engagement with the private-sector and work together in the management of the resource. 
In an era where traditional legal frameworks to secure the suitability of high seas fish stocks has 
been found wanting, AusRFMOs must now look beyond their internal compliance capacity to 
engage the private-sector if we are to see real progress for the sustainability of high seas fish 
stocks.   
 
 
11 Elise Clark, ‘Compliance enforcement in regional fisheries management organisations to which Australia is a party’, thesis 







This thesis has contributed to the wealth of information currently being collected on the 
performance of these organisations by analysing the ability of AusRFMOs to encourage greater 
compliance from both contracting and non-contracting parties.  This section summarises the key 
findings of Chapters 1 through 6 to establish a foundation for the general conclusions reached in 
the second section of this chapter. It is demonstrated that on a global level, there is a need for 
more effective cooperation between members of AusRFMOs and AusRFMOs themselves in the 
area of compliance enforcement. 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis highlighted the challenges posed by flag State jurisdiction and the need 
for increased recognition of the roles and responsibilities of the resource-user to enable change 
in the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs. It introduced the thesis as an opportunity to present a 
contemporary assessment of the compliance capacity of RFMOs to which Australia is a party.  
 
Chapter 1 went on to highlight ‘the problem’ by providing an overview of how unsustainable 
fishing in high seas areas has led to a global crisis of fisheries management. The need for a 
collaborative approach to governance of high seas fisheries was offered as a solution to this 
problem to increase the engagement of the private-sector regional fisheries management.  
 
The chapter goes on to argue that if sustainable fisheries are the objective, increased interaction 
between the government and the governed will always be of benefit to the work of AusRFMOs. 
To support this assertion, a brief case study of a recent advisory opinion issued by the ITLOS 
highlighted the complexities of reliance on flag State responsibility alone in a compliance context.  
 
Lastly, Chapter 1 outlined the structure of the thesis, and how the chapters are organised into 
three key segments. This includes the beginning chapters 1-4 which present the context for the 
thesis. Next, the empirical data is presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis. Ultimately, thesis 
conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.  
 
The second chapter of this thesis, entitled ‘Governance Theory and Research Methodology’ 
sought to explain the theoretical framework underpinning the analysis undertaken in later 
chapters. It examined the objectives of fisheries governance at a regional level, and the concepts 
of sustainable management and ecosystem-based management. These principles demonstrated 







The second chapter also explained that both rationalist and normative models of compliance are 
taken into consideration in this thesis. These models included deterrence and enforcement 
measures, as well as punitive approaches that seek to ‘name and shame’ non-compliance. It was 
also explained that normative approaches focus on cooperation and compliance assistance as a 
means to prevent non-compliance. 
 
Finally, the second chapter explained that the thesis seeksto test the hypothesis that there are 
significant inconsistencies between and amongst AusRFMOs in their adoption of conservation 
measures to support their compliance capacity. An assessment as to whether and where the 
main gaps exist between and amongst AusRFMOs was to be undertaken, assisted by insights 
from the performance reviews of AusRFMOs.    
 
Next, the thesis moved to examine in detail the AusRFMOs under examination in the thesis. 
Chapter 3 explores the mandate, geographic application and recent performance reviews of 
AusRFMOs. It examines how calls to qualitatively assess the performance of RFMOs led to the 
development of common criteria for the delivery of ongoing review and assessment. Currently, 
the practice of undertaking performance reviews and monitoring the implementation of 
associated finding has become common across RFMOs globally.  
 
The most recent performance reviews of each AusRFMO were examined to determine their 
respective compliance issues and areas for improvement. The basics of RFMO management 
were then explained, including the operation of conservation measures in RFMOs, their legal 
force and other key basics behind how RFMOs regulate.  
 
Chapter 4 comprised a stand-alone case study of how a specific compliance tactic adopted by 
the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) had made 
a significant contribution to the regulatory function of the organisation. This chapter analysed the 
rise of the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure (CCEP) and explored in detail how the 
CCEP contributed to the compliance capacity of the CCAMLR.  
 
Comprising, for the most part, an article co-authored by the author and the late Dr. Denzil Miller, 
Chapter 4 is relevant to many of the conclusions and recommendations made in this thesis but 
can also be viewed as a stand-alone case study. Chapter 4 found that the rise of the CCEP was 
one of the first of its kind and constituted a strong example of how compliance evaluation can 
function to effectively address instances of non-compliance in AusRFMOs.  
 
Chapter 5, entitled ‘Compliance-Related Conservation Measures in AusRFMOs’, identified and 





include cooperative policies, policies relating to non-contracting parties, policies relating to 
cooperating parties, vessel lists, requests and negotiations, diplomatic demarches, trade-related 
measures, graded sanctions and boarding and inspection and arrest. Each of the categories was 
clarified by Figure 1 which provides a graphic representation of the compliance capabilities of 
AusRFMOs.    
 
The penultimate chapter, Chapter 6, comprised the analytical basis of the thesis. It tabulated the 
data collected to determine how each of the AusRFMOs under examination is performing with 
regards to their compliance capacity. An overall compliance ranking of basic, developing or 
established was allocated to each AusRFMO with regard to its compliance capacity.  This finding 
was then considered in light of the performance of the RFMO in accordance with their most 
recent performance review outcomes. 
 
The findings of Chapter 6 highlighted the limitations of AusRFMOs and emphasised that 
compliance should now be viewed as a challenge to both the flag State, and the private-sector. 
To address this challenge, a series of specific recommendations were made for AusRFMOs and 
the private-sector to adopt.  
 
Recommendations included leveraging opportunities to engage the private-sector in compliance 
efforts, formally recognising the role of the private-sector in governance and involving private 
entities or associations in the decision-making process. It was demonstrated that in adopting 
these recommendations, the potential for the ‘regulated’ to perceive the measures to which they 
must conform as being legitimate would dramatically increase. 
 
Finally, the seventh and final chapter of this thesis concludes that efforts to improve the 
governance regime for high seas fisheries via amendment to international agreements or 
development of new agreements may be limited in effect.  It highlights that so long as the 
impacts of depletion of fish stocks continue to be felt by the ‘whole’, rather than the individual, 
significant governance challenges will remain in achieving sustainable fisheries.   
 
This final chapter demonstrates that applying the international legal principle of shared 
responsibility in AusRFMOs represents an exciting alternative to governance by RFMOs alone in 
the regional fisheries regime. This chapter draws an important connection between the voluntary 
nature of international law and international governance frameworks. It highlights that increasing 
government utilisation and engagement with the private-sector is beneficial to both parties but 








This chapter will now explore the conclusions that can be reached from the analysis undertaken 
in Chapters 5 and 6, combined with the contextual information presented in the introductory 
chapters. These conclusions are listed in order of the significance to the research undertaken in 
this thesis and are directly related to the recommendations made in Chapter 6.  
 
1) AusRFMOs continue to face serious challenges to their ability to achieve effective 
compliance outcomes.  
 
The findings of Chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis demonstrate that there remain significant 
inconsistencies in the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs. As a group, AusRFMOs have differing 
approaches to achieving compliance and have adopted varying compliance measures across the 
board. The result is that while some AusRFMOs have succeeded in building strong and resilient 
compliance regimes, others continue to struggle to adopt meaningful compliance measures for 
various reasons. The reasons some AusRFMOs struggle include:  a limited mandate as a result 
of the ways in which their constitution has been drafted, insufficient demonstration of the benefits 
to be gained from compliance, and a lack of political will to hold States parties to account for the 
actions of their flagged vessels.   
 
Arguably, intangible considerations such as operator attitudes towards the legitimacy of 
regulation,12 the method of compliance enforcement employed13 and perceptions as to the 
likelihood of apprehension are becoming increasingly important to the compliance capacity of 
AusRFMOs.14 The decision to fish responsibly or otherwise can be influenced by factors outside 
the traditional governance framework. 
 
2) Efforts to improve the governance regime for high seas fisheries via amendment to 
international agreements or development of new agreements may be limited in 
effect.   
 
As an extension of the findings of conclusion 1, this thesis concludes that it is time to consider 
reasonable alternatives to legislative reform or development to improve compliance rates in 
 
12  Davis, BW, The legitimacy of CCAMLR, Governing the Antarctic, Cambridge University Press, Stokke, Olav Schram and 
Vidas Davor (ed), Cambridge, UK, pp. 233-245. (1996). 
13 Darren S. Calley, ‘Market Denial and International Fisheries Regulation: The Targeted and Effective Use of Trade Measures 
Against the Flag of Convenience Fishing Industry’.  






AusRFMOs. Often it is the case that complex solutions to ‘improving’15 flag State responsibility 
and ‘strengthening’16 RFMOs continue to be at the centre of critical discourse on the problem of 
global fisheries management.   
 
However, this thesis recognises that in an environment where certain corporations take more fish 
from our oceans than an entire State on an annual basis, and have the capacity to ‘buy-out’ the 
resources of an entire State’s EEZ,17 any realistic solution to the compliance problem must 
consider both legislative reform and opportunities to better engage the private-sector.    
 
3) Applying the principle of shared responsibility to the RFMO regime provides an 
exciting alternative with respect to the impacts of fishing on the target stock, its 
environment and the associated ecosystems.  
 
As discussed in the introductory chapters of this thesis, the legal principle of shared responsibility 
represents an alternative approach to strengthening the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs. 
Today there exist examples of the private-sector assuming responsibility for the resource and 
creating a powerful counteractive to the activities of irresponsible fishers.18 The role and 
influence of a limited number of large companies on the high seas has only recently been 
recognised;19 however, it has long been the case that certain influential fishing companies can 
have a great influence on RFMO decision-making.20  
 
As previously discussed, the principle of shared responsibility is relatively new to the academic 
discourse but refers to the underexplored problem of the allocation of responsibilities among 
states and ‘other actors’. 21 This principle has particular relevance in international environmental 
law where the example of high seas fish stocks management is often cited as a demonstrative of 
the principle of shared responsibility. This is because it poses challenging questions relating to 
who is responsible for the over-exploitation of high seas fish stocks.  
 
The principle of shared responsibility seeks to address the challenges posed by multiple actors 
contributing to harmful environmental outcomes.22 The determination of responsibility for such 
 
15 Michael W Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: Report of an 
Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, (2007), ix 
available online at: <http://www.oecd.org/sd-roundtable/papersandpublications/39374297.pdf>  
16 Ibid.  
17 Henrik Österblom, ‘A handful of corporations could hold the answer to crisis in the seafood industry’, The Guardian, available 
online at <http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/may/28/seafood-industry-overfishing-corporations-control-
potential-solution>  
18 Margaret Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes in International Law, 305. 
19 Österblom, above n 17.  
20 Österblom, above n 17. 
21 Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law. (2014). In A. Nollkaemper & I. Plakokefalos (Eds.), Principles of 
Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art (Shared Responsibility in International Law, p. I). 






outcomes can become challenging and often, the law does not allow for the shared allocation of 
responsibility and blame. It has been asserted in this thesis that in reality, often key-stone actors, 
or members of the private-sector, have greater influence over the future of global fisheries 
resources than States. Therefore, the private-sector should share the same responsibilities as 
States parties to AusRFMOs.  
 
It has been demonstrated that international law recognises States as the bearers of 
responsibility, however, states can only act through individuals or private corporations. This 
regime must at least address certain questions concerning the interaction between the private-
sector and AusRFMOs in order to move forward in a logical way towards sustainability.23  
 
It is well recognised that regulatory authorities should constantly be concerned with maintaining 
the involvement of participants in the regime they administer. However, there is a gap in legal 
discourse relating to the regional fisheries regime in considering how RFMOs in general interact 
with the private-sector. This thesis has asserted that this statement is particularly true in a 
compliance sense.   
 
If cooperative action between the private-sector and RFMOs increases, so does the strength of 
the argument that responsibility for regional fisheries failures is shared by both the State (often 
via the RFMO convention) and the resource user.  This thesis has applied the principle of shared 
responsibility to suggest that AusRFMOs will benefit from increased engagement by the private-
sector in the regulatory compliance sphere.  
 
It seeks to demonstrate that the strongest regional regimes are those which extend beyond 
conventional notions of flag State compliance to leverage industry compliance mechanisms and 
engage with the opportunities they provide.  As the frequency and variety of cooperative action 
between States and non-State actors increases, there is a need for new perspectives that help to 
address how RFMOs might develop approaches that better serve the interests of injured parties 
under regional fisheries regimes. 
 
Many influential fishing corporations have yet to demonstrate their uptake of responsible 
management measures to ensure the long term best-interests of high seas fisheries.24 However, 
if AusRFMOs can enshrine the principle of shared responsibility in their founding agreements, 
and adopt an approach consistent with this principle in practice, this would represent an exciting 









4) The ability of AusRFMOs to incentivise compliance with their regime is critical to 
achieving sustainable fisheries. 
 
Where it appears the private-sector is acting from a sense of corporate social responsibility, 
AusRFMOs should explore every opportunity to provide incentives for such behaviour. In a 
governance context, the primary determinants of success relate to the institutional structure of 
the regulatory authority, and whether the authority has implemented incentives for participants. 
 
In the context of AusRFMOs, it has been demonstrated that certain fishing organisations have 
taken it upon themselves to promote compliance within their own networks and have created 
initiatives to preserve the marine living resources of the Antarctic. Industry has harnessed 
measures including sustainability reporting, eco-labelling and certifications, monitoring and 
compliance schemes and the adoption of fishing associations to increase engagement in the 
governance of international fisheries.   
 
However, the most effective AusRFMO compliance regimes will be those that incentivise 
compliance with their conservation measures to show that the benefits to be gained from 
complying can be greater than those to be gained by non-compliance.   
 
5) There is no legal barrier preventing AusRFMOs from increasing private-sector 
engagement in the making of conservation measures.  
 
It has been shown that currently, few AusRFMOs are fully utilising and involving the private-
sector in governance practices. Where examples of effective industry engagement do exist, there 
remains significant potential to provide the private-sector with greater responsibilities and 
autonomy over the resource, thereby legitimising perceptions of the regulator and empowering 
the resource-user.  
 
AusRFMOs have the potential to better contemplate how they incorporate and engage industry, 
constitutionally, philosophically, legislatively and procedurally.  They have significant scope to re-
consider how and whether they are currently leveraging industry initiatives in conservation 
measures and in their approach to governance.  
 
However, it is also recognised that obstacles including irresponsible fishers and jurisdictional 
issues can pose challenge to the effective implementation of this conclusion.  Despite this, 
AusRFMOs can and should improve efforts to engage and consult with the private-sector in the 






Information gathering on the nature of a management challenge, analysis of the underlying 
causes of the challenge, and planning of reform should all be informed by and often prompted by 
consultation with the persons being managed. While their role is not to make any binding 
decisions to address the situation, open streams of communication and cooperation between the 
regulator and the regulated will clearly be fundamental to the ultimate management decision 




Some have argued that a ‘transition to sustainable development’25 must occur if governments are 
to ensure the future development of life on our planet. This thesis argues that in a fisheries 
context, this means achieving a synergy between public and private regulation. This thesis has 
argued that where law and diplomacy fail, increased incentive-based regulation and voluntary 
engagement by the private-sector will provide a viable alternative to ensure the effective 
regulation of the resource.  
 
The premise of the thesis is that fishing industry associations and individuals can and have 
assumed responsibility for regional fisheries failures. In doing so, these organisations have 
assumed a significant compliance function and associated responsibilities. By documenting this 
trend in AusRFMOs and analysing its impacts upon the compliance capability of these 
organisations, this thesis hopes to demonstrate that the global challenge of unsustainable 
fisheries is not a problem for RFMOs alone to answer. Indeed, it is one RFMOs cannot and 
should not tackle alone.  
 
The private-sector operating in regional fisheries can and should assume shared responsibility 
for the resource. This thesis has examined examples whereby this is already occurring in the 
Southern Ocean. The thesis has recommended that if AusRFMO and the private-sector are able 
to better engage and unite to achieve compliance objectives, responsibility transfer can occur, 
empowering the ‘regulated’ who are well placed to achieve compliance outcomes.  
 
The ‘transition to sustainable development’,26 means that AusRFMOs must engage the private-
sector in decision-making and by the same token, the private-sector must connect with their 
responsibilities. This thesis recommends that failures of fisheries governance should no longer 
be seen as a problem for AusRFMOs alone to resolve and that the compliance capacity of these 
organisations is today, inherently connected to the responsibilities assumed by their respective 
sector.  
 
25 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, Transmitted to the General 
Assembly as an Annex to UN Doc A/42/427 (20 March 1987) (‘The Brundtland Report’) at para 53. 






Effective fisheries governance, particularly international fisheries governance, will benefit from a 
synergy between public and private regulation. A wealth of corporation-driven sustainability 
mechanisms have evolved in recent decades in an effort to address the deepening crisis of 
declining global fisheries. There are many examples where the private-sector has harnessed 
measures including sustainability reporting, eco-labelling, and monitoring and compliance 
schemes and to increase their engagement in the international fisheries governance space.  
Recent evidence suggests that this trend is on the increase.27 
 
This thesis has touched on, but has not been primarily focussed on, the motivations of the 
private-sector when it comes to engaging with the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs.  Indeed, 
corporate social responsibility28 can mean different things depending upon the philosophical or 
political standpoint from which it is being approached.29 However, what is clear is that economic 
success in the long run cannot be achieved unless, ‘employees, customers, suppliers, local 
communities and others with an interest in companies’ activities’30 are taken into account by the 
private-sector.   
 
This thesis contends that when the private-sector responds to social demands with policies, 
programs and tangible results,31 responsibility transfer occurs and the regulatory regime 
becomes stronger.  The private-sector has significant power to encourage change and such 
power entails responsibility. Today, this means that a company may be vulnerable to risk if its 
approach is contrary to the way its customers expect it to behave.    
 
Where the private-sector can demonstrate sustainable leadership, they can strengthen existing 
legal provisions, build fishery compliance and fill their own governance gaps without requiring 
international fisheries arrangements to be modified or new agreements to be developed. That is 
the crux of the findings of this thesis. Sustainable change in the regional fisheries sector can and 
should occur via many methods and private-sector engagement with their responsibilities is just 
one avenue for this to occur.  
 
In the last decade, a multitude of international organisations and high-profile critics have stepped 
up the pressure on RFMOs to have a real impact on global fisheries. This pressure has, in turn, 
led to a focus on performance-based assessment.32  However, it is only the performance of 
AusRFMOs and other RFMOs globally that is being assessed via such methods. This thesis 
 
27 Österblom, above n 17. 
28 Andrew Crane Guido Palazzo Laura J. Spence Dirk Matten, Contesting the Value of “Creating Shared Value”, California 
Management Review VOL 56, No. 2 2014 at 11.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at 17. 
31 Ibid at 4 





argues that we must go beyond consideration of the compliance capacity of AusRFMOs and look 
to the compliance capacity of the private-sector if we are to achieve a true understanding of the 
state of the fishery.  
 
As highly politicised and sensitive organisations, AusRFMOs are continually held to account for 
the decisions that they make. They seek to make progress in the field of fisheries conservation 
and management. This thesis has demonstrated that there is another party, the private-sector, 
which should equally be held to account for the state of global fisheries and the progress of 









10-03 provides that 
where an act of non-
compliance has 
occurred, CPs must 
cooperate with the flag 
State of the vessel to 
take appropriate action. 
Resolution 19/XXI 
urges all CPs and 
NCPs to cooperate to 
ensure that their 
nationals do not 
engage in or support 
IUU fishing.  
 




Contracting Parties” to 
encourage accession 
and compliance.   
Resolution 98/05 
provides that the 
Chairman of the IOTC 
should send a letter to all 
NCPs known to have 
vessels fishing in the 
IOTC Area to cooperate 
and become members to 
the Commission. 
 
Article IV of the IOTC 
Agreement provides CPs 
should cooperate to 
encourage any State to 
become a member to the 
Agreement.   
 
Article V of the IOTC 
Agreement provides that 
the IOTC shall 
encourage, recommend 
and coordinate 
information sharing.   
Articles 13 and 14 of the 
CCSBT Convention 
provide that CPs must 
cooperate to invite 
membership by any State 
not party to the 
Convention if their 
nationals fish for 
southern bluefin tuna 
(SBT). 
Part V of the WCPFC 
Convention provides 
States should 
cooperate to allow easy 
exchange of 
information.  Under this 
section of the 
Convention CPs are 
also required to 
cooperate to establish 
effective mechanisms 
for monitoring, control 
and surveillance. 
Article 19 of the 
SPRFMO Convention 
provides that members 
of the Commission 
must cooperate to 
enhance the ability of 
developing States to 
conserve and manage 
fishery resources.  It 
provides that such 
cooperation should 
occur via the provision 
of financial assistance, 
technical assistance 
and the transfer of 
technology. 
Article 6 of the 
Agreement provides that 
the Meeting of Parties 
should promote 
cooperation among CPs 
to ensure conservation 
measures are adopted in 













acceding States and 
NCPs to implement the 
Catch Documentation 
Resolution 01/03 
provides that evidence 
that NCP vessels are 
fishing contrary to IOTC 
regulations should be 
Article 15 of the CCSBT 
Convention provides that 
States Parties should 
draw the attention of 
NCPs to the activities of 
The “Conservation and 
Management Measure 
for Vessels Without 
Nationality” provides 
that such vessels are 
Article 32 of the 
Convention provides 
that members of the 
Commission must take 
measures to deter the 
Under Article 6 of the 
Agreement, the Meeting 
of Parties is charged with 
drawing the attention of 
NCPs to activities which 





Scheme (CDS) as soon 
as possible. 
Article X of the CAMLR 
Convention provides 
that the Commission 
must draw the attention 
of a NCP to any activity 
undertaken by its 
nationals or vessels 
which affects the 
implementation of the 
objectives of the 
CCAMLR.   
 
reported and the flag 
State should be made 
aware.  
its nationals, residents or 
vessels which may affect 
the attainment of the 
objectives of the 
Convention. 
presumed to be 
operating in 
contravention of the 
Convention.   
detrimental activities of 
vessels flying the flag 
of NCPs.  Such 
incidences should be 
reported to the 
Commission along with 
any action taken 
against NCPs. 
 
CMM 15-06 applies 
certain requirements to 
‘Vessels without 
Nationality in the 
SPRFMO Convention 
Area’. 
undermine the objectives 
of the Agreement.  
 
Article 6(4) of the 
Agreement provides that 
the Meeting of Parties 
can review the 
participation opportunities 
of NCPs by taking into 
account their 
implementation of 




Measure on Vessels 
without Nationality’ 
makes publically 
available the actions 







10-08 recognises the 
right of CPs to take 
action in response to 
acts of non-compliance 




agencies of CPs and 
cooperating non-parties 
(CNPs) should cooperate 
to investigate allegations 
concerning the 
The “Resolution on action 




requires CPs and CNPs 
Article 25 of the 
Convention provides 
that no CP shall allow 
vessels to be used for 
fishing species covered 
by the Convention 
Under Article 24 of the 
Convention, CPs must 
take all necessary 
measures to ensure the 
effectiveness of 
conservation 
measures.  CPs must 
Article 10 of the 
Agreement provides that 
flag States are 
responsible for any 
breach of a conservation 
measure that might 






urges all CPs to pursue 
diplomatic and other 
action to encourage 




Article X of the 
Convention provides 
that the Commission 
shall draw attention of 
CPs to any activity 
which affects 
compliance by CP with 
obligations.   
 
Article XXI of the 
Convention provides 
CPs must ensure they 
take appropriate 
measures to ensure 
compliance.  
 
engagement of their 
nationals in IUU fishing. 
 
Article X of the IOTC 
Agreement references 
the need for CPs to 
ensure they take action 
under national legislation 
to impose penalties 
against violations of the 
Agreement.  
 
to submit an action plan 
on compliance. 
 
Article 5 of the 
Convention provides that 
CPs shall take all 
necessary action to 
ensure enforcement and 
compliance with binding 
measures.  
 
unless authorised to do 
so.  
  
Article 23(5) of the 
Convention provides all 
CPs must take 
measures to ensure 
their nationals and 
fishing vessels comply 
with the provisions of 
the Convention.  
report to the 
Commission on an 
annual basis to 
demonstrate how 
compliance has been 
achieved. 
 
Under Article 25 of the 
Convention CPs must 
take all necessary 
measures to ensure 
compliance by vessels 
flying their flag.  This 




Article 26 of the 
Convention provides 
that port States have a 
duty to take measures 






violations by their 
nationals or fishing 
vessels.   
 
Article 11 of the 
Agreement provides CPs 
must take all measures to 
ensure that their fishing 
vessels comply with the 
provisions of the 
Agreement.  
 
Article 17(4) of the 
Agreement requires CPs 
to request NCPs to 





establishes a compliance 
and monitoring scheme 
for the SIOFA which 
includes a compliance 









10-07 establishes a 
NCP IUU Vessel List 
and provides that such 
vessels be identified on 
an annual basis.  
 
Conservation Measure 
10-02 requires all CPs 
to ensure their vessels 
are licensed to fish in 
the Convention Area. 
Resolution 09/03 
provides for the creation 
of the IOTC IUU Vessel 
List to record vessels 
presumed to have carried 
out IUU fishing in the 
IOTC Area. 
The CCSBT has a 
‘Resolution on 
establishing a List of 
Vessels Presumed to 
have Carried Out Illegal, 
Unregulated and 
Unreported Fishing 
Activities for Southern 
Bluefin Tuna’. 
The WCPFC IUU 
Vessel List is 
established via the 
“Conservation Measure 
to Establish a List of 
Vessels Presumed to 
have Carried out Illegal, 
Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing 
Activities in the 
Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean”.  
The creation of a 
SPRFMO IUU Vessel 
List is required under 
Article 27 of the 
Convention. 
 
CMM 04-2017 is 
entitled ‘Establishing a 
List of Vessels 
Presumed to have 
Carried Out IUU 
Fishing Activities in the 
SPRFMO Convention 
Area’. 
CMM-06 establishes the 
SIOFA IUU Vessel List to 
name and shame vessels 
and flag States engaged 
in IUU fishing in the 






acceding States and 
NCPs to implement the 
Catch Documentation 
Scheme (CDS) as soon 
as possible.  
 
Resolution 15/XXII 
urges all CPs to require 
their vessels to land 
catches in States that 
are fully implementing 
the CDS.   
 
Recommendation 03/04 
urges three specific 
States (the Seychelles, 
Vanuatu and Japan) to 
implement cooperative 
management frameworks 
effectively and to 
continue to report to the 
IOTC in this regard. 
  Under Article 8, the 
SPRFMO Commission 
must adopt measures 
to prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing.  
 
Article 11 of the 
SPRFMO Convention 
provides for the 
creation of a 
Compliance and 
Technical Committee to 








urges all CPs to pursue 
diplomatic and other 
action to encourage 






10-07 provides CPs 
should not take any 
trade measures against 
vessels as a result of 
their inclusion on the 
IUU Vessel List.  
 
Conservation Measure 
10-05 provides that the 
Commission is 
committed to taking 
steps to ensure fish are 





acceding States and 
NCPs to implement the 
CDS as soon as 
possible. 
Resolution 10/10 on 
market related measures 
provides a legally binding 
measure to take 
measures against CPs 
and NCPs who 
repeatedly fail to 
discharge their 
obligations. In the case of 
CPs, action such as the 
reduction of existing 
quotas or catch limits 
should be first carried out 
before market-related 
measures are adopted.   
The “Resolution on the 
Implementation of a 
CCSBT Catch 
Documentation Scheme” 
covers all landings, 
transhipments, exports, 
imports and re-exports of 
SBT and requires whole 
SBT be tagged at the 
time of the kill.  
 
The 2017 ‘Resolution for 
a CCSBT Scheme for 
Minimum Standards for 
Inspection in Port’ 
requires that foreign 
fishing vessels must 
meet certain notification 
requirements. 
 
Article 15 of the 
Convention provides that 
Parties should cooperate 
Under the 
“Conservation Measure 
to Establish a List of 
Vessels Presumed to 
have Carried out Illegal, 
Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing 
Activities in the 
Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean”, 
members may take 
non-discriminatory 
trade measures to 
eliminate the activities 
of IUU listed vessels.  
 
Article 27 of the 
Convention provides 
port States may adopt 
regulations to prohibit 
landings and 
transhipments where 
catch has been taken in 
Article 8 of the 
Convention provides 
that the Commission 
must adopt procedures, 
including non-
discriminatory trade 
measures, to ensure 
compliance.  To this 




international law to 
assess flag State 
performance. 
 
Article 27 of the 
Convention contains 
further references to 
the implementation of 
trade related measures. 
 
CMM-08 establishes 
measures to implement 
port-state inspections to 
detect and apprehend 





in taking trade restrictive 
measures to deter fishing 
activities for SBT where 
such action could affect 
the attainment of the 
objectives of the 
Convention.  
 
a manner which 
undermines the 





for Minimum Standards 
for Port State 
Measures’ (2017-02) 
requires all vessels to 
adhere to the 
Agreement on Port 
State Measures.  
 
Article 25(11) of the 
Convention authorises 
the Commission to 
develop procedures to 
allow for non-
discriminatory trade 
measures to be taken 
against any State 
undermining the 
objectives of the 
Commission.   
CMM-07. ‘Minimum 
Standards of Inspection 
in Port” can assist in 
imposing trade 





10-03 provides that 
where an act of non-
compliance has 
Resolution 99/02 
provides that action be 
taken against the 
activities of “flag of 
The “Resolution on 
establishing the CCSBT 
Vessel Monitoring 
System” provides that all 
Article 25 of the 
Convention provides 
that where it has been 
established that a 
Article 3 of the 
Convention provides 







occurred, CPs will take 
appropriate action and, 
if necessary, apply 
sanctions to that 
vessel. 
 
Article XXI of the 
Convention provides 
sanctions may be 
imposed by States in 
response to non-
compliance by their 
flagged vessels or 
nationals.   
 
convenience” vessels 
including denying vessels 
a license to fish and 




provides that the IOTC 
Compliance Committee 
should develop a scheme 
of sanctions to provide 
greater direction in 
dealing with non-
compliance.  
CPs and CNPs take 
measures to ensure the 
owners of vessels are 
citizens or legal entities 
within the flag State to 
allow punitive action to 
be taken. 
 
Article 15 of the 
Convention provides that 
Parties should take 
appropriate measures to 
prevent their registered 
vessels from transferring 
registration to avoid 
compliance with the 
CCSBT.  
member vessel has 
been non-compliant, 
States must ensure that 
the vessel ceases 
fishing activities until 






to deprive offenders of 
the benefits to be 







10-04 requires CPs to 
ensure that their 







provides that vessels 
fishing contrary to IOTC 
regulations should be 
inspected and all 
landings and 
transhipments by the 
vessel should be 




provides for a control and 
The CCSBT “Resolution 
on Establishing a 
Program for 
Transhipment by Large-
Scale Fishing Vessels” 
recognises the need to 
ensure monitoring of 
transhipment in areas 
beyond national 
jurisdiction.   
 
The “Resolution on 
establishing the CCSBT 





provide each member 
must ensure that their 
vessels comply with its 
provisions and that any 
harmful evidence 
obtained from such 
inspections be referred 
to the authorities. 
Article 8 of the 
Convention provides 
that the Commission 
must develop and 
establish effective 








Article 6(1) of the 
Agreement provides that 
the Meeting of Parties 
shall develop rules 
concerning the boarding 
and inspection of vessels 
operating in the Area. 
 
Article 11(1) of the 
Agreement provides that 
CPs should take 
measures to ensure that 












establishes a vessel 
monitoring system in the 
IOTC Area to standardise 
the systems adopted by 
CPs. 
Vessel Monitoring 
System” provides all CPs 
and CNPs are to ensure 
that no vessels carry out 
IUU fishing activities.   
 
Article 10 of the 
Convention provides 
that CPs must 





was adopted in 2015. 
This procedure is 
supported by the 
SPRFMO Observer 
Programme which 
entered into force in 
April 2019.   
 
CMM 06 creates the 
SPRFMO VMS and in 
2019, the SPRFMO 
Compliance and 
Monitoring Scheme 
was established to 




CMM 12 ‘Regulation of 
Transhipment and 
Other Transfer 
Activities’ supports the 
detection and 
apprehension of IUU 
fishing activities.  
vessel monitoring 
system” for fishing 
vessels flying their flag. 
 
CMM 2018-10 specifies 
requirements for a SIOFA 
VMS, entry and reporting 
requirements, as well as 
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